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ABSTRACT 
The emergence of Concurrent Engineering has caused growing demands on project 
management. The classic project management methods are often slow: problems may already 
exist when those methods are applied. The objective of the present study is to improve the 
opportunities of those responsible for a project’s operational management to receive advance 
information about potential problems and final results through early warnings typical of the 
theory of weak signals by Igor Ansoff. 
The research examines the background of Ansoff’s theory, the way in which project 
theories treat project problems, the causes of problems, and possible early warnings. Other 
aspects of the phenomenon investigated in this study include its relation to project risk 
management and its communicational character. 
A survey of the relevant literature shows that project literature contains some discussion of 
early warnings. However, only a few studies have the phenomenon as their main focus; 
similarly, research on the Ansoff theory is sparse. A number of studies concerning early 
warnings can be found in other fields, such as military science and general business 
economics. In addition, communications studies are familiar with the concept of weak signals, 
which is analogous to the concept of early warnings. 
An examination of project literature shows that certain factors in a project  - early warnings 
detected in project work, project problems, and the causes of those problems  may form 
chains. The interpretation of these factors may vary depending on the perspective and the time 
of observation. In addition, they can to some extent be considered subsets of one set (as 
defined by set theory). 
The research was conducted using a qualitative research method. A total of seventeen 
project experts were interviewed using the semistructured (thematic) interview method, which 
was also used to identify and examine early warnings in four case projects. Almost 900 such 
statements were observed. These observations were grouped according to similar 
characteristics, after which the various factors were analyzed qualitatively as well as according 
to percent distributions, both individually and through multiple attribute examination.  
The empirical research shows that stimuli (signals, messages) that comply with 
communications theory can be found in the project environment. These signals and messages 
are always to some degree inaccurate, and making decisions based on them is difficult. To 
clarify the meaning of these messages, the present study examines the general character of the 
early warnings phenomenon and designs an explanatory model that illustrates the 
communicative character of the phenomenon as well as the stages of decision-making. Further, 
the study develops a hierarchical classification of warning signals, complete with signal type 
categorization and descriptive typology, and draws up categorizations to help in signal 
identification. The categorizations are formed using eight (8) different factors. In addition, the 
relationship between early warnings, project problems, and problem causes is investigated; the 
dependence network designed of these three factors plus the responses they require furnishes 
some of the most important data for further utilization. 
Furthermore, this study designs a fundamental model for the utilization of the early 
warnings phenomenon. This model, and the results of the present research in general, can be 
used to identify early warnings.  For the present, the data provided by this research have to be 
handled manually, which may be somewhat laborious. To aid utilization in the future, the study 
proposes a way to incorporate early warnings to the Risk Management Knowledge-Based 
program created by Kiyoshi Niwa.  
The study provides project management and project risk management theories with 
additional information about the early warnings phenomenon, which has not been extensively 
studied, but which is widely known among project management specialists. The study defines 
the phenomenon and makes it easier to comprehend. A broader utilization of the phenomenon, 
however, requires further research. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1  Background 
Since prehistoric times, man’s activities have included project-type undertakings.  
The pyramids of Egypt, the road networks of Rome, and many ancient war 
expeditions match the characteristics of a project. According to historical records, 
these have even been implemented in conformity with surprisingly modern 
principles of project management [Lientz et al -95]. Great operations and 
undertakings by the Allied forces during the Second World War (such as the 
Manhattan Project and the north Africa and European landings) were apparently 
implemented using thoroughly developed project-type methods [Cleland -94]. 
When project theories were first beginning to be developed, a project was 
defined as an undertaking that accomplishes a set goal within a designated budget 
and a specified time frame. Nowadays the term project is understood in a broader 
sense; in PMBOK [-95] it is defined as follows: Project: Any undertaking with a 
defined starting point and defined objectives by which completion is identified. In 
practice, most project depend on finite or limited resources by which the objectives 
are to be accomplished. [PMBOK  -95, pp. 3.4]. For more about project theories, see 
section 2. 
The areas of usage for the now-classic project management methods have 
typically been construction, the development of weapons systems and industrial 
investments. In the United States in the 1960s, the direction of development was 
dictated by the needs of the U.S. Navy (the Polaris submarine project) [Cleland -94].  
As a result of this, the Program Evaluation and Review Technique method (PERT) 
was developed, and the needs of industry taken into account in the form of the 
Critical Path Method (CPM). The project approach was widely used elsewhere in 
U.S. government undertakings as well, initially within the Department of Defense 
(DoD), the NASA (the Apollo Program) and the Department of Energy (DoE) 
during the 1970s; it is also extensively used today in all public undertakings in the 
U.S. [Cleland -94]. The 1970s introduced the so-called mega-projects, which 
entailed risks far greater and more complex than ever before [Bent -82]. Another 
new area of application during the 1970s was research projects, notably within the 
medical field [PMI-81]. 
Today, the project management approach is used in almost all areas of 
commercial and human life, in product development and in company restructuring. 
One significant area of application is the management of contracts, such as the 
construction and delivery of ships or factory equipment, as independent projects. 
The driving force in the course of development has been the effect that the theories 
of project management and project leadership on the one hand, and their areas of 
application on the other, have had on each other.  When existing methods are tried in 
a new area, new requirements are perceived, leading to further development of the 
methods.  
The character of projects varies greatly depending on the industrial field. 
Traditional building projects and industrial plant investment projects are, once the 
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decision to implement has been made, very static as regards the cost estimate and 
schedule. Delivery projects, as well, are static once the contract has been signed. On 
the other hand, research and product development projects are usually fairly well 
adjustable, especially in their early stages. The objectives of these projects can be 
recast completely as new ideas crop up. Once the work progresses the objectives are 
usually clarified; in that case it may be legitimate to view the later stages of that 
project as a new, clearly defined project.  
The preliminary stages of investment projects (brainstorming, prefeasibility 
study and feasibility study) greatly resemble research and product development 
projects. When the management of a company decides to carry out an investment, 
the goals of that investment are defined. The investment project becomes final and 
"irrevocable" once the main equipment orders have been placed. 
In the 1990s, projects have become increasingly important as a component of 
management methodology, as compared to the 1970s. Projects have become more 
complex and require ever-speedier implementation. Quick implementation will also 
generate savings in project costs. The availability of resources is more limited and 
cost pressure leads to a demand of their more effective use. In addition, the risk of 
failure has grown, especially within the field of product development. 
  
1.2  Matters Affecting Project Work 
Project work (see terminology: This term is used in the general meaning of “an 
undertaking carried out in the form of a project.”) has always been characterized by 
a short implementation period. Projects are bound and limited by time (this, indeed, 
is one part of the definition of a project). Implementation personnel appear to be 
taken by surprise as problems emerge during implementation, and these problems 
usually require a very swift reaction. They fulfill the characteristics of strategic 
surprises as applied to project work, outlined by Igor Ansoff [Ansoff-84]. 
Implementation due to the pressure for changes exerted by various factors requires 
great flexibility. Project management literature contains numerous presentations of 
trends that affect project management and project leadership, (see e.g. [Kezsbom et 
al. -89] [Lientz et al. -95] [Lewis -93] [Harrison-93] [Cleland -94] [Kerzner -95]. 
The concept of “fast tracking” is one of the commonly used devices, which the 
developers of project work have aspired to respond to the requirement of 
implementing projects in an ever-shorter time. A more modern term appears to be 
“concurrent project management” [Lewis -93]. The idea is to implement the various 
life-cycle phases of the project in an overlapping manner: simultaneously to a 
degree, instead of successively, as is the traditional practice in project 
implementation. Overlapping the main phases demands good cooperation between 
the various disciplines of project people (engineers, designers), suppliers and 
contractors, so that the next phase of work may be launched on the basis of initial, 
not fully confirmed data. Concurrent Engineering related thinking is employed here.  
Concurrent Engineering, involves the various functional areas of a company 
working, as much as possible simultaneously, instead of successively. This approach 
has also been introduced into project work. For example the goal of Concurrent 
Engineering in product development is to save time. The methods of project 
management have proven to be advantageous in this type of activity, and therefore 
mutually enhancing.  
 
1.3  Contemporary Challenges of Project Work 
This chapter presents factors central to project management on an operational 
level. These factors form the main premises of this study. 
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The increasing expectations of the various parties, especially those of the project 
owner (the customer, the upper management, SEO), influence projects of all types. 
This, in turn, affects everything in project work. Above all, fierce competition 
affects product development projects, but it also plays a role in investment projects 
and in various delivery projects. The danger in product development projects is that 
the product is not ready in time, thereby allowing someone else to gain the market. 
The investment project must be completed under the date set by the competitive 
situation, with the highest possible quality and the lowest possible cost.  Equipment 
suppliers will have to price their orders with ever-smaller profit margins and to 
implement them with ever-tighter schedules. 
With the advent of the general trend of quality thinking, quality requirements as 
well as the implementation and the final result of a project have received added 
emphasis. Both the significance of quality as a competitive factor and the wide 
scope of quality have been recognized. The important issue is that the end users on 
the customer's side are satisfied, in which case the participants in the project can use 
the quality achieved as a valuable reference later on. The financial demands have 
tightened. Cleland [-94, pp. 15 and 105] presents several good examples of projects 
that have played a crucial role in the weak yield achieved by the company. Similar 
cases can also be found in Finland [Nikander-98]. The project director's personal 
goals with regard to profit and career development also affect the implementation of 
the project and the methods of management and leadership that he or she employs. 
Due to the relatively short time span involved, abruptness has always been a 
characteristic of the problems that appear during the implementation of a project. 
These problems seem to come as a complete surprise to the implementation 
personnel. This impression is enhanced by the use of the method of Concurrent 
Engineering by project work professionals to counter the tightening schedule 
requirements, which leads to a situation where a disturbance in a particular activity 
of a project is more prone to influence other activities as well as the final result of 
the whole project. In addition, the activities must be begun with less and less initial 
data, and they are increasingly dependent upon the well-timed data produced by 
previous activities. Project problems have constantly more characteristics in project 
work that are similar to the strategic issues raised by Ansoff in corporate activities 
[Ansoff-84].  The apparently sudden emergence of problems is accentuated by the 
lack of reaction by project leaders (on account of reluctance or other reasons) to 
slight deviations from the plan in regard to schedules, costs, or technical details.  In 
the experience of this researcher the leaders have in some cases even prohibited the 
noting of minor deviations in routine reports. 
All of the aspects discussed above show how risks in project work have 
multiplied as awareness of those risks and project risk management have improved 
[Kezsbom et al. -89] [Lientz et al. -95] [Lewis -93] [Harrison-93] [Cleland -94] 
[Kerzner -95] [Artto -94] [Kähkönen -96] [PMBOK -95]  [AACE -95] [Chapman 
and Ward -97]. The demand for ever-quicker implementation with ever-smaller 
resources is an essential issue in all situations. The basic problem is the lack of time 
and the fact that there is no room for failure. There is no time for remedial measures; 
moreover, these would mean additional costs. It would seem that project leaders 
need to more effectively anticipate the future; i.e., need proactive project 
management. They should be provided with tools that are more suitable to their 
needs than those offered in the contemporary literature on project management (see 
chapter 2 for details). 
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1.4  The Theoretical Foundations of This Study 
The theoretical foundations of the research presented here are primarily rooted in 
project management literature.  However, the cornerstone of the research questions 
posed in this study is provided by the theory of weak signals by Igor Ansoff. 
The Theories of Project Management (PM) 
The theories of project management encompass everything that is included in 
project work and project management. PMBOK [-95] presents the following 
divisions of project management: project integration management, project scope 
management, project time management, project cost management, project quality 
management, project human resource management, project communication 
management, project risk management and project procurement management.  
The present study follows the contents of PM as presented by Lewis [-93]. It 
focuses on those parts of the theories that are related to the anticipation of the future 
of a project in the form of predicting future events and possibilities. All areas 
mentioned in PMBOK [-95] contain a certain amount of prediction. The areas that 
most clearly contain prognosticative aspects are project time management, project 
cost management, project quality management, and project risk management. These 
are discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
The Theory of Weak Signals 
Igor Ansoff presented the first version of his theory in the mid-1970s [Ansoff-
75] and further developed it in his book [Ansoff-84]. He contends that in the 1970s 
and 1980s, “strategic surprises” deviant from steady progress appeared with 
increased frequency in corporate environments. The management of such situations 
with the means of the then-popular trend-based business planning methods is fairly 
difficult. According to Ansoff,  “strategic surprises” do not appear out of the blue; 
rather, they may be detected with the aid of preemptive signs. Ansoff calls these 
preemptive signs “weak signals.” Additional information on this theory is provided 
in chapter 3. 
The diagram in figure 1.1 shows the areas of emphasis in this study, as well as  
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their mutual dependencies.  Theories of project management comprise the total 
frame of reference within which the research is conducted.  Other important frames 
of reference influencing the study are Ansoff’s theory of weak signals and the 
depiction of project problems and their causes in the project management literature. 
 
1.5  The Premises of the Study 
Research Problems 
This study attempts to clarify the early warnings phenomenon. At first the 
following questions aroused in the mind, they need to be answered: When do early 
warnings emerge? What forms do they take? With whom are they found? The main 
issue is discerning how the vague information provided by early warnings could be 
used in project management.  
The objective of the study is to examine the possibilities of increasing the ability 
of operative project management to collect preemptive information (early warnings 
in the form of weak signals) and to use these to make prognoses on future events and 
possible problems in the project, as well as on the project’s final result. In other 
words, at issue is a method of leadership meant to anticipate future developments. 
Research Perspective 
The central research perspectives of the study are: 
A) The phenomenon will be examined using the theory of weak signals as 
regards a) occurrence, b) state of knowledge, and c) models of application. 
B) The perspective of project work is crucial.  The phenomenon should be 
studied in regard to a) project problems, b) the temporal phases of the project, c) 
project participants, d) the causes of project problems and e) the theories of project 
management.  The early warnings observations will be described from the viewpoint 
of the project leader, as a phenomenon related to project work. 
C) The project risk management perspective is apparently significant as related 
to the utilization of early warnings. 
D) It is important to examine the suitability of the leadership models provided by 
different theories as models of utilization of the phenomenon. 
E) The research problem isn’t studied as a phenomenon in communications; 
rather, theories provided by communications are used to explain the phenomenon. 
Research Questions 
The following central questions emerge: 
1) Can information of the type of Ansoff’s weak signals, referred to as ”early 
warnings” in this study, be found in project work? 
2) Is it possible to design a description of the early warnings observations and a 
categorization of the early warnings? 
3) How do observable early warning signals apply to different project problems 
and/or causes of project problems? 
4) Can observations of early warnings, project problems, and the causes of 
problems be chained together and networked, and can their character vary depending 
on the point and time of observation?  
An actual interviewing question frame is developed in the section 6.3 (table 
6.3.1). 
Scope 
Project methods are currently applied in very diverse areas of business activity. 
Building projects and industrial investment projects are the traditional fields, while 
newer areas of application include (as mentioned above) projects relating to research 
and product development, equipment and other deliveries, personnel, organizational 
development, and to arranging various events (festivals, exhibitions). Nowadays 
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even traditional project fields are understood in a broader sense, i.e. containing the 
brainstorming, prefeasibility and feasibility study phases. 
The needs of the various areas where project methods are applied, as well as the 
applications they use, are significantly varied. As a result of this, the scope of the 
research has to be strictly limited.  The study is mainly confined to exploring the 
early warning signals appearing in and around investment projects of industrial 
corporations after the decision to implement, that is, covering the implementation 
phase of investment projects from the decision to implement to start-up. The focus, 
in addition to project control and the utilization of early warnings, is on developing a 
decision-making procedure; other project management sectors are explored more 
superficially. The viewpoint adopted in this study is that of the owner (client) or the 
project manager of the main consultant. 
The preliminary phases of an investment project, such as brainstorming and the 
prefeasibility and feasibility studies, are not included in this study because their 
character is very different from the actual implementation phase of an investment 
project (see section 2.1).  Similarly, research topics like project leadership is 
excluded: such topics belong more properly to the behavioral sciences while the 
present study is concerned with industrial engineering and management. 
 
1.6  The Structure of the Research 
The first part, which surveys the literature on the research problem, views the 
early warnings phenomenon in the light of Ansoff’s theory of weak signals, project 
control and especially project risk management.  It also looks at certain 
communications theories, primarily as theories explaining the phenomenon. 
A Survey of the Research Literature 
Chapter 2 briefly inspects the contents of Project Management (PM), then moves 
on to explore those parts of PM, which attempt to anticipate future developments in 
the project.  These include project control and project risk management.   
Chapter 3 reviews Ansoff’s theory of weak signals, the research supporting it, 
and its applications. The chapter examines the Weak Signals Strategic Issue 
Management (WSSIMS) method; in addition, theories in communications -- Wiio’s 
“system theory of information” and Åberg’s “facet theory of communications” -- are 
examined as complementary to understanding the phenomenon. 
Chapter 4 defines the term “early warning” as it is used in this study, presents 
examples of early warnings in project management literature, and reviews some of 
the methods found in the literature for predicting the final result of a project.  The 
chapter presents the preliminary type categorization of early warnings. The chapter 
also examines, still on the basis of project management literature, some factors that 
affect the success or failure of a project. Another area explored in this chapter is 
formed by the problems that may arise during a project, their causes, and the 
responses they require. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the section on research literature. 
Field Research 
The part of this research dealing with field studies is divided into two sections: 
basic interviews and interviews within case projects. The final part of the research 
examines the results of this study, develops a model to help understand the 
phenomenon, and looks at a database model for project risk management that could 
perhaps be used with the results of the study. The purpose of the case interviews is 
to find out whether preliminary signals of the Ansoffian weak signals -type have 
been found in actual industrial investment projects. 
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 Chapter 6 explains how the basic interviews were carried out, presents the 
case projects, and looks at the project and work experience of the people in both 
interviewee groups. The results of the interviews are presented in a combined form, 
i.e., with the material from the basic and case interviews pooled. The chapter lays 
out the scope of the interview material and presents the early warnings research 
elements analyzed from that material. The elements are classified hierarchically as 
the type categorization groups of early warnings. 
With a view toward utilizing the results, the crucial point is to use the research 
material to analyze early warnings, project problems and their causes, and the 
interdependencies of the problems. These will be examined in chapter 7, creating the 
basis for a general description of the phenomenon. Using all of the interview 
material, the chapter lays out combination tables on the following pairs: early 
warnings/project problems; the problems/their causes. On the basis of the material, a 
web of interdependencies is drawn up between a) the main groups of early warnings, 
b) groups of project problems, c) the causes of the problems, d) the corrective 
measures (responses). These dependencies will also be examined on the level of 
early warning subgroups. The case project material will be used to draw up case-
specific webs of dependencies. Finally, the reliability of the results will be assessed. 
   Chapter 8 interprets the obtained results. The first section examines the 
results from the point of view of the study’s premises; the second answers the 
research questions stated in the introduction.  
 Chapter 9 develops a model that describes the nature of the phenomenon and 
proposes a utilization model for the phenomenon from the point of view of project 
management. The results are also studied in the light their implications for project 
risk management and project leadership. The chapter also examines how the results 
may be used in a modern project risk management system. 
Chapter 10 assesses the area of validity for the research results and considers 
their application -- both their generalization potential and their limits. The chapter 
also appraises the effect of the research results on the theories that are used as 
premises, for this study, such as the Ansoff theory of weak signals. The chapter 
evaluates both the usefulness of the research strategy and how successfully the 
strategy has been used. Finally, further research areas are proposed. 
The appendix C briefly reviews the descriptive typology of early warnings 
developed in the course of the study [Nikander-98]. 
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2. Current Methods and Practice of Forecasting 
Potential Problems in Projects Management 
 
2.1  General 
The purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a short description of those 
project management methods that aim to anticipate the activities within a project. 
The experience of the researcher, almost 30 years in practical project work  first 
with project owners and later as a project specialist in a consulting firm  
substantially influenced the choices and assertions made in this chapter. 
The traditional, basic theories of project management that are currently in use 
may be said to have originated at the end of the 1950s and in the 1960s [Cleland -
94]. One of the oldest techniques is the so-called Gantt Chart (Bar Chart) that was 
developed as early as the beginning of the 20th century.  Its developer Henry Gantt 
died in 1919 [Lock -92]. The methods and techniques widely used today, such as 
CPM and PERT, were published in 1958. The principle of Earned Value (EV) was 
developed in 1963 [Lewis -93]. GERT (Graphical Evaluation and Review 
Technique) was devised in the mid-1960s [Chapman and Ward -97]. The US 
Department of Defense (DoD) C/SCSC (Cost/Schedule Control System Criteria) 
was completed in 1968 [Selogie -85 and Fleming -92]. Selogie has covered this 
development comprehensively. SCERT (Systems Criteria Evaluation and Review 
Technique) was developed in mid-1970s [Chapman and Ward -97]. It must be noted 
that e.g. the GERT and SCERT methods have not been widely adopted in practice; 
often they aren’t even mentioned in textbooks. Selogie [-85] and Cleland [-94] 
present a rather extensive look at the growth of project management thought. The 
development of project work has also been discussed in [Adams -81], [Internet-81], 
[PMI-83], [Kezsbom et al. -89], [Nordnet-89], [AACE-90], [PMI-91], [Lewis -93], 
[Harrison-93], [Kleim and Ludin -94], [Kerzner -95], [PMI-94], [PMI-96].  
Project Life Cycle 
Different writers have rather different perceptions of project management, 
depending on what types of projects lie within their own interest and experience. 
The writers usually recommend the leadership methods of their time for use in both 
project management and project leadership. For example, the principles of 
Management by Objective (MbO) are singularly suited to project work: all projects 
naturally have objectives regarding performance, cost and schedule. Today, the 
combination of these three is said to comprise the quality of a project [Kezsbom et 
al. -89]. There are also other definitions for project quality; this subject has been 
more extensively discussed in the study [Nikander-98]. 
The variations in project management arise from the different phases of the 
project life cycle: the tone of a project changes with each new phase [Lewis -93] 
[Cleland -94] [Honko et. al. -82]. The main project phases used in this study are 
outlined in Figure 2.1.  
The project phases used in the empirical part of this study are the following: The 
first main phase is engineering, which includes preliminary engineering, defining 
(project planning), and the actual implementation engineering. Procurement was 
chosen as the second phase, because of its major effect on the subsequent phases of 
the project and of the fact that the most vital decisions regarding costs are finalized 
during this phase. The subsequent phases are the delivery phase and the site phase.  
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Figure 2.1 The life cycle and main stages of a project   
Adapted from Lewis [-93, figure 2.4, p. 20] 
 
The brainstorming, prefeasibility and feasibility study phases, which take place 
prior to the decision to implement, are excluded from this study. These preliminary 
activities often are (or should be) composed of continuous activity concerning 
product development, marketing, and business strategy.  In the 1980s and early 
1990s, these phases were seen as entirely separate from the investment project, 
which in turn was considered to begin with the implementation planning done in the 
pre-engineering phase -- or even later, with the decision to implement.  Today, the 
commonly held view is much broader. 
The central concern in the brainstorming phase is often the preservation of 
creativity.  The prefeasibility studies are at first conducted as small-scale inquiries 
and memos, which are expanded to “mini-projects” if the management shows 
enthusiasm.  Feasibility studies can be more extensive, but they too are conducted 
quickly and with strictly limited resources. Errors and deficiencies in these phases 
are extremely detrimental to the implementation project.  If weak signals from e.g. 
the market are not interpreted correctly in the preliminary phases, the whole 
investment may founder.  Examples of such cases are abundant both in the literature 
and in Finnish industry. 
The character of the weak signals that appear in the preliminary phases is 
probably very similar to the character of signals found in innovative activity.  
However, studying such signals is such a rich area of research that it would provide 
material for an entirely separate dissertation; moreover, preliminary phases and 
innovative activity is largely carried out within corporations, which makes it 
difficult to get sufficient information about it. 
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Project actors 
The external environment of a project, described by various writers Lewis [-93] 
Cleland [-94], is very similar to the operating environment of a corporation. Cleland 
connects the environment of a project to the role of project actors as internal and 
external stakeholders. His views are best illustrated by figure 2.2.  
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Figure 2.2  Project Stakeholder Network 
Adapted from [Cleland -94, figure 6.2, p.147]. 
 
The activity in investment projects consists mainly of interaction between the 
project actors (both organizations and individuals). Naturally, projects also include 
the kind of interaction and relations between people that belongs to the area of 
general management. However, individual, private "projects", which are some 
individual person's idea are rare in the implementation phase of investment projects, 
though these may occur in the brainstorming phase. 
Figure 2.2. shows the main interest groups of a project, which are owner/client, 
consultant, supplier and contractor (marked in bold). These are employed in the 
empirical part of this study as project parties; this is further discussed in the context 
of presenting the question frame. 
According to Cleland, external stakeholders include government agencies, local 
communities, the general public, and creditors.  In addition, it should be noted that 
the external and internal factors affecting a project vary greatly depending on the 
type and character of the project. 
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2.2  The Contents of Project Management 
An important view of the contents of current project management is presented in 
figure 2.3. 
In addition to controlling project planning, organization, control, and project 
techniques and methodologies, project management takes into account the effects of 
culture and human needs, and applies human approach leadership.  Compared with 
its previous forms, current project management has been supplemented with a new 
emphasis on setting goals and objectives and on preparing strategic approaches; 
information management has also been incorporated into it. 
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Figure 2.3 The Main Areas of Project Management 
Adapted from [Lewis -93, Figure 2.5, p. 22]. 
 
The project plan creates a basis for the completion of the project.  Moreover, the 
project is “simulated” during project planning; that is, the activity descriptions, 
schedule, and other documents required by the planning instructions are devised.  At 
the same time, the project plan is usually the first blueprint of the project’s future.   
The project plan is the standard (called “performance measurement baseline”) with 
which the progress of the project is compared during project control.  
The basis of project control is always the project plan.  The parts of a project 
plan are: 1) project definition and objective setting, 2) creation of the project 
organization, 3) the structure of the project (WBS), and 4-6) formation of the 
  
 
Nikander    12 
     
schedule, the resource plan and the cost estimate, as well as the purchase plan, figure 
2.4. 
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Figure 2.4  Planning Process Adapted from [Baker & Boyd -82, Figure 1] 
 
During project planning, the following issues are settled: the tasks, their order, at 
what point each task will be carried out, and the person to perform the task.  
Nowadays, this is usually done using commercial project control programs.  
Extensive discussions on preparing a project plan can be found in e.g. Harrison [-
93], Kerzner [-95] PMBOK [-95]. 
 
2.3 Project Control 
Project control should be understood mainly as activity management.  Project 
control very clearly contains possibilities for anticipating future developments in all 
the sub elements of the project (performance, cost, time).  Project control methods 
belong to the so-called “management by deviation” group.  All the methods that are 
in general use presume that there is a project plan to which activities and 
developments are compared.  The methods report both positive and negative 
deviations from the plan; however, the effectiveness of the implementation depends 
largely on the users of the methods.  They are the ones who decide what is to be 
monitored, followed up, and controlled, as well as what responses are necessary in 
case of slight deviations.  In the experience of this researcher, it is by no means 
unusual for project leaders to be uninterested in slight deviations; they may even 
direct (or indicate by their behavior) that slight deviations are to be excluded from 
reports, with disastrous consequences. 
The main phases of project control are a) planning, b) monitoring, c) cost and 
time control and d) reporting and, if necessary, proposing corrective measures.  Cost 
and time control are usually performed separately in the early stages of the control 
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process, but in the later stages of analysis the data provided by these is generally 
combined in accordance with the Earned Value (EV) principle, and the information 
is used as a basis for decisions in project control.  
For example Niemann [-91], Cass [-90], Cass [-94] have endeavored to present 
various improvements in regard to predicting the final result of a project. A 
somewhat separate field of activity is technical quality control, which is often 
assigned, where possible, to occur in connection with regular project meetings 
developed in a different context. 
 
2.4  Forecasting Methods of Project Management 
The Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)  
On the basis of the earned value principle, United States government agencies 
have developed an exact method of reporting the progress of a project.  This method 
is called the Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC).  Fleming outlines 
indicators of C/SCSC that can be interpreted as early warnings, and that best 
forecast if a project would exceed its budget [Fleming –92, pp. 220…222]. The 
actual C/SCSC defines various indicators that describe the project status in 
comparison with the project plan.  These are also widely used in applications of the 
earned value principle.  They convey the direction of progress of the project. The 
indicators include:  1) Schedule Variance (SV), 2) Cost Variance (CV), 3) 
Management Reserve (MR), 4) Cost Performance Index (CPI), and 5) Schedule 
Performance Index (SPI).  The latter (CPI and SPI) are used in e.g. preparing the 
cost estimate of the project’s final result (Estimate at Completion, EAC); SPI can 
also be used in formulating schedule estimates.  A major drawback in using 
C/SCSC, however, is that the forecasts it provides are based on the past history of 
the project and hence are always somewhat late. 
Some Methods for Predicting the Final Result of a Project 
- Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) as an early warning signal 
Fleming [-92] notes that the performance measurement baseline, a comparative 
basis devised in the context of project planning, is a good prediction method. 
- The 15 percent rule 
As another prediction method Fleming [-92] suggests the 15 percent rule: the 
completion estimate of the project is reviewed when 15 percent of the 
implementation time has been used. 
- Project implementation profile 
Pinto and Slevin [-92] have developed a project evaluation method called project 
implementation profile. This method can be used in all project phases, and it may be 
possible to use it to predict the success or failure of a project. Forecasts are prepared 
in the project-planning phase. The project implementation profile should be useful 
for designing corrective action and even for after-project evaluation, when the 
question to be answered is why the project succeeded or failed. 
Schedule Estimate 
Predictions made using the schedule of the project are very efficient in giving 
information on potential future problems.  In the practical experience of this author, 
they are the only functioning project status prediction method widely used in actual 
projects. 
The PM literature does not provide instructions in similar detail on preparing 
schedule estimates as it does on preparing cost estimates. There are no formulae for 
computing the Projected Schedule Delay (PSD), which expresses the total delay of 
the project’s final result.  The reason for the omission of schedule estimates from the 
C/SCSC may be the fact that the effects of logical dependencies and resource 
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restrictions are crucial in predicting the final schedule of a project.  Hence schedule 
estimates should always be calculated using project control programs rather than 
mathematical formulas as in the Estimate at Completion (EAC) methods. 
Nevertheless, the prediction methods of EAC can be used to some extent in 
preparing a schedule estimate.  The object is to improve the schedule estimate and to 
reveal new potential risky or problematic tasks. 
“Optimistic” PSD 
An optimistic prediction is made by simply recalculating the schedule according 
to the rules of CPM, using the activity data at the time of inquiry. The crucial issue 
is discerning which incomplete task will most affect the critical path.  The schedule 
so devised is then compared to the original plan; PSD is the difference in the 
completion dates of the two schedules. 
“The most credible” PSD 
The most credible PSD represents the schedule, which is most believable.  In 
actuality, this means that the schedule will be have to completely redraw: the 
schedule planning in all its phases is repeated.  The person designing the schedule 
should take into account that the earned value principle expresses the project’s 
schedule performance or SPI-index. The determining factor, however, is the view of 
the implementation personnel, engaged in the various parts of the project on how 
soon they can have their work ready.  This new schedule is then processed in 
accordance with the instructions agreed upon within the project, and will after that 
be the new point of comparison (baseline “2”). 
 
2.5  Risk Management 
2.5.1 General 
Risk estimates are related to decision-making. According to the traditional 
interpretation represented by March and Simon [-58], decision-making in a risk 
situation means that the probability of alternative series of events is known. Keeping 
to this interpretation greatly reduces the chances of risk management in projects. A 
considerable singularity is characteristic of projects, meaning that exact, experience-
based information of the probability of risks is not available; rather, projects must 
rely on inexact and often subjective information. Kerzner [-95] shows how decision-
making varies in different risk management situations: Decision making under 
certainty, Decision making under risk and Decision making under uncertainty 
[Kerzner -95]. For the last-mentioned situation, he presents four basic criteria, 
among which the decision-maker must choose, often according to his ability to 
tolerate risk. The criteria are: a) the Hurwicz criteria, as the maximax criteria, b) the 
Wald criteria, as the maximin criteria, c) Savage criteria, as the minimax criteria and 
d) the Laplace criteria, which makes an a priori assumption based on Bayesian 
statistics.  
There are several definitions and objectives of project risk management [Kerzner 
-95] and [PMBOK -95]. Paying attention to risks has long been an integral part of 
project planning.  Recognizing and evaluating risks are included in project planning 
as early as in the preliminary planning phase and take a more definite form during 
implementation planning at the latest.  The current trend is to strive for continuous 
planning during the whole project [PMBOK -95] and [Kerzner -95]. This obviously 
indicates an aspiration to constant anticipation of future events. 
Project risk management has not yet become an everyday tool for project 
leadership. Ashley [-89a and -89b] expected a rapid change in this situation; he 
thought that information technology would have made project risk management as 
ordinary a tool for the project leader as CPM and schedule programs already had 
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made of schedule management. Levine [-95] also hopes for new views in project 
risk management and emphasizes the importance of such features in current projects.  
The development of project risk management has followed general risk management 
guidelines, and has been directed toward applying general methods to project work.  
This has been somewhat hard, however, as collecting statistics is tedious due to the 
uniqueness of every project.  The early warnings phenomenon appears to be a part of 
project risk management as well [PMBOK -95]. 
Artto and others [2000] state that project management literature most commonly 
discusses project risk management as an activity of the implementation phase, in 
which case the observation perspective can be called “site-centered.”  This the 
authors see as a shortcoming.  Their own observation perspective starts when the 
company receives an invitation to bid; therefore the whole business perspective of 
the supplier is observed [Artto et al. 2000, Figure 5)].  
The perspective can be broadened.  When risk management is examined from the 
perspective of the client, the starting point should be the company strategies that 
lead to the company’s vision. Nascent or existing project ideas should be in 
agreement with this vision.  This evaluation of project ideas is made in the 
prefeasibility study stage at the latest. Either in this stage, or in the feasibility study 
stage, first invitations to bid are prepared; this step initiates the supplier’s business 
sphere.  However, these pre-project owner stages are beyond the scope of this study. 
For a thorough discussion of project risk management, see e.g. the following 
books on project management: [Kerzner -95, pp. 752...756, pp. 877...900], 
[Obradovitch -90] and [PMBOK pp. 111...121].  
 
2.5.2 The Definition of Risk 
There are several definitions of the term “risk” [Niwa -89].  Most often risk is 
associated with uncertainty and damage.  Kerzner [-95] gives the following two 
definitions of a risk: 
       
  Risk = F (uncertainty, damage)   
  Risk = f (hazard, safeguard)  [Kerzner-95] (p. 879) 
 
When risk is defined in the later manner, the source of danger is the hazard. 
When the hazard increases, so does the risk; conversely, when the safeguard 
increases, the risk decreases. Artto [-94], Kähkönen [-96], PMBOK [-95] and AACE 
[-95] further define risk so that it includes opportunity.  
Several authors use the concept of “issue”, which includes both the notion of 
opportunities and that of threats [Ansoff –84a], [King -87] and [Lienzt et al. -95]. 
(See section 3.1.3  “Issue Life Cycle and Symptoms”). Webster’s Dictionary [-92] 
defines these terms in the following pages: Risk (p. 859), Issue  (p. 515), 
Opportunity  (p. 704), Threat  (p. 1029). 
This study mainly employs the concept of risk.  The rest of the above-mentioned 
concepts are used when referring to the works in question. 
 
In connection with the early warning phenomenon, this study uses a definition of 
risk that according to Kerzner includes the notions of uncertainty/damage or threats, 
but does not include the notion of opportunities. 
 
On the basis of the previous definition, the concept of “issue” seems to be as a 
parallel of the broader concept of risk (including opportunities), with a meaning very 
similar to it.  
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Kähkönen [-96] states that problems and disturbances are risks, which have 
come true. Ward, S. [-89] asserts that problems are embedded in the current 
situation, while risks indicate future possibilities. On the basis of the foregoing, and 
of the definition of risks, it can be further stated that the concept of “problem” can 
also seem to have family connection to the concept “risk”; the difference between 
the two resides in the time element and in the uncertainty of the realization of a risk. 
  
2.5.3 The Elements of Risk 
Risk Factor 
Niwa [-89], among others, mentions the term “risk factor.” This is related to the 
risk mechanism model he presents [Niwa -89, p. 43]. The same concept, to some 
degree, is discussed by Kerzner [-95]. Down, Coleman, and Absolon note the 
concept “primary question” as the actual source of a risk [Down, Coleman, Absolon 
-94, pp. 7, 52, 68, 91, 106, 107, 119].  The risk factors they cite can in some of the 
sample cases also be seen as anticipatory risk signals.  This interpretation is feasible 
especially in the cases where the risk factor is noticed in a very early stage of the 
project. 
Bufaied uses the same term, risk factor, in the summary table of his literature 
survey on the risks present in construction projects; he uses these risks later in his 
research as the risk variables in his model [Bufaied -87, table 5, p. 73]. 
All of the above definitions contain the view that a risk factor is the source or 
cause of the risk. 
Risk Categories 
Risks can be classified in several different ways, which makes discussing them 
easier. Such classifications are e.g. the slightly divergent risk categories cited in 
[Pasedag -89] and [Kerzner -95]. 
 
2.5.4 Project Risk Management 
 Risk management, in the project context, is the art and science of identifying, 
analyzing, and responding to Risk Factors throughout the life of a project and in the 
best interest of its objective’s  [Kerzner-95, p. 880]. 
Niwa [-89] argues that (a) Managers want to be informed of the risks that 
actually happened during similar projects in the past. (b) They want to be able to 
recognize risks that correspond to the size of the work element they want. (c) They 
want risk alarms in advance. d) They want to be informed of risks from many 
aspects that can not be predicted in advance, if possible [Niwa -89, p. 20]. 
The Stages of Project Risk Management 
Project management literature uses varied terminology in discussing the stages 
of project risk management. Kerzner [-95] and PMBOK [-95] divide project risk 
management in four stages; the essence of these stages is much the same in both 
works, although the terms used to describe them are different.  In the following, the 
terms used by Kerzner are underlined, while those used in PMBOK are italicized: 
risk assessment, risk identification; risk analysis, risk quantification; risk handling, 
risk response development; lessons learned, risk response control. 
Each of the stages presented in PMBOK includes three task units: 1) the input 
necessary for the completion of the stage, 2) the tools and techniques used in the 
stage, and 3) the output produced by the stage. 
Kähkönen [-96] adds defining the objectives of risk management as the first 
stage of project risk management.  In this stage, the questions to be answered are: 
Why is this done? What is the output? When and how? 
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Risk Assessment / Risk Identification 
The sources and tools of risk assessment may be employable in refining the 
utilization of the early warnings phenomenon. PMBOK [-95] presents risk 
identification as input information: product description, other planning outputs, and 
historical information. Of the tools are mentioned checklist, flowcharting of the 
planning process, as well as interviewing, schedule analysis, expert judgment, 
brainstorming, scenario building, baseline cost estimates and technical performance 
measurement [Kerzner -95], [Ashley -89a], [Ashley -89b]. 
[Ashley -89a] strongly criticizes all methods that employ historical information. 
According to him, the greatest error results form the subjective interpretation of 
information and uses the expression ”hindsight bias” to describe a situation where 
the person who evaluates the information allows himself to add a positive or 
negative coloring to the past events he is recalling. When this happens the cause and 
effect chains are no longer real but imagined. Secondly, it is difficult to find projects 
that are similar enough to one another to serve as models, the problems of which 
could then be assessed.  A third problem in employing historical information is that 
history cannot throw any light on ”unknown-unknowns” situations. 
An interesting concept for this study is the output concept ”risk symptoms” 
found in PMBOK and defined there as follows:  Risk Symptoms, sometimes called 
triggers, are indirect manifestations of actual risk events.  PMBOK also provides 
some examples of this:  For example, poor morale may be an early warning signal 
of an impending schedule delay or cost overruns on early activities may be 
indicative of poor estimating. [PMBOK, p. 114] 
Risk Analysis / Risk Quantification  
As with the tools of risk identification, the tools of risk analysis may also be 
useful in fine-tuning the utilization of the early warnings phenomenon. The literature 
contains several well-known assessment methods for evaluating risks: these include 
e.g. the Monte Carlo simulation, regression analysis, sensitivity analysis, scenario 
techniques, network analysis, and Delphi techniques [Franke -89] and [Kerzner-95]. 
Kähkönen [-96] states the methods vary depending on the situation and the risk. He 
recommends the use of checklists in risk identification and the use of the following 
six levels in risk analysis: 1.) A list of risks, 2.) A verbal description of each risk, 3.) 
The dependencies between the risks, 4.) An assessment of the effects if the risk 
materializes, 5.) An assessment of the effects of responses, and 6.) A computer 
simulation of the comprehensive model. Kähkönen only suggests two methods for 
assessing the effects: scenario building and range evaluation.  
PERT in Risk Management 
Older project management literature usually presents the opportunities offered by 
the PERT method as the only effective way of preparing for risks.  However, 
applying this method is such arduous work that it is rarely used more than once 
during a project. The PERT method contains a statistical possibility of preparing for 
risks that aren’t defined in detail. The method can be applied to costs as well, in 
which case it is called the PERT/Cost method. 
Commercial Risk Management Computer Applications 
Kähkönen [-96] lists a number of notable commercial risk management 
applications that were available in Finland at the time.  He has examined six of these 
applications: Range Estimating Program-REP, Futura, @RISK, Risk+, Opera, and 
MONTE CARLO.  
Nevertheless, nearly all of the methods presented in project management 
literature, as well as the commercial risk management applications, have a certain 
old-fashioned quality, which is exemplified by their emphasis on one-time risk 
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identification, assessment and examination. This is evident in the laboriousness and 
heaviness of the methods, which may derive from the history of risk management. 
The presented methods do not seem to favor simple, quickly applicable risk 
assessments; instead, they require a fair amount of work. 
Knowledge-Based Risk Management Model 
Niwa [-89] presents an interesting model, based on an application of an 
interactive database, suitable for project risk management. He asserts that current 
artificial intelligence methods cannot by themselves clarify the varied problem- and 
risk situations present in projects.  Consequently, Niwa incorporates a human 
control element to a kind of expert-system program with a database foundation.  He 
calls his model “Human-Computer Cooperative Systems.” Niwa’s views are 
explored in greater detail in section 2.5.5 under the heading “Risk Mechanism 
Model,” as well as in chapter 9. 
 
2.5.5 Project Risks Chains 
Project risk chains can be detected in some studies and publications concerning 
project risk management. A study by Bufaied [-87] and a Risk Mechanism Model of 
Niwa [-89] are discussed below. 
The Bufaied Model 
Bufaied [-87] examines the risks in project management, as well as their causes 
and their effect on projects. He compares the risks of construction projects in the UK 
and Libya. Bufaied [-87] shows in his study that the fundamental cause of the 
external signs (Cost, Time, Quality) of project failure risk lies in the risk of failure of 
the project management. On the basis of his literature surveys, Bufaied has 
developed six subsystem dependency models as one of his hypotheses. These 
subsystems form, according to him, is the secondary source of risk. The subsystems 
are the following: the environmental risk subsystem; contractual arrangement 
subsystem; resource risk subsystem; information risk subsystem, organization 
structure risk subsystem; and personnel quality risk subsystem. 
As an example of the subsystems, the organization structure risk subsystem (2.5) 
is shown in figure 2.5. The figure illustrates seven groups or stages that all the 
models contain. In addition, the models include independent variables, which the 
project management cannot influence. In his results, Bufaied presents a 
comprehensive model in which all the subsystems are collected together; this is very 
complex and contains numerous dependencies. 
For this study the main interest lies in the results found by Bufaied concerning 
the variable list, the structure of the risk model, and the abundance of dependencies 
in the model. Of note is the formation of chains of risks into long and multi-
segmented dependency networks. 
The Changing Character of Risk Factors    
Another relevant point of Bufaied’s risk factors is the fact that as the risk 
materializes, the risk factor becomes observable or becomes an event. Hence, 
according to the example presented in figure 2.5 the risk factor 5.8 (Poor job 
performance), when materialized, apparently becomes an observable event; i.e., it 
has become a detectable problem.  It can be caused by one or more of the preceding 
4.xx-level risk factors (i.e. 4.16; 3.13; 4.17; 4.19). At the same time, when the risk 
factor 5.8 materializes it points to the possible materialization of one or all of the 
6.xx-level risk factors (6.6); i.e. the risk factors of this level may become problems. 
Similarly, the factors 4.17 and 3.13 affect the risk factor 5.11 (Ineffective decision), 
which in turn affects the risk factors 6.2 and 6.6. In addition, it should be noted that  
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Primary source 
Secondary Variable 
Secondary source 
   Intervening risk variable  
 1st group  2nd group  3rd group 
   Ultimate 
  intervening 
  risk variable 
     Ultimate 
     variables 
Lack of flexibility for 
change 
variable 4.7 
Overgrowth of 
administrative, 
variable 4.16 Lack of 
specification, 
variable 3.13 
Lack of 
standardisation, 
variable 3.14 
Centralised 
decision making, 
variable 3.15 
Organisation 
structure risk 
subs, 
variable 2.5 
Project 
management 
activities 
variable 1.1 
Role ambiguity, 
variable 4.17 
Insufficient 
delegation of 
authority, 
variable 4.18 
Improper span of 
control, variable 4.19 
Poor job performance, 
variable 5.8 
Lack of or poor 
coordination, 
variable 5.9 
Low morale, general 
dissatisfaction, 
variable 5.10 
Ineffective decisions, 
variable 5.11 
Loss of time, 
variable 6.1 
Disruption of work, 
variable 6.2 
Lack of improper 
machine utilisation, 
variable 6.6 
Absenteeism and 
high labour turnover, 
variable 6.7 
Strikes, 
variable 6.8 
Time, 
variable 7.1 
Cost 
variable 7.2 
Quality, 
variable 7.3 
 Project autonomy, variable 0.5 
 Geographical location of project, variable 0.6 
  The structure of organisation, headquarters, var. 0.10 
  Attitudes and values of workforce, var. 0.11 
  Nature of technology employed, var. 0.12 
General and specific environm. factors, var. 2.5 
 
Figure 2.5 A Causal Model for Organizational Structure Subsystem [Bufaied -87, Figure 14, p 212]  
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other subsystems might contain such dependencies on other variables in this 
subsystem as are missing from the example subsystem.  
It is noted that the character of the risk factor varies depending on the perspective 
and time of observation. The factor may be a) a cause, the source of the problem or 
risk, when it precedes the problem or contributes to the risk. It can be b) a detected 
problem (an observation), when the factor is currently active, or c) an effect 
(problem, risk), when the factor is the result of a preceding factor. Here can be again 
noted the phenomenon observed earlier in the context of examining project problems 
and their causes. Several of the matters represented by Bufaied’s variables are 
observations, some of which can be made quite early in the project; the rest of the 
factors are detected later during the project. 
An interdependency of project risks similar to the one used by Bufaied [-87] is 
also found in Kähkönen [-96]. Niwa [-89] develops risk chains in a similar manner 
in his risk mechanism model (figure 2.6). Ashley [-89a] also mentions the causal 
relationship of two risks. A similar chain theory is also presented in the ”weak 
signals” hierarchy by Webb [-87]. These contribute to the clarification of the quite 
discontinuous picture of project problems and causes of failure, and of their 
occurrence, that emerges on the basis of the various sources. 
Risk Mechanism Model 
The risk mechanism model by Niwa is best illustrated by figure 2.6 [Niwa, p. 42, 
figure 41]. In the figure, as well as in the way Niwa defines the concept “risk  
 
 
RISK FACTORS 
 - Contractual Defect 
 - Managerial/Operational Error 
 - Environmental Factors 
 RISK
 
 RISK
 
 RISK
 
 
 - Project Delay 
 - Cost Overrun 
 - Deficiency in 
   Technical Performance 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Risk Mechanism Model [Niwa, p. 42, Figure 41] 
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factors,” it is possible to observe the idea presented by Bufaied that a risk can cause 
(or influence) another risk especially if no responses are taken. The concept “risk 
factors” is discussed above in section 2.5. 
 
 2.6  Summary 
Project Control  
The available, commonly used project management and control methods have 
not improved substantially during the recent decades, with the exception of project 
risk management.  The experience of this researcher is that schedule estimates are, 
despite their shortcomings and awkwardness, the best current tools for examining 
the future developments in a project and for anticipating new potential schedule 
problems or risks.  The weakness in all the available methods is that they are based 
on data from the project history, and are forced to extrapolate future situations.  
Surprise factors are usually excluded from examination.  At the same time, both the 
vulnerability of projects and the demands placed on them have increased. 
Therefore, in this as well as in the earlier study by this researcher [Nikander -98], 
to investigate, first, whether the theory of weak signals, developed by Igor Ansoff 
[Ansoff -75], can be applied to project work and second, whether the principles of 
this theory can be employed to find a new leadership philosophy or to develop tools 
for the often surprising situations that arise in a project. 
Project Risk management 
In section 2.5 has discussed the project risk management fairly broadly. Today, 
risk management strives for the kind of anticipating management aspired to in this 
study as well, though the practical methods that risk management provides for this 
are not fully developed as of yet. The current methods still favor a kind of  ”one-
time” risk management, and have not become as everyday project management tools 
as e.g. the computer applications for schedule management. Several researchers and 
writers, however, expect risk management to become as common a tool as project 
cost and schedule management has been for the past two decades. The concept of 
”risk symptoms,” discussed in [PMBOK], apparently links early warnings to risk 
management.  
On the basis of Niwa [-89], it can be stated that there apparently exists a causal 
relationship between risk factors and risks. Bufaied [-87], Niwa [-89] and Ashley [-
89a] form chains of risks that affect one another. Niwa [-89] states that risks can 
influence one another and that they have sources and causes (risk factors). The risk 
variables presented by Bufaied [-87] (figure 2.5) seems to be very similar to the 
problems presented in the table 4.4. Problems are linked to the present, where as 
risks refer to the future [Kähkönen -96] and [Ward, S -89].  
The concepts “risk” and "problem" seems to be related to, but they are separated 
from each other by the time available and by the uncertainty of the materialization of 
a risk.  According to the observations of Bufaied [-87], the character of risk factors 
varies depending on the perspective adopted in the observation. They can be 
interpreted as causes of problems and risks; they can be detected problems; or they 
can be risks that may materialize in the future (potential problems). 
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3. Putting Early Warnings into Perspective 
 
 
3.1 The Theory of Weak Signals 
3.1.0 The Background of the Theory 
A central premise of this research is the theory of weak signals by professor Igor 
Ansoff, which appears to contain the kind of anticipation of surprising future events 
in the business world that is one of the research objectives of this study. If Ansoff’s 
thoughts on the uses of vague or inexact information can be applied to project work, 
there may be good possibilities of developing the sought-for tools for project 
leaders. 
This chapter clarifies the background and content of the theory of weak signals 
as presented by Ansoff. Research in business economics supporting the theory is 
meager, and the theory has been criticized severely.  Yet numerous writers seem to 
suggest that the existence of some form of presignals is self-evident. 
The theory is well known in communications. There are also linkages to state 
and military strategic security and intelligence research, as well as to some other 
areas of business economics and also futures studies. Some research in support of 
the theory is also presented in this chapter. 
This study uses the term “weak signals” in the context of Ansoff’s theory or in 
connection with those writings and studies that use this term.  In the section 3.1.3, 
“Research in Support of the Theory,” the term used in the research being discussed 
is employed. In other contexts the term “early warning ”, or an abbreviated form of 
that term, is used. The term weak signal is defined in section 3.1.2 and the term early 
warning in the section 4.2.   
Ansoff’s theory can be divided into two parts. The first part deals with the 
existence of weak signals and the level of information they embody. The second part 
encompasses the use of weak signals in the form of the Weak Signals Strategic Issue 
Management Systems (WSSIMS), discussed in a separate chapter. Observation 
procedures called environment scanning and source of strategic information/issue, 
closely related to the observation of signals, are also considered.  They are related to 
project risk management methods.  It should be noted that Ansoff uses the term 
“issue” in his theory, which includes both threats and opportunities, and not the 
terms “problem” or “risk;” in other respects as well, this chapter follows the 
terminology used by Ansoff.  The term “issue” has already been discussed in section 
2.5. 
 
3.1.1 General Remarks on the Theory  
Ansoff’s Views on Business Management 
The development of business management can be presented in several quite 
different ways. Ansoff has divided it into four main units as regards the 20th century: 
(1) Management by (after the fact) control of Performance, which was 
adequate when change was slow. 
(2) Management by extrapolation, when change accelerated, but the future 
could be predicted by extrapolation of the past 
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(3) Management by anticipation, when discontinuities began to appear but 
change, while rapid, was still slow enough to permit timely anticipation and 
response. 
(4) Management through flexible/rapid response, which is currently emerging, 
under conditions in which many significant challenges develop too rapidly to permit 
timely anticipation.    [Ansoff -84a, pp. 14...15] 
These management strategies are tied to a time scale in figure 3.1, which is 
directly from Ansoff’s book, in which he also presents the detailed contents of long 
range planning and subsequent management strategies [Ansoff -84a, pp. 15...25].   
 
Visibility          1900          1930          1950          1970                              1990 
of Future         <---Familiar-><-Extrapolable-><-Familiar Discontinuity-><-Novel  Discontinuity----- 
              
Recurring      - systems and procedures manuals     
     management by control               
   -financial control 
         
                 -operations budgeting                   management  
Forecastable               -capital budgeting                     by extrapolation   
by Extrapolation                        -management by objectives 
                                           -long range planning 
          
Predictable  management                 -periodic strategic planning  
Threats and  by anticipation                 - strategic posture management 
Opportunities of change        
          
              -strategic issue management 
Partially 
Predictable  management by                                   -weak signal issue management 
"Weak Signals"  flexible/rapid response 
           -surprise management 
Unpredictable  
Surprises 
          
Turbulence     1   2             3                  4                      5 
Level        Stable              Reactive      Anticipating          Exploring       Creative 
Figure 3.1 Evolutions of Management Systems   [Ansoff-84a, p. 14] 
 
According to Ansoff, the management strategies shown in figure 3.1 are principally 
business methods of strategic management. The theory of weak signals links to the 
time scale of “management through flexible/rapid response” in the form of weak 
signals issue management.  Ansoff’s thoughts on weak signals are closely connected 
to strategic business management, which may, especially as regards mega-
corporations, be compared to political leadership and its need for information. This, 
in turn, is linked to the strategic security and intelligence studies in the military 
sciences [Betts -82], [Herman -96] and [Sivonen -98]. 
 
The Origins of the Theory 
Igor Ansoff presented his theory of weak signals in business economics in the 
mid-1970s [Ansoff -75]. His idea was to seek an improvement to the strategic 
planning method, as this method didn’t work satisfactorily when sudden changes or 
unanticipated discontinuities in development occurred in the business environment; 
the environment showed turbulence. Ansoff also uses the term “strategic surprise” to 
describe these discontinuities.  An example of such a discontinuity is the oil crisis in 
the early 1970s, when OPEC raised the price of oil so that it was several times what 
it had been earlier. In such cases, according to Ansoff the usual method of 
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monitoring trends and basing planning on them was not sufficient. Strategic 
planning requires the information provided by the environment to be available for 
use sufficiently early and in an adequately exact form.  These requirements caused 
by sudden changes in the business environment cannot be fulfilled by monitoring 
trends, as this is based on information accumulated over time. Strategic planning is 
inevitably late.  
Premises 
Ansoff asserts that strategic surprises give advance information of themselves; 
there are signals or symptoms of surprises to come.  This information is initially 
inexact: the signals are vague, fuzzy, and difficult to interpret, but gradually they 
become more distinct and easier to decipher.  Even on the basis of the initially 
inexact information some action can be taken.  However, e.g. Heiskanen [-88] warns 
against doing this. Webb [-87] states that it is not possible to obtain messages or 
information of the future; instead, anticipatory events or the like must occur, and 
these provide the advance information presumed by Ansoff. A good example of such 
anticipatory events is the existence of numerous early warnings (signs of 
preparation) of military “surprise” attacks, mentioned in Betts [-82]. 
Research Foundations 
Ansoff presents no research results to support his theory; he only refers to 
discussions with several persons [Ansoff -75]. In 1987, Makridakis and Heáu [-87] 
stated that the subject has remained academic idea. In the same year, also Webb [-
87] states that there is no earlier foundation for Ansoff’s research; according to him, 
it is important to investigate whether weak signals even exist.  Webb´s comment is 
also applicable to the research at present research, and therefore the first objective of 
this study is to demonstrate the existence of weak signals/early warnings. 
Other Researchers 
Although research results are scarce, quite a few writers link early warnings with 
strategic planning and strategic management. Articles and literature published in 
business economics suggest that the existence of early warnings is on some level 
taken for granted.  Terms used to refer to these warnings are varied: early warnings, 
early indicators, symptoms, weak signals, soft form of information [Ansoff -84a], 
[Webb -87], [Weschke -94], [Michman -89], [Mintzberg -94a], [FitzGerald -94], 
[Sharma and Mahajan -80], [King -87], [Taylor-87], [Juran-95] and [Åberg-93]. A 
comparison of the content of these different terms shows that the authors are 
referring to identical, or very similar, phenomena.  When surveying the literature on 
the subject the present study uses the terminology employed in the work being 
discussed. 
The section 3.1.3 presents studies that show the existence of early warnings and 
weak signals. Research from other fields familiar with the existence of early 
warnings and weak signals is discussed in greater detail in the same section. 
Denying the Phenomenon 
Ashley [-89a] claims that no warning phenomenon exists, but rather the 
“detection” is made afterwards and is based on hindsight bias, which often occurs in 
interpreting past events. After an event has occurred, people wish to see warnings 
and in some respects defend their actions. Ashley [-89a] bases his view on the 
opinions of some historians.  In addition, he mentions an article discussing the 
historical examination of the Pearl Harbor attack at the beginning of the Second 
World War. 
Mintzberg debates the necessity of strategic planning and strategic management 
with Ansoff [Mintzberg -94a] and [Ansoff -94]. Betss [-82] also mentions the 
wisdom of hindsight, but at the same time he confirms the existence of warnings.  
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The problem isn’t detecting early warnings; rather it concerns interpreting them and 
believing in the analyses made [Betss -82] and [Heiskanen -88]. Sivonen [-98] cites 
some comments critical of the existence of early warnings, but seems to himself 
hold the view that warnings can be detected. R. Morris [-97] mentions the wisdom 
of hindsight, which may distort research findings. 
 
3.1.2  Strong or Weak Signals 
Ansoff’s starting point is the information a company receives from its 
environment; the accuracy of that information and the knowledge provided by it the 
knowledge of what is about to happen in the environment possibly.  Ansoff refers to 
the level of information as having two extreme stages: strong signals and weak 
signals. 
Ansoff gives the following definition of strong signals: 
Issues identified through environmental surveillance will differ in the amount of 
information they contain. Some issues will be sufficiently visible and concrete to 
permit the firm to compute their impact and to devise specific plans for Response. 
We shall call these strong signal issues.   [Ansoff -84a, p. 22] 
 
Weak signals he defines as follows: 
Other issues will contain weak signals, imprecise early indications about 
impending impactful events......all that is known (of them) is that some Threats and 
Opportunities will undoubtedly arise, but their shape and nature and source are not 
yet known.         [Ansoff -84a, p. 22] 
 
Connected with the level of signal strength is the problem of the credibility of 
signals. Strong signals are easy to detect, credible and rational; it is easy to agree 
about their interpretation. However, according to communications theories, a 
unanimous interpretation is not self-evident, since each person interprets the 
received message in his own fashion (see section 3.2, Communication). According 
to Åberg [-93], weak signals are usually so vague that they are easily missed 
altogether. It is difficult to believe in them; in other words, they are uncertain, 
irrational and not credible. They resemble the custom of ancient (according to some 
claims, even modern) heads of state to consult clairvoyants, Pythias, or prophecies 
interpreted by priests from the flight of birds or the entrails of sacrificial animals. 
Similarly, most of us occasionally read our horoscope in the paper, though how 
much we believe in it is a different question. 
The question of the rationality of signals may be linked to the conceptual 
dimensions of anticipation discussed by Turtiainen [-99, table 1].  He defines five 
roles of anticipators, which are prophet, astrologer, seer / witch, researcher and 
visionary. In this scheme the knowledge of prophets and astrologers has a 
mythological that of witches a mystical, and that of researchers and visionaries a 
cognitive basis. 
The core questions of weak signal detection, presented by Åberg, are linked to 
detecting and accepting weak signals: 
-Is the detected signal: a message, a change in the situation, a symptom of a 
significant, relevant change, or merely arbitrary changes or scattered information? 
-How can signals be detected in as early a stage as possible, when they are still 
weak, so that there will be as much time as possible for responses necessitated by 
the threat? (Cf. the time available in 3.1.5, figure 3.4)  [Åberg-93, p. 250]. 
Kuusi [-99b] examines the weak signals of technological progress. His viewpoint 
is very different from Ansoff’s. He links strong signals to risks and their 
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probabilities, and considers the ways in which weak signals can appear in the 
context of a technological innovation. Of especial significance is his statement that if 
weak signals are not detected and responded to, a session of “shock learning” is to 
be expected once the development anticipated by the weak signals begins, i.e., once 
the signals become strong [Kuusi, -99b]. 
Bryan S. Coffman, who works for the MG Taylor Corporation, published a series 
of very commercially oriented articles on the Internet. According to him, a weak 
signal is: 
1) An idea or trend that will affect how we do business, what business we do, and 
the environment in which we will work 
2) New and surprising from the signal receiver's vantage point (although others 
may already perceive it).  
3) Something difficult to track down amid other noise and signals 
4) A threat or opportunity to your organization 
5) Often scoffed at by people who "know"? 
6) Usually has a substantial lag time before it will mature and become 
mainstream 
7) Therefore represents an opportunity to learn, grow and evolve. 
[Hiltunen -99] 
 
3.1.3  State of Knowledge   
The concept “issue,” a central concept in the theory presented in Ansoff [-84a], 
was defined in section 2.5, in the context of risk definition.  Ansoff generally refers 
to this concept as a “strategic issue.” 
Ansoff describes the signals with a scale containing five states of knowledge, the 
level depending on the information content provided by the signal.  The scale is 
clarified in Figure 3.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2  States of Knowledge under Discontinuity    
[Ansoff -84a, Figure 5.4.1, p. 353] 
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Level (1) The lowest state of knowledge is the sense of threat/opportunity, where 
there is only a conviction that discontinuities are impending [Ansoff-84a, p. 353]. 
This is simultaneously the highest state of ignorance that can be used in managing a 
corporation. Ansoff asserts that in the “political and economic fog of uncertainty”  
prevalent in the mid-1970s, many companies found themselves in such states of 
ignorance, however he gives no specific examples [Ansoff-75]. As an example of 
the second and third levels of knowledge Ansoff points to the development of the 
transistor. In the 1940s, when it was known on the basis of physics that transistors 
might work, this information was level (2) in strength, and the source of threat was 
known because the source of discontinuity was identified. When researchers 
succeeded in developing the first functioning transistor, the information was 
strengthened to level (3). 
Webb [-87] emphasizes that Level 1 is the highest state of ignorance that can be 
of any use to management. On Level 2, Threats and Opportunities are recognized 
and from what direction become clearer. Level 3 is still insufficient for the company 
to make a Response. On Level 4, the knowledge is now sufficient for a Response to 
be made. Level 5 contains all the information necessary to make a strategic 
planning decision.             [Webb -87, pp. 68.69] 
Webb [-87] points out some reasons for the fact that signals only provide weak 
knowledge of the final threat or opportunity.  One reason is that despite strong 
signals, we are unable to receive the information or only register a negligible amount 
of it. Another is that we filter the available information to such a degree that it loses 
its significance. In addition, external disturbances may affect the situation: a signal 
is very short-lived and quick, which leaves it weak [Webb -87, pp. 12…14]. These 
reasons are related to the communications concepts of “filter” and “noise.” 
(Communications theory is discussed further in section 3.2, and filtering in section 
3.1.5). 
In his Ph.D. thesis, Kuusi [-99] introduces the concept of “epistemic value” for 
assessing the credibility of Delphi studies. The concept is geared toward specifying 
the significance of the information content of detected signals, and toward 
examining it from several viewpoints. Kuusi [-99] divides the assessment in four 
parts: One, the (at least in principle) measurable impact (I) of the signal on the 
matter under investigation (the project). Two, what the signal indicates can be 
accomplished, i.e. feasibility (F). Three, the likelihood of the accomplishment, or 
validity (V). Four, the relevance (R) of the accomplishable effects. When a value is 
assigned for these factors, for instance on a scale of 0-5, and their product IFVR is 
calculated, the value of the product indicates the credibility of the detected signal. If 
one of the factors is very small (or zero), the total value of the product is also small 
(or zero) [Kuusi, 99a and 99b]. 
This method may be very useful in project work when there is time and 
personnel available for the assessment. Using the method is probably possible and 
even recommendable in e.g. research and product development projects, as well as 
in the preliminary stages of investment projects (brainstorming, prefeasibility, 
feasibility).  It has not been possible to test the method in the empirical research 
conducted for the present study, as it was not available at the time. 
 
3.1.4  Studies in Support of the Theory 
As mentioned earlier, Ansoff’s theories are controversial. In this controversy 
basic problem is whether the “weak signals” type information is ever detected in 
practice.  Outlined below are some studies and papers from different fields that 
support Ansoff’s theory; these show that Ansoff is no longer alone in his views.  (On 
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the use of terminology in discussing different studies, see section 3.1.1, “Other 
researchers”). 
3.1.4.1 Research Directly Related to Ansoff’s Theory or  
to the Concept of Early Warnings 
Weschke [-94] presents a group of early warnings in relation to economically 
risky enterprises.  Weschke´s article, which is based on other studies and articles, 
discusses seventy examples of early warnings. Weschke divides warnings into three 
main groups, each of which has subgroups, and provides examples. The main groups 
are: 1) long-term patterns, 2) ownership issues and 3) immediate danger signs. 
Some, but not all, of the examples of warnings are clearly applicable to project 
work. 
In his doctoral dissertation, Webb [-87] investigates the future of the 
development of a limited technical operations sector (laser technology) of a 
company. Can “weak signals” (quotes in the original) be identified in this 
development? The research is divided into two parts. 
First, Webb uses interviews with nine eminent experts in the field (researchers 
and professors) to explore directions of development in the field, and the “weak 
signals” that can be identified in them.  The “weak signals” that Webb identifies and 
uses in his research are potential new products and/or operating methods. He notes, 
that as many as twenty such signals were identified, but only 9 were accepted to the 
second part of the research.  The accepted “products” were the ones that were of the 
greatest interest from the standpoint of the company that had commissioned the 
research. These “weak signals” Webb calls “primary weak signals.” 
The second part of the research consists of a poll on the possibility and 
significance of the existence of these nine “primary weak signals.” Based on the 
poll, Webb analyzes signs of market development of particular interest to the client 
company. These “weak signals” Webb calls “secondary weak signals.” 
According to Webb, the results of his research are that:  
1) Discontinuities in development can be brought about by turbulence in the 
technological environment  
2)  A method for observing, enhancing and filtering “weak signals” has been 
arrived at 
3) Nine possible devices or methods that can become significant for the field in the 
future, have been identified 
4) Depicts details in the operating environment of the field researched has been 
clarified 
5) The sources of “weak signals” are hierarchical, “each source being ‘triggered’ 
into action by the combined effect of the ‘weak signals’ being emitted by these 
sources above it in the hierarchy.”   [Webb -87, p. 351] 
With the exception of the research method, Webb’s results are difficult to 
generalize.  Even his observation of the hierarchy of the sources for “weak signals” 
may be caused by the research method he used. The first part of the research comes 
close to a product development estimate, where as the second part resembles 
marketing research. 
Leidecker and Brono [-87] note the effect of the critical success factors in a 
company’s activities as they examine the import of individual intuition. This idea 
can be associated with observing weak signals or early warnings. 
Pinto and Slevin [-92] have developed a project implementation profile - a 
method for predicting the likelihood of success or failure of a project - which can 
also be regarded as research in support of the existence of early warnings or weak 
signals. The assessment questions presented in the method strive to both map the 
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current situation of the project and estimate its future states or the final result. When 
the assessment is done in an early stage of the project, such as the planning phase, 
almost all assessment questions regard future events or the views of the person 
making the assessment (such as the project manager) on what actions will be taken 
in the project. 
3.1.4.2 Futures Studies 
The anticipation of technological progress has been internationally popular in the 
1990s. In Japan, Expert Foresight Studies have been conducted regularly since 1971. 
In these studies, so-called topics are sought for and the basis for the assessments of 
the experts is formed by the weak signals they are familiar with. In Finland, more 
than a hundred practical anticipation research projects were carried out in the 1990s. 
These studies were conducted under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour and 
funded by the European Social Fund.  According to Turtiainen [-99] they did not 
attempt to acquire an in-depth understanding of the issue, but rather had the 
character of small-scale, case-type projects. They have, however, created a need for 
the development of a theoretical base for anticipation [Turtiainen -99]. To facilitate 
this, discussion of weak signals has been initiated within the field of Finnish futures 
studies [FUTURA -99]. Defining and researching weak signals has emerged as an 
extremely interesting field of study. One part of this attempt to find a definition for 
weak future signals was the Delphi study, which was conducted in the spring of 
2000 [Kuusi et.al. 2000]. The study revealed substantial differences in the 
perceptions of experts. 
Mäkelä [-99], in discussing methods and practices of anticipation, links weak 
signals to megatrends. Weak signals are also sometimes linked to implicit 
anticipatory knowledge (observed at work places and educational institutions). In 
addition, they are a central factor in the TOP10 cluster analysis, which links them 
with megatrends. Weak signals should be used with qualitative methods. They 
indicate future events in the short term (under two years) [Moisseinen et al. -99] and 
[Mäkelä -98]. 
 In his book, Mannermaa [-99] combines the concepts ”wild cards” and ”weak 
signal,” and implies that wild cards are the only type of weak signals. In doing this, 
he sees weak signals as a progressive phenomenon, even though they have no 
previous history or time series; he seems to expect them to form one. In 
Mannermaa’s opinion, weak signals may rise to central significance in the future.  
Mannermaa [-99] sees wild cards and weak signals as unique and non-repeating 
strange phenomena. They may seem ridiculous and only exist for a short while, and 
many experts scorn them. He points out, however, that not all strange phenomena 
can be counted as weak signals of real developments; methodologically, weak 
signals are problematic, as modeling them is difficult  due, for example, to the 
absence of history or time series. All Mannermaa’s examples are of phenomena that 
have developed into something “real,” such as the Internet and the demand for 
ecologically sustainable development.  
In the present researcher’s opinion, developing phenomena of this type have not 
necessarily ever been weak signals; instead, they are the result of various 
developments.  The phenomena in Mannermaa’s text that can be seen as actual weak 
signals are the “first signs” he mentions, such as ARPANET and the report of the 
limits of growth [Mannermaa -99a, pp. 87.92], [Mannermaa. -99b] and [Mannermaa, 
-2001]. To some extent, both ideas (wild cards and developing time series) reject 
single and apparently random observations, signals and early warnings. In the 
opinion of this researcher, the ”wild cards”-phenomena may be seen as weak 
  
Nikander    30 
 
signals, though not necessarily vice versa. Later in this study, it will be shown that 
there are also other types of weak signals. 
Metsämuronen [-99] examines the possibilities of using mathematical methods to 
detect weak signals from interviews with experts, conducted at different times. The 
interviews should be as closely parallel as possible, as well as sufficiently far apart 
in time. Metsämuronen analyzes the results using the Markov chain theory, which 
gives significance to the changes from one interview to the next. He states that there 
are two types of weak signals in research of this kind: weak signals that are about to 
emit a future attribute, and signals that indicate that an old attribute is losing its 
significance. The experts who are “visionaries” are interesting, though it is difficult 
to distinguish those who are visionaries from those who are merely fanciful 
[Metsämuronen -99]. 
3.1.4.3 Communications Research 
Åberg proposes external and internal scanning as one part of organizational 
communication (discussed in more detail in section 2). This resembles the 
environment scanning method used in business economics.  Åberg mentions 
“mapping and interpreting weak signals” as one purpose of scanning Åberg [-93, p. 
246]. He states that external weak signals may include: the weakening or 
strengthening of the demand for products or services; a decrease in the quality of 
work done by subcontractors; an increase in advertising by competitors; strange 
questions from consultants or competitors; letters to the editor in the press 
discussing the professional community or the competitors; public changes of earlier 
stands by politicians; work acquaintances avoiding one’s company. 
Examples of weak signals of internal changes are, on the part of the personnel, 
an increase or a decrease in attendance, turnover, or number of work stoppages, as 
well as changes in the atmosphere of the organization, work motivation or in the 
communications atmosphere.  In finance, they may include changes in the 
economical key figures; in production- and other technology, the number of flaws 
identified during preventive maintenance and periodic check-ups.  In logistics, weak 
signals may include pile-ups or breaks in the production chain, or an increase or 
decrease in the efficiency of the machinery and appliances. [Åberg -93, pp. 
247…248]. 
3.1.4.4 Military Science and Research on International Security 
In their books, [Betts, -82] and [Herman, -96] discuss international strategic 
intelligence, conducted to satisfy the needs of political and military leadership. Betts  
[-82] presents early warnings (weak signals) of the onset of attack that can be 
observed in several assaults during the Second World War and in the early stages of 
later wars.  He contends that there is no scarcity of early warnings; rather, the 
problem lies in the interpretation of the warnings, and especially in convincing 
political leaders of the existence of a threat.  As mentioned earlier, Betts also notes 
the danger of hindsight bias in interpreting and examining early warnings after the 
fact. Herman [-96] discusses the aims, organization, working methods and other 
matters relating to intelligence agencies.  Both writers assert that predicting potential 
threats forms the very core of intelligence work. The issue at hand is anticipating the 
future [Sivonen -98].  
In intelligence work, the relevant stages are identifying, observing, collecting 
and interpreting early warnings, as well as adapting the information to the needs of 
the leaders. The emphasis in a national intelligence agency is on international 
relations; in the business world, parallels include at least the strategic management 
needs of mega-corporations. In smaller businesses, adapting strategic management 
to the size of the company should be considered. Regarding projects, the principles 
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of intelligence work can possibly be applied, but not the methods, sources of 
information, etc. 
From the perspective of this research, it is significant that both writers (Betts and 
Herman) state that the research field examined by them already recognizes the 
existence of early warnings. They show, as do Sivonen [-98], Nurminen [-98] and 
Davies and Gurr [-98], the extent of research and literature in these fields. In their 
book, Davies and Gurr [-98] enumerate about 60 national or international Open 
Access Early Warning Projects. Apparently the research covers nearly everything in 
the area of war and conflict: there are studies conducted under the auspices of the 
United Nations, national studies and studies by various organizations and 
universities. Subjects ranging from terrorism to hotbeds of ethnic conflict to food 
crises and environmental problems are researched [Davies and Gurr -98]. One can 
only wonder how little influence all these activities seem to have; could it be that 
they, by virtue of being so numerous, have turned into communicational noise? 
An examination of the literature in this area supports Ansoff’s belief in the 
existence of weak signals.  Heiskanen presents eleven assertions regarding attitudes 
dangerous both for military intelligence and for decisions made on the basis of 
intelligence information [Heiskanen -88, pp. 289…291]. With only minor 
alterations, several of these claims are applicable to project management. 
3.1.4.5 Predicting Bankruptcies 
R. Morris [-97] has examined broadly the issue of prediction of corporate 
bankruptcies. He surveys exhaustively previous studies on bankruptcy predicting, 
different methods, and the theoretical backgrounds of these methods. He has also 
conducted an extensive empirical study of British companies that have gone 
bankrupt, and of the likelihood of predicting these bankruptcies using various 
methods. 
Morris notes that there are significant variations in the manner and accuracy with 
which different methods predict the approaching bankruptcy. From selected data 
(where 50 percent are problem companies) all of the methods are able to select the 
problem companies fairly accurately. According to Morris, the greatest weakness of 
the methods is their ineffectiveness in picking out problem companies from 
unselected data (where 2 percent are problem companies). One of the reasons for 
this, he believes, is the fact that the prediction methods examine the symptoms of 
bankruptcy, not the causes of the actual problems.  Morris´ conclusions can be 
interpreted to mean that the prediction potential of causes may be greater than that of 
symptoms. 
The focus of the methods is mainly on economical key figures, which in reality 
are symptoms of problems. A negative development visible in these is always 
caused by something else, not by the figures themselves. For the present research, 
the main interest lies in the fact that Morris cites a number of studies, which have 
examined various qualitative (non-numerical) factors as forecasters of bankruptcy. 
Morris’ own observations of qualitative variables are also noteworthy. Some 
surprising variables seem predictive the failure of a company several years in 
advance [Morris, R -97, p. 256 Table 11.4].  The results of Morris’ study as regards 
these areas are in table 3.1. 
The table shows how “changes in lines of business” and “changes in registered 
charges” may provide signals of future problems years before the bankruptcy. In 
Morris’ view, another very good indicator is the “audit qualifications” factor. 
Changes in the financial status of the company (“changes in financial year end”), 
according to Morris, show the problems clearly only a couple of years before the 
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bankruptcy.  For the present research, it is interesting to note that qualitative early 
warnings of the kind presented by Morris indeed appear to be observable. 
 
 
Table 3.1 
The Significance of Selected Dichotomous Qualitative Variables  
Event window:    Audit                                         Changes in   
years prior          qualifications    lines of         accounting      registered    auditors     company     financial  
to failure                       business        policies          charges                  name           year end     
   1         5.5 ****            4.8 ****     -0.5                 5.0 ****        1.4   *         1.3    *        - 
   2             1.5    *               4.1 ****     -0.7                 3.2 ****        2.1   **       0.3            3.5 ****   
   3         1.5    *               3.6 ****     -0.2                 2.5 ***          2.2   **       0.3            2.3   **    
   4         1.4    *               2.6  ***      -1.0                 2.2  **           2.3   **       0.3            2.3   **    
   5         1.7   **              2.1   **       -2.4  ***         1.9  **           1.9   **       0.8            2.1    *    
   6         1.8   **              2.1   **       -2.3  **           2.4  ***         1.7   **       0.9            1.3  
  
Notes 
1. Event windows cover five-year intervals. 
2. Figures are t-statistics. 
3. Significant at 99.90% level ****; at 99% level ***, at 95% level **; at 90% level *. 
4. There were no instances of a change in financial year-end in the non-failed sample for the final window 
before bankruptcy. 
[Morris, R., p. 256, Table 11.4] 
 
 
3.1.4.6 Issue Life Cycle and Symptoms 
Carroll and Hall [-87], King [-87] and Lientz et.al. [-95] discuss the life cycle of 
issues and the concept of symptoms embedded in it, both of which are included in 
Ansoff’s theory of weak signals and are related to the idea of a state of knowledge 
presented in that theory. Ansoff’s definition, as well as a more general definition, of 
the term “issue” can be found in section 2.5. The term “symptoms” is defined in 
section 4.2. 
Especially the awareness of social and public issues occurs as an S-curve. The 
symptoms of issues appear much earlier than the issues themselves. At first, 
symptoms (or indicators, another term often used in the literature) are bits and pieces 
of data, e.g. statements in comments made by leading experts. Even if all this 
awareness were to be gathered together, information provided by it would seem 
arbitrary and would not indicate any trend. When the awareness increases, the 
number of groups interested in it increases as well. The stages of public issues are 
“conversation, contention, legislation, and regulation” [King -87, pp. 254...255]. In 
the business world, strategy changes planned by competitors are reflected in the 
behavior of the competitors’ staff before the change of plan is publicly announced 
[King -87].  
Lientz et.al. [-95] refer in several sections of their book to the existence of issues 
and symptoms and to their interdependence in project work. They write: 
Suppose that an issue surfaces. Problems and opportunities don’t often just 
appear from thin air. There are Symptoms of the issue that surface first....  
      [Lientz et.al. -95, p. 21] 
The weak point of Lientz et.al. [-95] is that their book provides no references; 
hence it is impossible to know whether their assertions are based on previous 
research or on their own observations and conclusions. 
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3.1.5  Weak Signals Strategic Issue Management Systems 
3.1.5.1 General 
Ansoff states that the Strategic Issue Management (SIM) thinking that he 
developed earlier does not take into account the ever faster-occurring strategic 
surprises in the business environment, nor the changes that occur in a very turbulent 
environment. To mend this defect he develops further the possibility of taking 
advantage of weak signals in strategic management.  He notes: 
...at high turbulence levels, it becomes necessary to start the firm’s Response 
while the environmental signals are still weak.     [Ansoff-84a, p. 22] 
 
Ansoff calls this management method Weak Signals Strategic Issue 
Management.  
Starting Point 
Ansoff uses as his starting point the state of knowledge (figure 3.2) and uses it to 
specify the strength of the signal. The actions necessary after the recognition and 
evaluation of the signal depend critically on the time that is estimated to be available 
for responses. 
3.1.5.2 Detecting Weak Signals 
The process of detecting weak signals should be examined, since the same 
observation procedures may be useful in the utilization of early warnings in project 
problems. Detection can be carried out either on an individual level or as a more 
detached Environmental Scanning activity. Ansoff [-75, -84], Juran [-95], Webb [-
87], Taylor [-87] and Åberg [-93] discuss individual-level signal detection. Åberg [-
93], King [-87] and David  [-91] put forth various models of Environmental 
Scanning (often with a different name). King [-87], Rhyne [-87], Webb [-87], 
Cleland [-94] and Herman [-96] examine the topic “source of strategic 
information/issues.” All of these merit investigations, as the detection and existence 
of early warnings are one of the core questions of this research. These activities are 
also analogous to the risk identification procedures of project risk management. 
The Basic Problems of Detection  
Åberg notes that the fundamental questions in weak signal detection are (as 
mentioned in the section 3.2.1 Strong / Weak Signals):  
 -Is the detected signal: a message, a change in the situation, a symptom of 
a significant, relevant change, or merely arbitrary changes or scattered 
information? 
 -How can signals be detected in as early a stage as possible, when they are 
still weak, so that there will be as much time as possible for responses necessitated 
by the threat? (Cf. the time available in 3.1.4).   [Åberg-93, p. 250] 
Individual Detection 
According to Ansoff, the detection of weak signals requires listening to the 
environment “with an ear to the ground.” This demands sensitivity from everyone in 
corporation. Detection of weak signals should not be left to only a few key persons; 
everyone should participate in it -- leaders, social, political, economical and 
technological experts, sales personnel, buyers, researchers, etc. Even drivers of 
distribution vehicles should be heard. Detectors of weak signals internal to the 
company are all employees who have wide contacts within the corporation [Åberg -
93]. As sources of weak signals, Webb [-87] mentions the “organisational 
environment” and  “the rate of change in the environment” [Webb -87, p.43]. 
Juran (in a chapter on “sensors” in the book Managerial Breakthrough, where he 
presents his model of management) discusses early warnings and their detection. 
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The concepts he uses must be seen as identical with early warnings.  Juran states that 
a ”sensor” is “...a detective device, highly specialised to recognise certain 
stimuli,....” [Juran –95, p. 281].  
Sensors can give information prior to the event, during the event, or after it. 
When sensors give information prior to the event, they may be clear early warnings. 
Sensors can function either defensively (control) or offensively (breakthrough). The 
latter is an active method of making predictions.  In addition to these, Juran also 
mentions the concept “the early-warning principle.” [Juran –95, p. 284].  
Juran emphasizes that it is expensive to procure early warnings. He recommends 
thorough consideration of what aspects should be monitored with constant 
anticipation; the 20/80 (Pareto) rule should be kept in mind at all times. According 
to Juran, the most important sensor is a human being. It is true in all cases that a 
human being compares the actual event with his expectations (his standard) and 
notes the difference (cf. communications). In most cases, however, people function 
as incidental sensors, and it is normal human frailty that they are not very accurate. 
People can give false information intentionally (e.g. with a view toward fraud), for 
their personal comfort, because of erroneous or misleading information etc. 
In the first phase of his research, Webb [-87] used an interview-based weak 
signals detection procedure that is in conformity with the New Paradigm Research 
trend; in the second phase, he used a questionnaire method. Webb’s research has 
already been discussed in section 3.1.3. (Studies in Support of the Theory). In the 
context of examining the preparation of scenarios as a part of strategic planning 
[Taylor -87], combines weak signals with environmental scanning, especially in 
regard to social and political changes. 
3.1.5.3 Environmental Scanning 
Strategic management models usually include environmental scanning in the 
stage where issues are identified [Ansoff-84a], [King -87]. Different writers use 
different terms to describe the same concept; for example, David [-91] discusses 
such concepts as to “perform external audit to identify key opportunities and threats” 
and  “perform internal audit to identify key strengths and weaknesses.” 
Environmental scanning, a term used e.g. by Åberg [-93], is often associated 
with examining sources of issues and of information; different systems and 
observation procedures, as well as environment analysis, are explored. Such tracking 
of the project environment, as well as of the internal events and developments in the 
project, are also obviously important in detecting early warnings. According to 
Åberg [-93], scanning has six stages: recognizing relevant external and internal 
factors, developing a monitoring system, interpreting weak signals: and if necessary, 
making recommendations on responses, carrying out the responses, and tracking and 
supervising the responses. 
For this activity, forums should be created within the professional community 
where weak signals (the term is used by Åberg) can be compared and their 
significance evaluated. These forums function as sources of weak signals for the 
professional community. Such forums for the company’s external scanning include 
e.g. product responsibility groups performing scanning; unit meetings performing 
scanning; business travel reports and interviews of those who have been on business 
trips; the distribution of professional magazines by the information service; persons 
mobile in the market field (including even the drivers of distribution vehicles); and 
customer panels. 
According to Åberg [-93], external scanning can also utilize the semiotic 
analysis method, also called “myth analysis.” This method compares the “official 
story” to the “bazaar story” ("rumor mill"), thereby uncovering the trends of thought 
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that are still under the surface, only just emerging in people’s minds. Åberg [-93] 
states that the technique has been successfully employed by certain international 
corporations in building scenarios of the political and cultural changes in areas of 
operation important to them. For example, Shell used this method to anticipate the 
Iranian Islamic revolution earlier than the state intelligence agencies [Åberg-93, pp. 
251...253]. 
The greatest problem with scanning, Åberg notes, is the difficulty of separating 
those detected signals that refer to real and permanent changes in the environment 
from those that indicate only temporary, arbitrary changes. He mentions only one 
method, parallel verification, of dealing with this problem. 
Internal scanning of a company, Åberg contends, is more complicated than 
external scanning. The units or persons engaged in internal scanning can be 
negatively labeled, i.e. become unpopular within the organization, which makes 
their task more difficult. Despite this, he recommends that internal scanning be 
carried out in some form. 
3.1.5.4 Filtering 
Ansoff [-84] states that a message or a piece of information has to go through 
various filters upon arriving to a firm from the environment of that firm.  These 
filters can either hamper or facilitate the reception and processing of the information. 
Ansoff notes three filters: the surveillance filter, the mentality filter and the 
political/power filter (figure 3.3).  
The first stage, exemplified by the surveillance filter, requires the company to 
choose what kind of information is needed and what kinds of techniques should be 
employed to procure it. Ansoff presents a table of different techniques and their 
suitability in various environmental turbulence levels of the company [Ansoff -84, 
figure 5.2.1]. He also discusses the limitations of procuring information and the 
significance of the use of experts. 
 
surveillance filter 
 
Environment 
 
Data 
 
Perception 
 
Information 
 
mentality filter 
 
power filter 
 
action 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Management information [Ansoff -84, figure 5.2.3] 
 
The second stage, the mentality filter, is sociological and psychological in 
character. At this point the receiver of information evaluates the arrived information 
and decides what to accept and what to discard because it is unrealistic, unnecessary, 
of little use, or otherwise irrelevant.  Ansoff explores the way in which different 
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mentalities relate to turbulence in the environment, and discusses the characteristics 
of a mentality that furthers strategic management. 
The third stage, the political/power filter, is the filter that is used especially by 
the decision-maker. This filter determines what information is allowed to influence 
the decision-making of the company. 
  The study of communications is familiar with the same phenome non in the 
form of communication noise. Wiio’s [-89] examination is somewhat different than 
Ansoff’s, but the connection is nevertheless clear. Wiio divides disturbances in 
communication into four groups: barriers, loss, distortion and noise. 
A) Communication barriers include the following problems: the message goes to 
the wrong address, the message gets lost on the way, the message doesn’t get 
noticed, the message is delayed, or the communication participants lack the ability to 
communicate. B) Communication loss is divided into two groups by Wiio: 
disappearance and rejection. Disappearance of communication can occur either 
when our senses fail to perceive the message or when information disappears from 
our internal information processing system.  Rejection, on the other hand, is clearly 
linked to Ansoff’s ideas. Wiio divides rejection into three subgroups. a) The first 
disturbance subgroup that causes rejection consists of individual rejection factors. 
These include having no need to communicate and therefore perceiving the message 
as useless, and wanting to preserve our psychological equilibrium (homeostasis).  
The latter case can lead us to reject uncomfortable messages, distrust the source, or 
disbelieve the message. These reactions can be caused by an overload of similar 
messages (immunization), differences between the message and information we 
already possess, the message being contrary to our norms, or the fact that our 
expectations are different from the message. b) The second subgroup is formed by 
social rejection factors. These include group pressure (i.e., our group of reference 
does not accept the message) and community norms and customs.  c) The third 
subgroup contains technical communication problems: the message is sent either 
through the wrong channel or in the wrong form. C) Distortion in the message is 
caused by misunderstanding or misinterpretation. The causes of misunderstanding 
and misinterpretation are related to other disturbances in communication: the 
receiver is incapable of communicating, the message is ambiguous, the receiver 
wishes to preserve his psychological equilibrium, the sender and the receiver have 
different experiences and interpretation of the information, or the message gets 
altered on the way. D) Communication noise occurs when the significant, useful part 
of the message gets buried in irrelevant, interfering information. The channel 
contains noise, other messages, random disturbances etc.  
Ansoff’s ideas and Wiio’s division do not entirely concur. In the surveillance 
filter stage, communication barriers and losses do influence the reception of the 
message, but the main emphasis is on communicational factors, especially on the 
decision that we make on how to procure information. In the mentality filter stage 
the most important factors are rejection and its counter phenomenon, emphasizing 
messages agreeable to us. In the power filter stage the main factor is apparently the 
rejection of the message in order to preserve psychological equilibrium, though 
other factors, related to the exercise of power rather than to communication, are 
important as well. 
One explanation for the filtering phenomenon may be the facet theory proposed 
by Åberg (see section 3.2.4).  Apparently, such matters as cognitive maps, futures 
maps, and the interests and beliefs of different stakeholders can be interpreted as 
facets.  These questions, however, are outside the scope of the present study, and 
more extensive research on them belongs to the area of behavioral sciences.  
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Nevertheless, the topic is very interesting and it might provide a fertile field for 
further research. 
3.1.5.5 Source of Strategic Information/Issues 
The sources of information and issues are important contributing factors in 
scanning; these merit study, as they may also be sources of early warnings. The 
following list divides the sources according to King [-87]. 
a) Internal Source, such as the “boss”, the board, the planning process, superiors, 
the accounting system, subordinates, inside reports, specific MIS, project team 
members, key managers, and annual corporate reports;  
b) Operative Source, such as the union, creditors, suppliers, trade associations, 
outsiders, and customers/users;  
c) General Source, such as public interest groups, the technological environment, 
outside publications, outside studies, business periodicals (such as the Wall 
Street Journal, Fortune etc.), business reference services (Moody´s Industrial 
Manual etc.), professional associations, trade associations, the local press, the 
trade press, articles and papers presented at professional meetings, public 
meetings, government sources;  
d) Some groups of sources can belong to several contexts (e.g. stockholders) [King 
-87], [Rhyne -87] and [Cleland -94].  
 
The foregoing shows the primary role of people as sources of information. The 
next-mentioned sources are usually document sources and the company as a source. 
The relationship between human intelligence and official intelligence in the business 
world is similar to the one encountered within intelligence agencies (where the 
official sources of information include e.g. attachés with different fields of expertise) 
[Herman -96]. 
The definitions of information sources used by Webb in his study are rather 
different from those used by other researchers.  They are a) verbal presentations, e.g. 
by customers, salesmen, or university workers, b) written presentations, e.g. reports 
and journals, and c) other, e.g. meetings, conferences, and discussions [Webb -87, 
Fig. 3.2 p. 107]. This classification is akin to the classification used in 
communications.  Webb does not mention non-verbal sources, but this is 
understandable as his study is concerned with long-term instead of short-term 
information. Webb also shows how the use of information sources varies between 
different studies as well as between different user groups. Generally, it seems that 
written sources (documents) are more widely used than verbal (human) sources. In 
most cases both are used simultaneously. 
3.1.5.6 WSSIMS Procedures and Model 
Estimating the Impact 
In Ansoff’s model the next step is to estimate the impact of the impending issue 
on the company. This can be done one Strategic Business Area (SBA) at a time. As 
assessment methods in simpler cases, Ansoff recommends e.g. the Delphi technique 
as an assessment method appropriate for fairly simple cases; in more complicated 
situations, he suggests quantitative forecasting and modeling. 
The Time available and the Choice of Responses  
The most important issue in utilizing signals is choosing the proper response. 
This is done on the basis of acquired information: as the signals grow stronger and 
the information provided by them gets more precise, responses can also be chosen 
more accurately. When the signals are weak (level 1 or 2), it may be necessary to 
settle for environmental awareness and surveillance, but when the signals are strong 
(level 4 or 5), direct action can be taken. The other response options are self-
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awareness, internal flexibility, external flexibility, and internal readiness (described 
in more detail in [Ansoff -84a, pp. 356…365]. The crucial factor in choosing 
responses and issue management is the amount of time estimated to be available 
until the issue reaches full impact on the corporation. When time is scant, even weak 
signals should be reacted to. This is best described in figure 3.4. In figure, ’T’ 
represents the normal response time, while ’T1’ indicates a crash response. ’δ’ is the 
available time, extending from the detection of a level 5 signal to the time of full 
impact of the issue/threat. 
Curve A represents a situation where the estimated development speed is slow 
and there is enough time for normal responses. Curve B describes a case where an 
alarming situation, indicated by strong signals, requires a reaction; nevertheless, it is 
doubtful that an exceedingly swift response would be necessary. The development 
of Curve C is so rapid that even an alarm given by weak signals should be reacted to 
and a response enacted. In the case of Curve D, responding is already too late when 
the first weak signals are detected; the situation requires crisis management. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Choosing the System [Ansoff -84a, Figure 5.4.9, p. 367] 
 
According to Ansoff, the situation can be defined mathematically as follows: 
…normal response time is (T), issue management response time is (T1  ). 
If we label the time remaining from level 5 to full impact (level 6)  δ , and the 
time from the inception of threat to full impact F: 
  
Nikander    39 
 
 (i) T < δ, use only periodic planning 
(ii) if T > δ and T1  < δ, use strong signals issue 
(iii) if T1 > δ <  F, use weak signal management 
(iiii)  if T1 > F, use Crisis management  [Ansoff -84a, p. 368] 
 
The model presupposes that while assessing a signal the issue it refers to can be 
identified and its impact on the corporation estimated. Subsequently the strength and 
urgency of the signal will be analyzed, and a decision formed on the basis of this 
information. 
A Decision-Making Model 
Figure 3.5 depicts the Weak Signals Strategic Issue Management decision-  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Priority Assignments in Weak Signal SIM 
[Ansoff-84a, Figure 5.4.8, p. 366] 
 
making model by Ansoff. In his model, Ansoff concludes that if the effect of an 
issue expressed by a signal is a minor one, it can be left out of the response analysis. 
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If, however, the effect is a major one, it is necessary to estimate the signal strength 
(Figure 3.5). 
In the case of a strong signal, depending on how urgently a response is required, 
there are three alternatives: (i) response is delayable: continue to monitor the 
situation; (ii) response is postponable: include responses in the next planning cycle; 
(iii) response is urgent: start a priority project to cover the responses. When the 
signal is weak, the options are: (i) delayable  continue to monitor; (ii) postponable 
 include in the next planning cycle; (iii) urgent  start a gradual commitment 
project. 
Webb summarizes weak signals management as follows: 
1) With increased levels of environmental turbulence, Threats/Opportunities 
arise so rapidly... The response must be initiated while only partial information is 
available. This is “Weak Signals Management.” 2) There is a hierarchy of strengths 
of the incoming signals, ranging from a vague sense of turbulence... 3)  Managing 
by “Weak Signals” requires: - a close attention to all incoming information, - The 
classification of the incoming signals into the appropriate “state of knowledge”...  
4) “Weak signals” enable a firm to make progressive responses... 5)“Weak Signals 
Management” is the third alternative management strategy open to a company in 
the light of impending Threats/Opportunities, the other two being strong signals 
management and periodic planning.....   [Webb -87, pp. 81...85] 
The Ansoff model contains some of the same elements as the models of project 
risk management. The greatest differences between these lie in the state of 
knowledge, the time available, and especially in the fact that the Ansoff model does 
not recognize the concept of a realization probability of an issue/a risk. 
3.1.5.7 Other Models 
The Communications Model 
[Åberg-89] describes external and internal scanning as a continuous process, and 
gives a corresponding model of weak signal scanning. The model (Figure 3.6)  
 
 
 
Recognizing 
relevant external 
and internal 
factors 
Developing monitoring 
methods and 
monitoring weak 
signals 
 
Interpreting weak 
signals 
Response 
recommendations and 
the implementation of 
response 
 
 
Figure 3.6 External and Internal Scanning as a Continuous Process 
[Åberg-89, p. 250] 
 
contains the following stages: a) “Recognizing relevant internal and external 
factors”, b) “Developing monitoring procedures and monitoring weak signals”, c) 
“Interpreting weak signals” and d) “Response recommendations and the 
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implementation of responses,” which leads back to the first stage. According to 
Åberg the external and internal scanning should not be arbitrary: forums for weak 
signal assessment should be created. 
A Structural Model of Social Action 
According to Heiskala [-90], in his work The Structure of Social Action Talcott 
Parsons presents the basic concepts of an action frame of reference (Figure 3.7) and 
a unit act. The latter concept can possibly be applied as an explanation and a 
utilization model of weak signals. Heiskala writes:  
The basic components of a unit act are an actor (the detector of signals), an 
objective (or objectives), normative orientation, situational factors, and alternative 
strategies. The actors are presumed to make the most rational choices possible 
regarding strategies in the light of the situational factors, normative orientation, 
the information they possess, and their own commitment to goals.    
   [Heiskala -90, p. 11] 
 
 
NORMATIVE ORIENTATION 
(norms, values, beliefs etc.) 
ACTOR OBJECTIVES 
SITUATIONAL FACTORS 
(biology and the environment) 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
Figure 3.7 A Structural Model of a Unit Act of Social Action 
    (Source: Turner 1974, 32) [Heiskala -90, p. 11] 
 
3.1.6 Summary 
In the mid-1970s, Ansoff introduced his theory of weak signals, which is 
concerned with sudden changes in the business environment; in the mid-1980s, he 
developed a management model based on the strategic management of companies 
applying the theory of weak signals. He presented no research basis for his 
proposals, and consequently the theory is quite controversial. Nevertheless, 
numerous writers associate phenomena resembling weak signals or presignals with 
strategic management. Although the terminology is remarkably varied, this does not 
seem to be of much consequence as long as the substance of the terms is the same. 
There are very few studies or works directly supporting Ansoff’s theory. 
Communications research is familiar with weak signals. Within the field of 
military science, the study of intelligence activities is well acquainted with early 
warnings; indeed, all intelligence service work is based on a type of information 
gathering that could use advance information of prospective threatening surprises. 
This is the same idea that is included in Ansoff’s theory. The principles of 
intelligence activity are very similar to those of the environmental scanning 
procedure used in corporate strategic management; this procedure is also known in 
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communications. The scope, objects, and methods of national intelligence activities 
are nevertheless very different from their counterparts in the business world. In the 
field of business economics, early warnings have been discussed at least in 
connection with predicting bankruptcies. The studies concerned with early warnings 
also note the risk of hindsight bias. 
In the light of the research supporting or alluding to the theory, the conclusion 
can be drawn that the early warnings phenomenon can be observed in strikingly 
varied contexts. This shows that the first part of Ansoff’s theory (the existence of 
weak signals) is apparently justified. Despite criticism that has been brought against 
the theory, research related to it in the area of project work is worth continuing. 
When Ansoff’s theory in its broader form is compared with the focus of the 
research (figure 1.1), it can be seen that Ansoff’s theory partly covers the foci in the 
area of business activities. However, Ansoff’s theory does not examine risk 
management, and the nature and typology of the weak signals phenomenon is 
discussed only in passing. In addition Ansoff’s weak signals provide information of 
a potential issue; this coincides with the meaning of the concept of early warnings 
(defined below in section 4.2). Therefore, the ”weak signals” concept used by 
Ansoff appears to be synonymous with the concept of early warnings; hence, Figure 
1.1 can be expanded to the form of figure 3.8. 
 
  Theories of Project Management 
 
   The area coverd by 
   the theory of weak signals
 
Early Warnings 
         Weak Signals  
Project Problems 
Issue 
The cause of the problem 
Responses 
Project Risk 
Management 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The Theory of Weak Signals in the Research Field 
(see: Figure 1.1) 
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3.2  Communications  
3.2.1  General 
In examining the theory of weak signals, a connection to communications has 
clearly arisen. Ansoff states that the salient issue is obtaining information. In his 
presentation, he uses the same concepts as communications theory; examples of 
such concepts are ”signals” and ”filters.” The latter corresponds to the concept of 
”noise” in communications. The framing of the objectives of this research, …to 
obtain anticipating information… can be regarded as attaching a communications 
element to the research. 
This chapter surveys the communications theories, which complement the 
theoretical basis of this study. These theories are treated as theories explaining the 
phenomenon to be examined. Explanation for the phenomena that have appeared in 
the course of this research will be sought mainly in recent Finnish communications 
theories, including the system model and the facet theory of communications. The 
fundamental concepts of communications used in this chapter are clarified in section 
3.2.2. These issues should be noted in the next chapter, exploring the occurrence of 
early warnings in project literature. 
Definitions of Communication 
Professor Osmo A. Wiio defines that information (1) diminishes uncertainty of 
an issue by decreasing the choices; (2) brings order to disorder; (3) entails surprises 
[Wiio -89]. Communication signifies the sending of messages between a sender and 
a receiver. Communication is an event, a process [Åberg -93]. Communication is the 
exchange of information between people [Wiio -89]. 
 
3.2.2  Concepts in Communications 
Several factors affect communication: the individual and his needs, different 
background factors (individual and social) and the stimuli of communication [Wiio -
89]. Wiio identifies the internal communication of an individual as a separate branch 
of communication; this is explored further below.  
Of the concepts used by communications, the ones relevant for understanding the 
results of the present research warrant examination. Knowledge, or data, is 
organized information, and it is gathered from other information. Information can be 
signals or stimuli transmitted to us by our senses, or a result of our own thinking. It 
is linked to the receiver. Information is a change occurring in the control system; this 
change can be permanent or temporary [Wiio -89, p. 63, Figure 3.9]. A message is 
any series of stimuli that results in the receiver’s having cognitive events: thinking, 
reasoning, and remembering. For example a wilting flower communicates to us 
[Åberg -93]. A message is a combination of signs consciously constructed by the 
sender [Åberg -93]. At the same time, a message is a combination of signs that 
forms a body of thoughts [Åberg -93]. Signs, or signals, include sounds, letters, 
computer language etc. [Åberg -93]. 
Almost anything that can be detected with the senses is a potential stimulus. For 
a stimulus to turn from potential to actual, it must meet four requirements:  
(1) Observability: the stimulus must be strong enough for the senses to notice it; 
(2) Change: the senses note a change; (3) Suddenness: the senses cannot detect slow 
changes [Åberg -93]; (4) Sender: in interpersonal communication, there is always a 
sender whose behavior the message depends upon [Wiio -89]. According to Åberg, 
we are not limited to interpersonal messages but receive others as well (e.g. the 
wilting flower communicates with its appearance). 
Assisted by communication, experience, worldview, and context, a person strives 
to give a meaning to a message he encounters. The roles of the receiver and the 
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sender are inevitably intertwined in forming the meaning. The bulk of the 
information and knowledge that produces meaning is non-verbal, hidden 
information. Aula states that according to Ikujiro Nonaka, two thirds of the 
capability within an organization is hidden, tacit knowledge. In creating know-how 
within the organization, this tacit knowledge holds a key position: tacit knowledge is 
knowledge held by the members of the organization, which they use in their tasks 
and in understanding their environment [Aula -00]. 
Medium and message: The medium and the message are separate, even though 
they are often used interchangeably in everyday speech. A medium is the tool that 
transmits the message. Using it always requires energy, force. The range of media is 
great and they can be used concurrently [Wiio -89].  
Receiver: Every message requires a receiver (without a receiver, there is no 
message and no communication). Without a receiver, sending an interpersonal 
message becomes announcing.  The receiver is always the one that decides how the 
message arrives and how it is interpreted [Wiio -89]. 
Noise: noise includes obstacles, loss, distortion; these can be either internal or 
external to the individual. (see 3.1.5, Filtering) 
Feedback: Communication includes feedback. The actual communication 
process is bidirectional. 
Multiple stimuli: Every communication event is multi-stimulied. Multiple stimuli 
disturb communication, but it can also be effectively utilized [Åberg -89, p. 25]. 
  
3.2.3 System and Contingency Models 
Wiio treats communication as a system; Åberg finds this revolutionary, because 
Wiio defines information both as an event and as a process.  In communication, a 
message always has a sender. It also has content; because there is the message itself.  
In addition, there is the medium through which the message is transmitted; and there 
is the receiver. An instance of communication also includes feedback. Hence, the 
system model of communication is very similar to process control models in 
technology. 
In this study, it is important to understand what happens at the receiver’s end 
when the message is received and processed. The receiver has to have, among other 
things, the need and the ability to receive the message. The interpretation and 
processing of the message depends wholly on the receiver [Wiio -89]. Wiio’s 
”detailed model of communication” describes effectively both the stages of the 
message’s formation and the process stages at the receiver’s end [Wiio -89, p. 77, 
figure]. However, the stages where the message is formed and sent are not of interest 
to this study, and so will not be discussed here despite the fact that communications 
studies are very focused on them. Instead, the emphasis will be on the reception of 
the message. The reception of the message occurs with the aid of the senses, and is 
therefore a physiological phenomenon. There are theories on the processing of the 
message in the brain, which belong to the fields of physiology and psychology. 
Wiio’s ”detailed model of communication” depicts those relevant factors and 
stages in communication through which the received message (stimuli) takes form as 
conscious knowledge. Wiio calls this stored knowledge. The model shows that in all 
stages of communication, noise disturbs the formation of the message, its progress 
as well as its interpretation. Noise can occur both at the sending and the receiving 
end of the message, as well as in the medium.  In addition, all the stages of the 
communication process are affected by individual or social background factors. 
Contingency models are developed from the system model. These are some of 
the most advanced models in the field of communications. There are several of these 
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as well [Wiio -89]. However, their subject areas are so general that they are hard to 
apply to this research, and won’t be discussed further. 
The Means of Communication 
It has already become apparent in surveying the literature concerning weak 
signals that signs or signals that are observed in different situations can be very 
dissimilar. For this reason it is relevant to examine what communications research 
has to say about the means of communication. According to Wiio [-89] it can be 
stated that human communication typically uses two coding systems: nonverbal 
communication and language. In addition to these, media are a central set of tools 
from the viewpoint of communications research. 
For this study, nonverbal communication is extremely interesting. A) Nonverbal 
communication includes 1) communication with gestures, which is probably the 
oldest form of communication; the impulse to communicate is actually genetic. 
Another old and important form is 2) communication with pictures. B) Another 
categorization of nonverbal communication, according to Wiio, is a) communication 
through showing: facial expressions and gestures; b) communication through things: 
objects, clothing, buildings; c) communication through messages: pictures, tables; d) 
communication through time and place: punctuality, distance to the person one is 
speaking with. Other way of categorizations, too, are described in the literature.  
Language, both written and spoken, is probably the most important means of 
communication in interpersonal relations. Language is not, however, a tool used 
solely by humans; expressions that can be interpreted as language have been 
observed among animals, and even insects, as well. The study and properties of 
language is too broad a field to be included in this study. If the reader is interested in 
the subject, he should consult the literature in the field, e.g. the works by Wiio and 
Åberg. 
Internal Communication of the Individual 
One of the most useful theories explaining the detection and interpretation of 
early warnings is Wiio’s ”System Model of Information and the Information 
Process, ” figure 3.9.  
 
 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
Regulates and controls the work 
process of systems 
INFORMATION PROCESS 
Reorganization of parts and/or 
energy in the control system 
INFORMATION 
A change in the state of the control 
system 
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0-level: Changes generated by 
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1-level: changes generated by the 
control system itself 
2-level: changes generated by the 
environment of the control system  
Input 
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Can start new changes in the 
control system 
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Control functions 
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without any changes in the 
functions of the system 
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system controls 
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or outside the system 
STORED INFORMATION 
Data 
Knowledge 
 
 
Figure 3.9 System Model of Information and the Information Process   
[Wiio-74, p. 15] 
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According to the model, there exists so-called ”input information,” which occurs 
in the form of signals and stimuli. The actual information may have three levels 
(Figure 3.9). As a result of the information process, output information is formed; 
this can disappear from the system, cause feedback or be stored. 
The explanation provided by this model for the reception of information, 
messages and observations is extremely important for this study. Early warnings and 
weak signals appear often to be observations, non-verbal (unintentional) 
communication, etc. [Webb -87]. The basis of Wiio’s model lies in theories about 
how the human brain operates: how it functions as an information processing 
system. This is discussed in more detail in [Wiio -89, pp. 25…66]. 
 
3.2.4  The Facet Theory of Communications 
Åberg [-89] introduced his facet theory of communications in 1988. The theory 
is based on the theories or regularities in a person’s internal communication noted in 
various studies, e.g. the one by Wiio discussed in the previous section. Åberg uses as 
his starting point the structure of the human brain and the brain’s immense capacity, 
flexibility, ability to store information by associating it with prior knowledge, and 
the ability to recall information. He further states that the stimuli used by the brain in 
processing a message are either a) external, or received through the senses; b) 
internal, or previously stored stimuli used in thinking; or c) random noise. 
External stimuli are received through the senses. Different senses transmit 
different stimuli. Each occurrence of stimulus is multi-stimulied. Even though 
different senses give us different stimuli simultaneously, the magnitude of our 
response to them varies. In psychology, this is called the single-channel theory: 
compared to the channel that is the centre of attention, the other channels subside 
and become peripheral. However, the reception situation forms a unit, and the level 
of peripheral action of the channels can vary notably from moment to moment 
[Åberg -89, pp. 3…9].  
A facer is an impotent concept to help us better understands all of this. Åberg 
defines a facet as follows: 
A facet is a multidimensional image in our mind. A facet can be operationalized 
physiologically or information-theoretically. Physiologically it is a combination of 
those synaptic connections, which are activated in connection with a certain 
stimulus process. Communicationswise it consists of those images, which are 
activated, in processing a certain stimulus. Parallel concepts to facet are cell 
population, cognitive map, and schemes, often used by brain researchers (e.g.…).  
Facet is a multidimensional surface, which consists of images or associations. 
Facet has some point, which is clearer or more distinct than others. This is a core 
matter, an idea that for one reason or another has stayed in mind as an image in a 
certain stimulus environment. Weaker, more faded memory traces are connected to 
the core. They can be other parts of an incoming message or matters previously 
existing in our brain, which are activated together with the core idea.  [Åberg-89b, 
p. 11].   
 
 An association is either a piece of information or an assumption, combined with 
an attitude. Associations are activated in the context of processing a specific 
stimulus. Facets change; they expand and contract, new input can be connected to 
old facets. Thinking is the activation of facets: a good example of facet activation is 
creative thinking, where two previously unconnected facets intertwine. 
Stimuli are not fragmented; rather, they are perceived as forming a unit of 
thoughts. Stimuli transmitted by all of the senses influence the interpretation of the 
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”core message.” More information on the facet theory of communications and the 
arguments supporting it can be found in Åberg [-93] and in Åberg’s lecture abstract 
on the facet theory of communications [Åberg -89]. The hypotheses of Åberg’s facet 
theory of communications are presented in Åberg [-89, pp. 25…27]. 
 
3.2.5  Summary 
The phenomenon of early warnings and weak signals appears to contain 
communication-related elements, which include receiving signals and stimuli and 
interpreting them, as well as receiving messages. The ”knowledge” already exists in 
our environment in the form of signals; it becomes information when it has been 
received and interpreted. The knowledge itself consists of individual pieces of 
information. 
Wiio [-89] states that information can be knowledge transmitted to us by our 
senses, or it can be the result of our thinking. It can consist of various observations 
of the environment, or it can be verbal knowledge. Information is a relative concept, 
and it is connected to the receiver: what is surprising and what is uncertain depends 
on the receiver. Information comes about only when a signal is realized, that is, 
when it becomes conscious. Wiio gives the following definition of information: 
 Information is a change that occurs in the control system. The change may be 
permanent or temporary.      [Wiio-89, p. 59]. 
The ”System Model of Information and the Information Process” (Figure 3.9) 
presented by Wiio depicts how an individual processes the signals and stimuli he 
receives [Wiio -74]. Åberg’s facet theory of communications complements the 
picture of how a person processes information and how this information becomes 
knowledge and stored information [Åberg -89]. According to Åberg, every 
communication event is multi-stimulied [Åberg -93]. Stimuli received through all of 
the senses affect the interpretation of the ”core message.” 
The process of understanding and interpreting messages and information is 
always more or less vague; according to Wiio there are no absolutely exact 
interpretations of a message, only relatively exact ones [Wiio -95]. Understanding a 
message strongly depends on the receiver and his interpretation of it. Each of us has 
his own way of interpreting the messages and other information he receives; 
possibly all of these ways are different from one another. In interpreting and 
applying the results of the present research one should be mindful that the results 
represent interpretation of one person, not results arrived at through a statistical 
research method.   
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4.  Previous Studies on Early Warnings and 
Related Phenomena 
 
 
4.0  The Contents of the Chapter 
As the examination of the theory of weak signals showed, signals of the type 
described by the theory can be detected in the context of various activities. The 
purpose of this chapter is to depict how current project management literature treats 
the early warnings of project problems.  The chapter begins by defining what is 
meant with the term “early warnings” in this study. Next, certain studies concerning 
early warnings, examples of early warnings found in the literature, as well as the 
preliminary type categorization of early warnings are presented. The complex of 
problems to be examined is also studied from the perspective of project problems 
and related factors (figure 1.1). Other foci of the chapter include the criteria of 
success or failure of a project, project problems and their causes, the 
interdependencies between these factors, as well as steps taken to minimize the 
effects of the problems. 
 
4.1  About Early Warnings 
A comprehensive, unified study of the early warnings phenomenon wasn’t found 
in the survey of project management literature. As noted earlier, only Lientz et al. [-
95] have discussed the occurrence of symptoms and issues, which are related to the 
phenomenon to be studied. PMBOK [-95] mentions the concept “risk symptoms.” 
Almost every book on project management contains statements that can be 
interpreted as early warnings, even though the writer himself rarely refers to them as 
such. In the context of this study, very rough criteria have been used in collecting 
quotes of early warnings from literature. Emphasis has been placed on the links 
between Ansoff’s theory and project management literature in general. Some of the 
varied terms for the concept of early warnings, which were discussed in the general 
part of the theory of weak signals (see section 3.1). Other researches can be found in 
project management literature as well Lientz et al. [-95], Kerzbom et al. [-89], 
Cleland [-94] and Kerzner  [-95]. 
 
4.2  The Definition of Early Warnings 
Dictionaries of different languages give somewhat different definitions of the 
terms used in this study. For example, Nykysuomen Sanakirja [-80] (Dictionary of 
Contemporary Finnish) defines the term oire (symptom) in a way that is both 
broader and better suited for this study than the definition given in Webster’s [-92]. 
Webster’s Dictionary’s definitions are found on the following pages: warning, 
[Webster’s -92, p. 1109]; symptoms (Webster’s associates the word with medicine) 
[Webster’s -92, p. 1002]; signal, [Webster’s -92, p. 925]. 
The Delfoi study by Kuusi et al. [2000] has strived to both define the concept of 
an “early signal of the future” and to devise a kind of anti-definition for the same. 
The study gave a group of twelve experts twenty claims that they were asked to 
comment. The study was conducted as an Internet discussion. The research report 
includes a wide selection of the arguments the experts made to support their 
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comments.  The definition arrived at contains central features of early signals of the 
future, including a wider selection of the characteristics of such signals than the 
definition of early warnings used in this study. 
The main concepts that will be used in this study are “early warning” (and its 
abbreviation, “warning”) and its parallel concept “preliminary signal.” The term 
“symptom” will not be used, as this word is associated with medicine both in 
common parlance and according to Webster’s Dictionary. As noted earlier, the use 
of the concept “weak signals” will be limited to discussion of Ansoff’s theory and its 
derivatives, as well as to cases where the work cited uses this concept. This concept 
is defined in section 3.1. 
The concept of an early warning is defined in this study as follows: 
 
An early warning is an observation, a signal, a message or some other item that 
is or can be seen as an expression, an indication, a proof, or a sign of the existence of 
some future or incipient positive or negative issue. It is a signal, omen, or indication 
of future developments. 
 
The definition is based on the definition of the word “oire” (symptom) in 
Nykysuomen Sanakirja [-80] (The Dictionary of Contemporary Finnish). Hence, in 
accordance with the definition, it is typical for early warnings that: 
 
- They give information. 
- The matter, phenomenon or issue on which information is received might come 
to pass in the future. 
 
Of the above definitions, the former is related to communications while the latter 
ties the phenomenon to project risk management. 
 
4.3  Examples of Early Warnings 
Project management literature includes a few remarks that can be interpreted as 
examples of early warnings or even as weak signals as described in Ansoff’s theory. 
Kerzner presents a number of examples that in the opinion of the present author 
are examples of early warnings [Kerzner -95, pp. 284...286]. 
Communication traps 
-There may suddenly appear an exponential increase in the flow of paperwork, 
everyone is writing "protection" memos. Previously, everything was verbal... 
In this example, a change in behavior is the alarming early warning that should 
be paid attention to. Apparently something has happened in the project since there 
has been a change in its atmosphere, though what has happened cannot be inferred 
from the example. In addition, the situation in the example tells of something that 
has already happened; apparently it warns that leadership problems may arise in the 
project, and even the final result of the project can be imperiled. From this example 
it is possible to infer a situation similar to the formation of a chain of problems 
discussed in section 4.8 Cause-Problem Chains.  
Cleland also presents an excellent example of the detection and utilization of 
early warnings: 
I can walk onto any project site anywhere in the world and within a short time 
tell you if that project is going to be a winner. It’s easy; I just look at the people, 
what they are doing and how they are doing it. If the project people look 
determined, confident, enthusiastic, and busy, it’s a good bet that you’ve got a 
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winner team. If people respect each other, help each other and things seem to be 
getting done with a minimum amount of confusion, then you can be fairly certain 
that they have their act together and they will pull it off without much strain.     
[Cleland, -94, p. 462] 
In this example, group behavior reveals the mental state of the workplace to the 
observer.  The observation can be positive or negative. The example does not 
directly discuss a problem or its cause but it gives also a procedure with which one 
can actively observe early warnings (I can walk... I just look at the people...). 
In addition, the works by Kezsbom et al. [-89], Obradovitch and Stephanou  [-
90] and Whitten [-95] give examples, which can be seen as early warnings of 
problems. 
The Study by CII 
The Construction Industry Institute (CII) of the United States conducted a study 
in the early 1990s [Zeitoun and Oberlender -93]. The outcome of the study was that 
matters noted in the bidding phase of the project could possibly be utilized in 
assessing the realization of the project’s final result in terms of cost and schedule. 
Other Groups of Early Warnings 
The following sources include more consistent discussions that can be 
considered examples of early warnings regardless of the term used in the original 
text. Kleim and Ludin [-94] present a list of indicators (their term) that express the 
poor morale of the project group; these they call “Indicators of Poor Morale.” The 
book by Lewis [-93] includes a ten-page list called "Checklists for Managing 
Projects" (chapter 24). Nearly every item noted in it, if absent or poorly handled, can 
be a sign or cause of future problems. Kerzner [-95] and Cleland [-94. p. 405] 
present nearly identical lists of signs that characterize an effective and an ineffective 
project group. In addition, Cleland’s work includes several other statements that can 
be interpreted as warnings. Lientz et al. present a table called “Symptoms of 
Problems” [Lientz et al. -95, p.186]. Some of the causes of project failure discussed 
in Honko et al. [-82] can also be regarded as early warnings, depending on how early 
in the project they are recognized. 
 
4.4  Analyzing the Examples 
Preliminary Type Categorization of Early Warnings 
The two first research question are (section 1.5): 1) Can information of the type 
of Ansoff’s weak signals, referred to as ”early warnings” in this study, be found in 
project work? 2) Is it possible to design a description of the early warnings 
observations and a categorization of the early warnings? These are the questions that 
the present analysis is especially concerned with. 
For the study Nikander [-98] it was possible to select quotes from project 
management literature, which could function as examples of early warnings. For the 
table 4.1, this researcher accepted, on the basis of the definition presented in section 
4.2, a total of 91 examples of early warnings, divided into 8 main classes and 21 
subclasses. The example material collected from research literature can be found in 
full in table 4.2, appendix A.  This table gives bibliographical information for the 
quotes and a brief text sample of each quote. 
The choice of quotes has been made substantially more difficult by the lack of 
basic, case specific examples.  Summaries of broader studies, often conducted for 
purposes other than the analysis of early warnings, comprise the majority of the 
quotes. The present researcher has interpreted the results as early warnings.   
The largest main class, i.e. the one having the greatest number of examples, is 
formed by examples of preliminary signals (early warnings) expressed by the 
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personnel (41 % of examples). The second largest class is the collection of examples 
relating to project control and reporting (19 % of examples). Of the individual 
groups, the largest number of examples (19 %) concerns “interpersonal behavior.” 
The next largest group of examples concerns “attitudes and commitment to the 
project” (12 %). This does not necessarily mean that early warnings of these types 
are the most abundant in practical project work; rather, it indicates that the interest 
of the writers has been greatest in these areas.  
 
Table 4.1 
Main Type Groups of Early Warnings on the Basis of Project Literature 
           Literature references 
Warnings expressed by personnel, project group  40.6 % 
 Interpersonal behavior 
 Non-verbal information 
 Concealing difficulties 
 Attitudes and commitment to the project 
 Turnover rate of personnel 
 Professional competence of personnel 
 Personnel resources 
Project manager, management    10.9 % 
 Project manager as a person 
 Management 
 Insufficient management resources 
Project planning and objectives      8.8 % 
 Preliminary planning, errors made during the brainstorming phase 
 Ambiguous objectives 
 Project planning 
 Observations in the bidding phase 
Project control, reporting    18.7% 
 Progress of the project, quality level 
 Labour effectiveness 
 Delay monitoring systems 
 Changes in the cost estimate 
Working on the project       5.5 % 
 The character of the work initiation 
 Changes and disturbances in workflow 
 Repetition of the same work 
 Organization 
Communication       4.4 % 
Expressed by the project parties      6.6 % 
 Participation of the client 
 Support of the upper management, CEO 
 Contractor’s problems in devising a schedule 
Documents, reporting        4.4 % 
 Quality of the reports 
 Delay of the project 
     Total quotes              91  +  (Honko) 
 [Neil -89] [Kezsbom et al. -89], [Obradovitch -90], [Kerzner -95] [Fleming -92], 
[Bent -82], [Cleland -94], [Kleim and Ludin -94], [Smith -83], [Harrison -93], 
[Lientz et al. -95], [Zeitoun and Oberlender -93], [Honko et al -82] 
 
In certain situations, the causes of project failure presented by Honko et al. [-82] 
can possibly be also seen as some types of early warnings. They can also be 
interpreted as early warnings in the case that they are detected sufficiently early. 
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They include e.g. errors in the preliminary planning phase (35 pcs), the lack of 
various types of resources (31 pcs), several errors in the project planning phase (44 
pcs) and some problems in the implementation phase. As the material in Honko’s 
study is already in a summarized form, the figures may be incorrect.  
Other Characteristics Observed in the Examples 
Occurrence 
The examples that most plainly can be seen as early warnings contain a clear 
indication of their warning-like character. This seems to indicate that early warning 
observations, which comply with the definition, can be detected in the project 
environment. Most of the citations examined are already in a summarized, list-type 
form. The source itself characterizes some of them as warnings, whereas this 
researcher interprets others as early warnings on the basis of the context in which 
they are presented. 
The majority of the examples are observations of individual occurrences, which 
nevertheless can either reoccur in an identical or at least similar form, or can refer to 
the same problem. If this happens it is even possible to observe the formation of a 
chronological series. Some examples depict a continuous phenomenon, e.g. the 
actions and managerial style of the project leader. Clear chronological series can be 
observed especially in the context of deviations from the plan.  
 
Communicative Character 
In analyzing the examples found in literature, it can be readily observed that all 
of them give information of some type to the person receiving them. The examples 
discussed in greater detail are obviously communicational situations (cf. the citations 
above). See section 3.2, Definitions of Communication. 
 
The State of Knowledge and the Time Available 
The exactitude of the information provided by warnings seems to vary. 
Information received from non-verbal communication is apparently quite inexact, 
where as the information furnished by cost and schedule management can be very 
exact and can be expressed in figures. This leads to the conclusion that the state of 
knowledge presumably varies, as maintained by Ansoff in his theory. However, it 
isn’t possible to devise a scale of the states of knowledge on the basis of the 
material; moreover, it is difficult to form a judgment of the time available as 
described by Ansoff’s theory in the light of the examples. 
 
The Character of the Material and Categorization 
The material doesn’t support the framing of an actual categorization of early 
warnings. Several of the examples are of a very general character; only a few states, 
which project parties, they relate to or in which project phase they can be applied. In 
addition, the project problem referred to in the example is, in several cases, left for 
the reader to infer or guess; the writer doesn’t necessarily report what the problem is 
that his example pertains to. 
A number of situations are described that at the moment of observation can be 
regarded as problems as well. These include: sabotage of other people’s work; 
hidden feelings; conflict avoidance at all costs; poor quality of workmanship; low 
productivity. 
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The Link to Project Risk Management 
The project management literature doesn’t make a direct connection between 
project risk management and the examples or lists interpreted as early warnings. 
Only some of the more extensive quotes include a clear reference to the potential 
problem. The link to project risk management can be inferred from the context in 
which the example is discussed in the original text. For example, [Niwa -89] 
presents his concept “indicators/hint” together with the concept “keyword” in the 
context of his model (see section 9.3.). His “indicators/hint” concept and the concept 
of early warnings cannot be considered identical. The literature on project risk 
management doesn’t appear to contain references to early warning type phenomena. 
[Artto-94], [Ashley -89a], [Ashley -89b], [Bufaied -87], [Chapman and Ward -97], 
[Down, Coleman, Absolon -94], [Franke -89], [Internet-89], [Kähkönen -96], 
[Levine-95], [Levine-96] and [Pasedag -89].  
 
4.5  Failure Assessment Criteria 
The dividing line between the success and failure of a project is subjective and 
vague. Different interest groups and different people have divergent views on the 
matter. The criteria for success or failure may vary depending on the times [Lientz et 
al. -95]. Project objectives can be used as assessment criteria, e.g. performance, cost, 
and schedule objectives (PCT) [Lewis -93]. There can also be other criteria, such as 
security factors, constructional factors, buildability, various quality appraisals etc. 
The subject has been discussed extensively by several researchers, e.g. [Kerzner -
95], [Lewis -93],  [Broaddus -91], [Jaselskis -88], [Cleland -94], [Struckenbruck -
82], [de Wit -85] [Tuman -83], [Salapatas -86], [Murphy et al.-74], [Ashley -89a], 
[Migh -85] and [Pinto and Slevin -92].  
A project can be said to have succeeded at least in the case that, once it is 
completed, it fulfills the expectations of its owner (client, end users, interest groups) 
[Harrison-93] and [Honko et al. -82]. Common and unambiguous assessment criteria 
that would be satisfactory for all interest groups and in all cases are impossible to 
define; no single figure can depict the end result. Qualitative concepts and verbal 
assessments must suffice.  
 
4.6  Causes of the Success and/or Failure of Projects 
The prerequisites of a project’s success include those things that have to be in 
order before the project is initiated, and/or those matters that need to be attended to 
during the initial phases of the project (defining and project planning) [Lewis -93, 
Checklist of PM]. The causes of failure are factors that have been handicaps during 
the project. In Nikander [-98], the assertion is made that the causes of success and 
the causes of failure are opposite sides of the same issue. 
The matter has been commendably discussed from very distinct perspectives by 
numerous writers, including [Cleland -94], [Lewis -93], [Harrison -93], [Baker et al. 
-83], [Lientz et al. -95], [Morris, P. -94] and [Jaselskis -88]. In his doctoral 
dissertation, Lim [-87] examines, as a cause-effect network, which behavioral 
factors affect construction project performance. Honko et al. [-82] investigated in 
1982 the failure of Finnish industrial investments.  
A summary, aided by various sources, is attached to table 4.3 (Appendix A). 
When the causes of failure are compared with project problems selected from 
project management literature, several common factors are found. The main 
difference lies in the writers’ assertion that the causes of failure directly or indirectly 
affect the criteria of success/failure (PCT). 
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4.7  Project Problems and Their Causes 
Project problems provide another perspective from which the issue of the success 
and failure of projects has been examined in project management literature. The 
word “problem” is defined in Webster’s Dictionary [Webster’s -92, p. 797].  
 
In this study, “project problems” signify phenomena that interfere with the 
completion of a project. They usually bring about immediate concerns for the project 
management. 
 
However, the problem may only become tangible in the future. In that case, if it 
is detected ”in the present,” it is a potential problem and therefore fulfills partly the 
definition of risk. Project management literature and various studies explore these 
difficulties in project management in several management areas and using a 
somewhat varied terminology. 
A third approach is to examine the causes of problems.  ”Cause” is defined in 
[Webster’s -92, p. 156]. 
 
The causes of problems in this study signify those factors or phenomena that are 
perceived to have led to the problem. 
 
The cause of a problem may be a past event that is impossible to alter. In this 
case, the cause is ‘history.’ The cause may also be outside the influence of the 
project management.  
The study Nikander [-98] examines the project problems and their causes found 
in project management literature. Table 4.4. These problems and causes are divided 
into main groups and subgroups; this can be found in table 4.5. (Appendix A). 
 
Table 4.4 
Project Problems and their Causes, Main Groups,  
on the Basis of Project Literature 
      Problems   Causes 
Schedule problem, delay, time 11,8 % - 
Cost-related problem 5,9 % - 
Delivery problem, performance 10,8 % - 
Project environment, consultant 4,9 % 7,2 % 
Ambiguous objectives 10,8 % 10,5 % 
Client with no CEO support 6,9 % 8,0 % 
Management problems, combined 12,7 % 8,6 % 
Project manager as a person 6,9 % 7,5 % 
Organization / Staff 14,7 % 6,4 % 
Personnel problems in general 21,6 % 18,8 % 
Project planning in general 8,8 % 20,6 % 
Monitoring and project control 4,9 % 5,4 % 
Communication 4,9 % 4,0 % 
Engineering 2,9 % 4,3 % 
Total quotes 102 373 
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The table shows the total number of citations (462), as well as whether the writer 
has considered the citation a problem (102) and/or a cause of problems (373). This 
shows that all main groups include both problems and causes of problems. Causes of 
problems are discussed much more frequently; cases where the writer considers the 
citation to exemplify both a problem and a cause are very few.  
Although the problem and cause categories seem to overlap in the above table, 
project literature does consider these concepts separate. That model is followed in 
the present study as well, although the similarities are recognized. 
The example material collected from research literature can be found in full in 
study Nikander [-98], section 5.3 (partly in Finnish), in appendix 5.1, and 
bibliographical code in the end of references.  The appendix gives bibliographical 
information for the quotes and a brief text sample of each quote. The present author 
has, in addition to the above, examined each factor presented in the citations from 
the perspectives of warnings, problems, and causes of problems. For each citation, 
the researcher asked: Can the observation in some circumstances or at some time be 
interpreted as a) an early warning, are the phenomenon in other circumstances and at 
a different time as b) a problem, and in still other circumstances and at a still 
different time as c) a cause of problems? Figure 4.1 illustrates this analysis of the 
interpretation of the meaning of the observation from various perspectives of the 
subject under examination. This is a research method, which can also be considered 
an observation. 
The analysis is made more difficult by the fact that most of the material is 
composed of the results of different studies and analyses; it consists of summaries of 
broader primary data. Due to the general character of the material, examining it can 
derive no detailed categorization.  Nevertheless, when the material gathered from the 
literature is examined in greater detail, it is clear that quite a few citations can be 
interpreted differently when placed in a different context of project circumstances. 
 
  Problems perspective 
 
 
 
 
 
         Phenomenon 
 
 
     Observation 
 
Warnings perspective       Causes perspective 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The Possibilities of Interpretation of the Meaning of the 
Observed Matter from Different Perspectives 
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4.8  Cause-Problem Chains  
Several authors have presented clear cause-problem chains.  Kerzner [-95] 
discusses several causes of personnel problems, which immediately creates cause 
and effect chains [Kerzner -95, pp. 200...201]. Lientz et al. [-95] discuss causes and 
effects in two different sections of their book: ”Problems and Opportunities within 
the Project Team” and “Opportunities and Problems in Project” [Lientz et al. -95, 
pp. 123...124 and pp. 183...197). Kerzbom et al [-89] examine barriers to effective 
teamwork and the causes of those barriers in their chapter  “Barriers to Team 
Performance” [Kerzbom et al -89, pp. 285...289]. 
The study Nikander [-98] discusses some hypothetical cause-problem chains, 
which are partly based on the literature mentioned above and partly formed through 
inference. These show that cause-problem chains can be long and have several 
offshoots. A crucial finding is the fact, noted earlier as well, that the character of the 
interpreted causes and problems varies depending on the perspective adopted in the 
observation; similarly, the causes and problems surface at different times in the 
project. They are detected in different ways: either as a current problem, as a past 
cause for a problem, or as a potential future problem (risk). A broader analysis of 
these, with the aid of the information provided by project management literature and 
of inference, would be rather theoretical, as the literature only furnishes summary-
type results. 
 
4.9  Responses and Observation Procedures 
General 
Generally speaking, a response will in the present study denote all those actions 
taken by project management that are related to the early warnings observation. 
Such actions include e.g. detecting and analyzing warnings, remedial efforts in 
decision-making or in response to problems, etc. The former can best be described 
as monitoring. Remedial efforts are the steps that the project management takes in 
order to eliminate or minimize the detrimental effects of a project problem for the 
project’s end result. This is one of the study’s focus areas, presented in figure 1.1. 
The term “observation procedures” denotes those actions that strive to procure 
additional information about the problems. 
Responses 
Possible remedial responses to the effect of problems form an extensive subject 
in the literature; due to the limited resources of this research, it cannot be here 
discussed in great detail. 
Project management literature contains consistent presentations of problems and 
the responses related to them; e.g. the following sources are useful: [Kerzner -95], 
[Kerzsbom et al -89], [Lewis -93] and [Lientz et al. -95]. Often these studies are 
based on the research and publications of Slevin, Pinto, Thamhain and Wilemont. 
The structure and content of books on project management, however, is in itself 
an account of the content of project problems and of the techniques that can be used 
to avoid them. The books instruct their reader in sound project management and 
leadership; usually they are textbooks. In addition, the literature discusses general 
methods of problem analysis and approaches to problems, (see Table 7.3.1), [Lewis 
-93], [Kezsbom et. al. -89], [Kerzner -95], [Harrison -93], [Lientz et al. -95], 
[Whitten  -95]. 
Observation procedures 
The different levels of detection techniques presented in section 3.1.5, Detecting 
Weak Signals, can be considered observation procedures. The surveyed literature 
discusses several systematic observation procedures for detecting weak signals and 
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early warnings and for environmental scanning. The methods of risk identification 
can also be useful (see section 2.5.4).  These observation procedures are often 
laborious and require specially trained personnel; this is unlikely to please the 
project owners, as it will increase project costs. The section 3.1.5 emphasizes the 
significance of people as observers, “sensors,” and the fact that detecting warnings is 
something all personnel should be engaged in. A survey of communications yields a 
simple observation procedure that seems suitable for project work, and that 
endeavors to employ already existing forums (parts of the project organization). The 
section also points out that people are important as sources of signals. Other sources 
mentioned include documents, papers and corporations. 
 
4.10  Summary 
The early warnings observations described in figure 1.1, as well as project failure 
and project problems and the causes of these, are in this chapter examined from the 
perspective of project management literature and theories. The perspectives of other 
fields were previously discussed in chapter 3. 
 
4.10.1 Early Warnings 
The treatment of early warnings relating to project problems seems to be quite 
scattered. Only one source, Lientz et al. [-95], takes the existence of warnings into 
account a more systematic fashion. The theories of project management do not 
appear to be thoroughly familiar with the early warnings phenomenon of problems. 
The first part of the definition of early warnings alludes to communications, while 
the second part links early warnings to project risk management. The definitions 
found in dictionaries have been augmented by adding, positive issues, or 
opportunities, to the definition according to the model of Ansoff’s theory. 
Although the literature yields citations that can serve as examples of early 
warnings, good examples of early warnings are scarce. The preliminary type 
categorization of early warnings is presented in the chapter. Material provided by the 
literature seems to give clear indications that warnings of different types of problems 
can be detected during projects; these warnings are observed to have a 
communicational character. All “phenomena” selected as examples of warnings give 
the observer additional information on the project situation and/or on potential 
problems. The chapter analyzes examples found in literature and designs a summary 
of them in the table 4.1 (included also in table 6.7.1). The relation of warnings to 
project risk management remains unclear; according to their definition, warnings can 
be included in project risk management, but on the basis of the literature the manner 
in which this inclusion is to be made remains ambiguous. 
 
4.10.2  Project Problems 
Assessing project success is subjective and can be “measured” in several ways. 
The assessment criteria vary depending on the interest group and the time of 
assessment. Probably the most common practice is to measure the level of success 
using the project objectives (Performance, Cost, Time). A number of writers state 
that failure in these objectives (PCT) is a cause of project failure. However, failure 
in these objectives is always caused by one or more preceding events or project 
problems. The material collected from literature seems to indicate that project 
problems and the causes of problems are at least to a degree parts of the same factor 
group even though they can be interpreted differently when observed from different 
perspectives or at different times. The results of the literature survey have been 
included in the table 4.4 and the table 4.5 in Appendix A. The observations of 
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phenomena that may be interpretable as early warnings seem to at least partly belong 
to the same group.  
An important point is that while comparing Bufaied’s risk factors (variables) (see 
figure 2.5) to the project problem lists and causes of failure found in other sources, a 
clear similarity can be observed both in terminology and in content. His risk 
variables presented seems to be very similar to the problems presented in the table 
4.4 
Chains of early warnings, problems, and problem causes can be found in project 
literature and research. These chains can apparently be quite long and have several 
offshoots. The chain phenomenon is similar to the phenomenon observed in project 
risk management studies. These observations, too, connect the project problem 
phenomenon and the project risk phenomenon with each other. The chain is 
illustrated in figure 4.2. 
 
 
  The observed situation "today", at time T  
 
 The observed situation "tomorrow",  at time T+m 
The cause of 
problem C 
"today" 
Problem C 
“today” 
Early warning C 
Potential problem D 
New early warnings 
The cause of potential problem D 
   The observed situation "yesterday", at time T-n 
The cause of 
problem A , 
phenomenon, 
"yesterday" 
Problem A , 
phenomenon, 
"yesterday" 
Early warning A, 
observation, 
"yesterday" 
Potential problem B, 
phenomenon, risk 
"yesterday" 
Other early warnings, 
observations 
The cause of potential problem B, 
phenomenon,  
"yesterday" 
The cause of 
problem B 
"today" 
Problem B 
“today” 
Early warning B 
Potential problem C 
New early warnings 
The cause of potential problem C 
Responses 
Responses 
Responses 
 
 
Figure 4.2 The Chain of Problem Causes, Problems, Early Warnings and 
Responses 
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Problem (A), detected at a time T-n (“yesterday”), has its causes. This problem 
(A) can give rise to a potential problem (B); hence, it is the cause of (B). If this 
causal relationship is detected immediately, the observation of problem (A) can also 
be regarded as an early warning of the potential problem (B). When problem (B) 
materializes at a time T (“today”), (A) has become the cause of problem (B). 
Nevertheless, when (A) was detected at the time (T-n), the observation of it was an 
early warning of problem (B). Such a situation may recur at the time T “today,” in 
which case detections anticipate a situation at the time T+m “tomorrow” and give 
early warnings of a potential problem (C). The chain can be extremely long, even 
nearly endless. Additionally, studies of project risk management show that the chain 
may branch. Different responses should also be added to the chain. 
Project literature appears to discuss the responses related to separate problems in 
a very limited manner. The structure of the literature itself includes 
recommendations of actions that can be taken to avoid project problems. The aim of 
the literature is to instruct readers in “correct” project management. This chapter 
examines the relationship between remedial responses to the phenomenon under 
examination. The purpose of these responses is to minimize the negative effects of 
project problems on the progress of the project, as well as to detect possibilities for 
the utilization of positive opportunities. Table 7.3.1 presents a brief summary of the 
way that project literature interconnects project problems and response 
recommendations. 
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5.  A Summary of the Literature Survey 
 
 
5.1  The Existence of Early Warnings 
The literature survey appears to have given a partly positive answer to the first of 
the research questions posed in section 1.6.1. Project literature seems to contain 
examples that can be interpreted to fulfill the definition of early warnings and to 
provide the project management with information that is of the type of Ansoff’s 
weak signals. Presumably the concept of “weak signals” used by Ansoff and the 
concept “early warning” are parallel concepts. In agreement with the definition, it is 
typical for early warnings that: 
 
- They give information. 
- The matter, phenomenon or issue on which information is received 
may come to pass in the future. 
 
On the basis of the literature survey a summary and a preliminary type 
categorization of early warnings could be made. The type categorization and the 
summary are representative to a very limited extent, due to the narrowness of the 
material; to acquire further information, empirical research is needed. It is 
interesting to note that both communications studies and the research on strategic 
intelligence in military science are ostensibly familiar with the early warnings 
phenomenon. The examples collected from literature really do seem to be of a 
communicational character; they give information to the observer. The literature 
survey gave only ancillary information concerning the remaining research questions. 
 
5.2  Project Management 
Of the so-called classic methods of project management, the cost and schedule 
control methods are probably the best tools for mapping potential future problems of 
a project. The currently available commercial computer programs have made these 
methods so easy to apply that they have become everyday tools for project 
managers. The main handicap of these methods is that they are based on information 
from the project history, which means that a forecast made with them is 
extrapolative and always somewhat late. In addition, the methods can’t effectively 
take the possibly changing project circumstances into account. 
In recent years, project risk management has been the fastest-developing area of 
project management. High expectations are placed on project risk management: it is 
hoped that it will become as everyday a procedure as schedule management has been 
so far. This, however, has not yet been achieved. 
At the time of writing, the most common of the currently available project 
management methods do not seem to offer effective tools for turbulent project 
environments where unexpected changes may occur. 
 
5.3  The Applicability of the Theory of Weak Signals to Project 
Work 
Section 3.1.3 examined what part of the focus areas in the study which related to 
Ansoff’s theory of weak signals, and concluded that Ansoff’s theory encompasses 
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much the same area as this study, but places more emphasis on corporate activity 
and especially strategic management. On the basis of reviewing studies that support 
Ansoff’s theory, which report several kinds of early warnings, a need arises to 
examine the suitability of Ansoff’s theory to all project work, not only project 
control. Some studies indicate that the phenomenon under examination might be 
applicable in the human leadership of projects. 
Table 5.1 compares operational ranges of Ansoff’s theory with those of project 
work. A noteworthy point is a certain difference in scale and in the management 
environment: Ansoff’s theory is mainly concerned with the strategies of 
corporations (especially large ones), while the focus in project work lies in the daily 
management of activities and personnel. Another significant difference is the 
duration of the operations. 
 
Table 5.1 The Operational Ranges of Ansoff’s Theory versus Those of Projects  
Ansoff’s theory                    versus  Projects    
 Both look for additional information about future events. 
        Both include the need to anticipate the future. 
The external operating environment  The internal and external  
of a company.    environment of projects. 
Strategic management   Daily management and project control 
Unexpected significant changes  Unpredictable events, even small 
changes 
Continuous activity over several years The short implementation time of 
projects 
Continuity in activity   One-time event, no repetition  
 
On the whole, the difference in scale is so great that Ansoff’s theory can hardly 
be applied as such to project work. However, the principles of the theory should be 
applicable, and some parts of the theory may possibly be utilized as such; one of 
these is the state of knowledge of early warnings. 
 
5.4  Preliminary Type Categorization of Early Warnings  
Section 4.4. presents a preliminary type categorization of early warnings on the 
basis of the examples (quotes)  from research literature. This categorization contains 
eight main groups, divided into twenty-one subgroups.  The categorization has been 
designed on the basis of the content of the quotes. However, categorizing the 
examples has been complicated by the fact that the writers who are quoted have not 
necessarily meant their statements to be examples of early warnings; instead, these 
statements are usually summaries of broader studies.  Actual case specific examples 
are very few. 
  
5.5  Project Problems and Their Causes 
On the basis of the formulation of the research problem, early warnings are 
closely connected with project problems. Examination shows the similarities 
between project problems, their causes, and in part even early warnings. 
Nevertheless, all observations found in the literature do not fulfill the definitions of 
all the concepts; some only fulfill the definition of one or possibly two concepts. On 
the basis of the literature survey, it looks like project problems and the causes of 
these problems can be seen as parts of the same class of variables. Apparently this 
class can also include those events that lead to observations, which can be 
interpreted as early warnings. Responses, on the other hand, are a completely 
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distinct class of variables. A set theory presentation of this can be found in figure 8.2 
(chapter 8). 
The examples from literature, as well as some studies concerned with project 
problems, form long and branching chains or networks of problems and their causes. 
In examining such a network it can be noted that the same thing (event) can be 
interpreted at once as a project problem or as the cause of another problem; or the 
observation made of the event can function as an early warning of a potential future 
problem. A similar phenomenon can be observed in project risk management.  The 
character of the interpretation of the detected factors (phenomena) seems to vary 
depending on the perspective and time of observation. This helps explain the above-
noted set theory view (or vice versa).  
 
5.6 The Relation between the Phenomenon and Project Risk 
Management 
The concepts “problem” and “risk” can apparently be considered to be related to 
each other.  The difference between them is mostly composed by the uncertainty of 
the materialization of risks, and by the association of risks with the future. Normally 
risks have sources and causes (risk factor; cause of risk). Similarly, these concepts 
are parallel to the causes of project problems. Risks and risk factors are observed to 
have the capacity to form long and branching causal chains or networks; in such a 
case the risks influence one another. The early warnings phenomenon can apparently 
be included as a part of project risk management theories, since an early warning 
provides information about a potential impending problem. The links between the 
various concepts are illustrated in figure 7.15 (chapter 7). 
  
5.7  A Model Illustrating the Character of the Phenomenon 
As pointed out in section 1.6, one of the research objectives is to design a model 
and a categorization of the character of the phenomenon under examination. 
Ansoff’s theory cannot satisfy this condition (figure 3.8). On the basis of the 
material collected from the literature, it is possible to devise a preliminary model 
illustrating the character of the early warnings observations (figure 5.1).  
 
     TIME 
 
   
The moment of observation 
 
 
    Available time 
 
The stream of project events 
 
 
     Information Response 
Problem 
Processing 
 
 
Figure 5.1 A Preliminary Model Illustrating the Character of the Phenomenon 
 
The model views project events as a time-bound continuous stream of events. At 
a given moment, information about this stream can be procured (e.g. early warnings 
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of potential future project problems). This information is processed in some manner, 
and responses are required in order to influence the flow of the project. It should be 
noted that decision-making takes time, and responses can be implemented only in 
the future. In addition, responses are always concerned with future events: due to the 
time-bound character of a project, past events can no longer be affected. Only 
remedial responses are possible. A crucial factor in choosing a response appears to 
be, according to Ansoff, time available for responses before the potential problem 
significantly impacts the project. 
 
5.8  A Utilization Model 
The literature does not appear to provide a model that could as such be applied to 
the utilization of early warnings in project work. There are, however, several models 
designed for different situations and that can be used as starting point for the 
utilization of early warnings in project management. The SIMS models, presented 
by Ansoff and other writers, have potential, but can in practice be too cumbersome, 
slow, and expensive for use in project work. All these models are intended to be 
used in activities that stretch continuously over several years. The slowness of the 
operation causes a delay in the acquisition of information, which isn’t desirable in 
fast-paced project work. The models also seem to require creating new 
organizational functions; because of the extra costs this entails, the project owners 
will be averse to it unless indisputable added value for the project can be shown. 
On the basis of the information gathered from the literature, a preliminary model 
of the early warnings of project problems have been devised; the model is shown in 
figure 5.2.  
The starting point of the model is the stream of project events illustrated in figure 
5.1. The observer notes of these events and receives messages and signals. He either 
accepts a message as an early warning or disregards it. In the affirmative case, he 
determines the content of the information he has received, its significance for the 
project and the time available for responses. At this point at the latest, another 
person may enter the picture  a decision-maker who determines the possible 
responses. According to the model of social action, all this is influenced by 
situational factors as well as by norms, values, and beliefs. In addition, the model 
shows that responses influence project events. The model contains two anticipations 
of the future, the first when estimating the effect of the early warnings, and the 
second when estimating the impact of the responses. 
 
  
Nikander    64 
 
 
 Decision-maker 
Observer 
The stream of project events 
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Is it  Early Warning ? 
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Figure 5.2 A Preliminary Model for the Utilization of Early Warnings. 
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6. The Field Studies 
 
 
6.1  The Choice of Research Method 
The literature survey shows that there appears has been little research done on 
the theory of weak signals [Webb -87], [Weschke -94]. Only one study concerning 
early warnings in actual projects was found [Zeitoun and Oberlender -93]; 
however, this does not appear to be an academic paper. In project management 
literature, the subject has been discussed in a rather sporadic manner, although 
studies that touch upon the subject matter do exist [Bufaied -87] [Broaddus -91] 
[Morris, R -97] [Betts -82] [Herman -96]. For these reasons, the qualitative 
research method, rarely found in traditional research literature on industrial 
economics, was selected for this study. However, quantitative methods were 
included within the qualitative analysis.  
The research process follows the course outlined by Patton [-90]: 1) the 
collection of raw findings, 2) the interviewing methods, 3) preliminary estimates 
(conceptualization), 4) designing a categorization (coding), 5) description, 6) the 
analyses, and 7) generalization. As sources of information, the research mainly 
uses interviews (activities and structured interactions). In addition to this, 
especially case studies use archived documents, files and records, as well as 
monitor the events in the course of a case project (informal interactions and 
unplanned activities). 
 The method of field studies is a semistructured (thematic) interview approach 
[Hirsijärvi and Hurme -93]. Categorization is designed as one phase of analysis 
together with the description of the phenomenon. In the actual qualitative analysis, 
material is processed using phenomenological analysis on the one hand and logical 
analysis on the other, employing tables drawn up on the basic of quantitative 
analysis.  
In qualitative research, no demands, at least not a priori ones, can be set for 
measuring the material. In this study, the material itself will indicate whether it is 
possible to measure the time available as used by Ansoff or the state of knowledge 
in a single observation element. In other respects, the observation element either 
does or does not belong to the observed group.  
 
6.2  The Implementation of the Field Studies 
The field research section is divided into two parts: 1) the basic interviews, and 
2) the interviews and research within the case projects. The reasons that led to the 
choice of the semistructured interview method have been explained in the preceding 
section. The focus of the basic interviews is 1) to find out whether information akin 
to Ansoff’s weak signals, called early warnings in this study, can be detected in 
project work; 2) if early warning signals can be detected, to form a description and a 
categorization of the phenomenon and 3) to discover how early warning signals 
relate to different project problems. 
The objective of the case projects is to test whether the results obtained in 
analyzing the material from the basic interviews can be found in actual projects. 
Another important reason for collecting the case material was that no reliable 
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information on the causes of project problems could be gathered from the 
participants during the basic interviews. Especially the following research questions 
are emphasized: 4) Can observations made of early warnings, project problems, and 
the causes of problems be chained together and networked, and can their character 
vary depending on the point and time of observation?  
The group selected for the basic interviews was small, but at the same time it 
was widely representative of the different areas and parties within the professional 
project field in Finland. The selection of the case projects was dictated by their 
availability, i.e., the willingness of the owners to take part in the study.  
Both interview periods were conducted as semistructured interviews by the 
researcher. The basic interviews were conducted in the fall of 1993 and the case 
project interviews in the spring of 1995. All those who participated in the basic 
interviews were asked essentially the same questions. In contrast, the questions used 
in the case interviews were mainly concerned with events in the case project and 
therefore varied from case to case. All interviews were taped and transcribed in part 
by the researcher and in part by outside help. Between the interview periods, the 
researcher preliminarily analyzed the basic interview material. The final analysis 
was conducted after all the interviews had been completed. Only the researcher took 
part in the actual analysis. 
 
6.3  The Basic Interviews 
6.3.1   The Interviews Question Frame of the Research 
The final set of questions was determined after two test interviews. The 
questions are summarized in the question frame (Table 6.3.1). The matrix shows 
which areas, project phases, project parties, and project problem areas the questions 
targeted (indicated by the shaded area in the matrix).  
 
Table 6.3.1 
The Question Frame 
Project phases Engineering Procurement Delivery Site
Project parties
Owner / Client
Consultant
Supplier
Contractor
Project
Problems Project culture
Objective
Project manager / management
Project team / organization
Personnel / motivation
Project planing / control
Communication
Change of project / Technical details
External factors
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The project phases and parties in the upper portion of the table are based on 
project management literature and on the experiences of the researcher in projects. 
The lower portion is mainly concerned with project problems.  
The project phases are typical of investment projects in industrial establishments. 
They are, in a simplified form, the phases of a project life cycle as presented in the 
literature (Figure 2.1) [Lewis -93], [Kezsbom et al. -89], [Cleland -94]. a) The 
engineering phase includes the preliminary engineering, design and project planning 
phase conducted prior to the actual decision to implement the project, as well as the 
engineering and design carried out during the project. The main part of the 
engineering phase comes before orders are placed; due to the overlapping of project 
phases, however, engineering and design today continues nearly throughout the 
project.  b) The procurement phase is in this study considered to last from the 
invitation to bid to the placing of the order. Despite its fairly short duration, this 
period has been selected as a separate phase, because during it the final 
implementation of the project is largely determined. Mistakes made during this 
phase often crucially affect the subsequent phases of the project.  c) The delivery 
phase  
covers the time from the ordering of the equipment to their delivery to the site. d) 
The site phase includes all activities in the actual construction site. Project parties 
include the most important of the project stakeholders (Figure 2.2) as described by 
Cleland [-94] and Kerzner [-95]. a) The client is the owner of the establishment 
under construction, the person or firm (including the personnel) that has 
commissioned the project. b) The consultant is the main consultant or the project 
management consultant whom the client has employed to manage the planning of 
the implementation of the project, as well as (in many cases) the management and/or 
the main technical engineering of the project.  The consultant can be either an 
independent firm or a separate result unit within the client’s firm. c) The supplier 
group includes all companies that manufacture and supply equipment for the project. 
The suppliers can also be responsible for the installation of their equipment. d) The 
contractor group includes those companies that carry out construction or installation 
work at the construction site. The contractors do not actually manufacture anything 
outside the site.  The line between a supplier and a contractor is somewhat vague. 
The lower part of the question frame is formed by the project problems and 
causes of project failure summarized in the literature (table 4.4). The scope of the 
project problems presented in the question frame was narrowed down on the basis of 
the test interviews; questions concerning project culture, [Cleland -94], [Kerzner -
95] and project changes were added. The questions about problems regarding the 
owner and the support of the upper management are situated in the upper part of the 
frame. The questions regarding the project manager include questions on project 
management and functional organization. Questions about project planning, 
monitoring, and control can also be referred to as questions on project techniques. 
Technical details are included in the group of questions regarding project changes. 
 
6.3.2  The Questions Used in the Interviews 
The body of the basic interviews consisted of a list of questions, prepared in 
advance, that the interviewees answered freely. The foundation for the list of 
questions is formed by the question frame (table 6.3.1), to which were added more 
detailed project situations and problems. First, two test interviews were conducted, 
on the basis of which the list of questions was then revised. The complete list of 
questions is included in table 6.3.2, appendix B.  
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The questions are not divided evenly across the question frame of research (table 
6.3.1). Different questions from the complete list were selected for different 
interviewees, depending on the interviewee’s experience in projects and his or her 
role as a project party. For example, the questions from group C, “problems caused 
by the client,” were not asked of persons whose role in projects had always been that 
of a representative of the client. 
The questions are divided into three groups (see table 6.3.2, appendix B): 
- Group A questions explore the interviewee’s knowledge of project management 
theories and his views of projects 
-  Group B questions endeavor to map the project experiences of the interviewee, 
using very open questions 
-  Group C questions include fully open semistructured interview questions. Most of 
the questions in-group C, though open in their format, relate to the question frame, 
both the upper part (project phases/project parties) and the lower part (project 
problems). The questions focus on: 1) the problems caused by the client and the 
early warnings of these problems in different phases of the project (engineering, 
procurement/delivery, and site phases); 2) the consultant-related problems and their 
early warnings in the same project phases; 3) the equipment supplier; 4) the 
construction site contractor. A subgroup of questions concerned the various areas of 
project work and the problems related to these areas, such as differences in project 
culture, project management and management styles; organization and personnel; 
project techniques; communication; changes; and external factors in the project. 
When necessary, follow-up questions were asked during the interview. 
 
6.3.3   The Persons Interviewed 
The sample of persons selected for the basic interview was small (17 persons), 
but sufficient for a qualitative analysis (cf. the recommendation by Järvenpää [-96]). 
The selection was influenced by the wish to interview persons in different planning 
and industrial fields, as well as representatives of construction firms, project 
consultancies and clients. In addition, a range of persons engaged in different project 
tasks was sought. Another factor dictating the choice of interviewees was the 
willingness of the parties to give interviews; this was usually aided by acquaintance.  
The interviews were conducted in the fall of 1993 either at the home or the 
workplace of the interviewee. The time used for the interview varied from one hour 
to several, depending on the interest of the interviewee, as well as on how much time 
he or she could spare. The project and work experience of the interviewees is shown 
in table 6.3.3 (appendix B). The information in the table is based on the resumés 
submitted by the interviewees. 
Of the interviewees, eight (8) were engineers and nine (9) held a degree of 
Master of Science in engineering. The age of the interviewees ranged from 36 to 64 
years, and the amount of work experience (the time from graduation to the interview 
date) varied from 12 to 41 years. The project experience of the interviewees (years 
in project work) ranged from 4 to 27 years. The type of experience varied greatly 
between different interviewees. Work experience and project experience may not 
correlate, since all the interviewees had not worked exclusively in projects. To refer 
to the division of parties presented in the question frame, interviewees included 
persons who had worked only with one project party (client, consultant, or supplier) 
as well as persons who had experience working for several parties. 
Divided by industrial fields, the interviewees had experience in wood processing 
industry, construction, traditional and nuclear power plants, base metal industry, 
processing industry and engineering industry. Most of the interviewees had mainly 
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worked in Finland, but about half of them also had experience of overseas 
commissions. 
The objective in all of case projects was to interview representatives of each 
project party: the customer, the consultant, the supplier and the contractor. This 
could not be accomplished in every case, as the relevant persons were unavailable or 
abroad. In total, 32 people were interviewed in the case projects, the number of 
interviewees varying between six (6) and ten (10) within each project.  In case 
project 4, all the interviewees were employed by the same firm, but represented 
different offices or different divisions of the firm, in addition to having different 
tasks. Four (4) of these persons had already been interviewed during the basic 
interviews, and thus were already familiar with the idea of weak signals. The idea 
was explained to the others in the course of the interview. Of the interviewees, 13 
held a degree of Master of Science in engineering, 17 were engineers, and two (2) 
had been trained as technicians. The age, years of work experience and years of 
experience in projects of the interviewees were within approximately the same limits 
as those of the persons interviewed for the basic interviews. 
The Project Experience / Expertise of the Interviewees 
Various perspectives can be adopted in assessing the expertise, experience and 
professional skills of a person.  He may possess in-depth knowledge and extensive 
experience of one aspect of the profession, but be relatively ignorant of other 
aspects: for example, an experienced lathe operator may be an expert in his own 
craft while not mastering other areas of machine operation.  On the other hand, a 
machine operator may be able to work successfully with all the machine tools in an 
engineering shop.  The expertise of such a person is broad rather than deep.  This 
applies to all professions, skills, and fields of science.  It is possible to speak of 
deep, vertical expertise on the one hand, and broad, varied, horizontal expertise on 
the other. 
All the persons interviewed for the present research possess at least an average 
level of expertise in project work: all of them have participated in at least one larger 
project.  This project experience apparently varies depending on the type of project: 
what the scope of the project was, whether it was domestic or international, how 
long it lasted, etc.  The interviewees’ project experience also depends on the duties 
they had in the project.  Their duties may have been limited to one area of their 
technological expertise, such as process or electrical engineering, or they may have 
worked in one or more areas of project technique, such as planning and monitoring 
the schedule.  On the other hand, they may have needed to work with several 
different project stakeholders, in which case they would have acquired experience in 
various fields. 
Several interviewees also possessed various degrees of experience in the 
functioning of their company.  The depth/breadth division could be detected in this 
area as well: the interviewee might have in-depth experience in one area (or a few 
areas) of technology, or he may have been employed in the managerial functions of 
the company and obtained experience in several fields and come into broader 
contact with different company stakeholders.  This is clarified in figure 6.1, which 
shows the work and project duties presented in the explanatory section of table 6.3.3  
(Appendix B). In addition, an attempt can be made to estimate the amount of 
experience that a person has in the different cells of the figure. 
Estimating the experience of interviewees is complicated by qualitative 
differences in that experience.  The experience of some interviewees has to be first 
estimated in several cells of the figure, after which the effect these cells have on one 
another needs to be assessed.  Some of the interviewees are primarily project 
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Figure 6.1 Expertise / Work Experience of Interviewees 
 
experts, possibly with experience of corporate activity; some are primarily corporate 
experts who have also participated in projects.  The latter are usually employees of 
the company that owns the project (the client).  There is apparently variation in the 
extent to which the corporate experience of these persons has influenced the views 
that they have of project work, as well as their functions within the project.  The rest 
of the interviewees are employed by companies where projects are the main mode of 
operation: this includes consultant and planning agencies, equipment suppliers and 
contractors. 
A set of interview questions (Group A, table 6.3.2, Appendix B) was used to test 
the interviewees’ familiarity with the basics of project work.  All interviewees 
mastered these basic issues.  The broader project experience of the interviewees was 
estimated in this study on the basis of the following factors: age, years of work 
experience, years of project experience, the size and number of projects, the type of 
projects (versatile or one-sided, domestic or foreign), the position in the project and 
in other work, whether the tasks of the interviewee in projects have been varied or 
uniform, and whether functional tasks have influenced the interviewee’s project 
experiences. No formula was designed for the calculation of the project experience 
of interviewees; rather, the researcher made an estimate. The project work 
experience of those interviewed in the case projects was estimated according to the 
same principles that were used in the basic interviews (see table 6.3.4, appendix B). 
And alphabetical list of all the interviewees can be found in table 6.3.5 in appendix 
B. 
Project experience was rated on a scale of 1 to 5 (5=extensive project experience, 
1=little project experience). This scale is completely arbitrary and does not represent 
the relative project knowledge of the interviewees; rather, the scale should be seen 
as a way of grouping the interviewees.  The summary of these ratings is shown in 
table 6.3.6; the average is 3.82. In the case projects, the average is 3.50, which is 
somewhat lower than that in the basic interviews (3.82). 
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Table 6.3.6  
The Distribution of Project Experience 
                 Basic      Case 
 5. Extensive project experience   5          10 
 4. Substantial project experience   4  5 
 3. Average project experience   6  7  
 2. Some project experience   2  6  
 1. Little project experience   2  2   
 
Interviewees’ Views of Early Warnings 
During the interviews, an attempt was made to inquire into the interviewee’s 
view of the early warnings theory. Several interviewees (8 in basic group) used early 
warnings monitoring in their everyday work, while others (2) dismissed the theory. 
In the context of the basic interviews, it was noted that all interviewed project 
personnel had observed and recognized early warnings of project problems (in the 
same sense as they are used in this study) in project work.  
In estimating the results of the inquiry, “uses in everyday work” was given the 
value of 5, while “dismisses the theory” was denoted with 1. Table 6.3.7 shows the 
summary of the views of the interviewees regarding the early warnings theory. The 
average is 3.82. The view of the interviewees in the case projects toward early 
warnings was quite positive, and therefore an assessment of similar accuracy was 
not performed in that context. 
It should be noted that there is no correlation in the interviews between a positive 
view of the theory and extensive project experience, although the averages are 
identical (table 6.3.6).  Reasons for the different views were not examined; as such 
examination belongs to the field of psychology and is thereby outside the scope of 
this research. 
 
Table 6.3.7 
The View of Early Warnings, Basic Interviews 
 5. Uses in everyday work         8 
 4. Has often perceived signs and made use of them      3 
 3. Has sometimes perceived signs and even made use of them     3 
 2. Has perceived signs now and then but not made use of them          1 
 1. Dismisses the theory         2 
 
6.4  Case Projects 
6.4.0  Objectives 
During the basic interviews, the causes of the project problems discussed with 
the interviewees could not be reliably investigated, as problem situations were 
hypothetical. In the case projects, assessing the causes of the problems was fairly 
successful, because the problem situations were real and experienced. This 
researcher was also well acquainted with the history of the case projects, which 
helped in determining the causes of the problems.  
Another aim of the case project interviews is to verify the observations made 
during the basic interviews, such as whether the phenomena discussed in the 
research have been apparent in the case projects, how these phenomena have been 
reacted to and what responses have been adopted during projects. In addition, the 
objective of the case studies is to explore research questions 3 and 4.  
 
  
Nikander    72 
 
6.4.1  General 
The research in the case projects focused first on exploring the problems that had 
surfaced during the project. After this was done, different parties of the project were 
interviewed. The main questions concerned the way that different persons had 
experienced and recognized the problems. The selection of case projects was 
dictated by their availability. The oldest case project was begun in 1987, and the 
information received from the interviews regarding this project is very much 
dependent on memory. All the case projects were industrial investments, though 
they differed from one another significantly regarding the industrial field and the 
success of the project.  
The researcher participated in all the case projects, which means that he was 
already acquainted with both the interviewees and the project events; this facilitated 
the interviews, as both parties “spoke the same language.” However, this could also 
be a source of error: interpretations of the interviewee and the researcher may be too 
similar and subjective, and an outside researcher might have observed something 
relevant that now escaped notice. This has to be taken into account in estimating the 
research method as well as the results. 
Table 6.4.1 shows a summary of the case projects.  
 
Table 6.4.1 
Case Projects 
Case 1 Power plant project Successful, easy 
Case 2 Light process plant project Successful, problems 
Case 3 Renovation project “Failed”, numerous problems 
Case 4 Industrial plant delivery project Almost successful, problems 
 
The success and failure criteria of projects have been discussed in section 4.5. 
The estimates in table 6.4.1 are based on the view of the project owner. 
 
6.4.2  Preliminary Analysis of the Case Projects 
First, the problems that surfaced during case projects were investigated with the 
aid of the researcher's notes and of available archives. Archival material included 
minutes of meetings, memoranda etc.; for the older projects, however, these were 
scarce. Documentary material has been significantly diverse, because archiving 
practices have varied from project to project. Project problems were verified with 
the interviewees during the course of the interviews. 
 
6.4.3  The Case Projects 
Case Project 1 
This was a power plant project carried out in Finland, involving 125 MW 
electricity, 100 MW heating. This successful Greenfield power plant project had no 
particular problems. The project was carried out in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
and took about three years to implement. Customer participation was very strong: 
the future manager of the plant was the customer project manager, who was in 
charge of the project from beginning to end. The foremen of the entire plant were 
hired approximately six months before test runs began and took part in installations 
as supervisors. 
Case Project 2 
This project remains anonymous in accordance with the request of the project 
owner (client). The project was a light processing industry Greenfield plant project 
carried out in Finland. It was implemented a few years before the interviews, and its 
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duration was approximately three years. The end result was very successful: the cost 
estimate held up, the schedule was maintained to the day, and the plant operates 
flawlessly.  Nevertheless, numerous difficulties were encountered during the 
implementation of the project. 
Case Project 3 
This project consisted of the complete renovation of an overseas processing plant 
owned by a Finnish consortium (about 70-80 percent of the plant was rebuilt). The 
owner wished the project to remain anonymous. The project was implemented a few 
years before the interviews and it was very challenging technically, in its schedule, 
and in its management. The cost estimate was exceeded by about 30-40 percent, and 
the schedule was extended by 6 months; the total time spent on the project was 2.5 
years. 
Case Project 4 
This project consisted of the delivery of an industrial plant to Indonesia by a 
Finnish engineering industry company. The delivery encompassed the power plant 
block of a chemical pulp factory, including boilers and turbines, as well as the 
storage of chemicals complete with auxiliary devices, following the FOB principle. 
The plant was delivered in the mid-1990s and the delivery took about 2.5 years. 
Shipping, installation, etc. were handled by the client. The delivery project was quite 
successful. 
 
6.4.4  Problems in the Case Projects 
Project problems of the case projects are outlined in table 6.4.2.  
When analyzing the factors that have been problematic in a project, a number of 
questions arise: To whom is the phenomenon a problem? Who sees it as 
problematic? Who will have to take care of the problem? With which party does the 
phenomenon emerge? In problem analysis of the preliminary material from the case 
projects the focus has mostly been on the client’s and/or the consultant’s views of 
the problem. This is in large part due to the fact that a consultant employed the 
researcher during the projects. 
Because two of the case projects are to be maintained anonymous, the problems 
examined in the preliminary analysis of the case projects have been combined and 
treated in a more generalized form. The same need for combining also pertains to the 
results of the interviews. 
The problems noted in the preliminary analysis have been grouped according to 
the question frame into problems concerning a project party or phase and other 
problems. In doing this, it was noted that the project problems in the question frame 
do not cover all problems that emerged; therefore the question frame was extended 
during the analysis of the interview material. The case project 4 was about to be 
completed at the time of the interview, and therefore no precise list of questions was 
prepared. The primary questions in the interviews were: How did you become aware 
of the problems you faced in the project? Did you have any doubts in advance? (See 
more, appendix E) 
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Table 6.4.2  
The Case Projects, Problems Examined in the Preliminary 
Analysis - Project Parties / Project Phases 
Customer / at any time during the project 
Financial problems of the customer    
Customer project management    
Customer / planning phase 
Customer project experience limited   
Customer / procurement phase 
How a contract is achieved    
Consultant / at any time during the project 
The project experience of the project leaders 
Substantial differences in the project cultures of 
consultants 
Consultant / planning phase 
Low quality level of schedules    
Planning problems     
Supplier / delivery phase (planning) 
Receiving initial information for other planning  
Low level of supplier schedules   
Delivery problems of the equipment supplier   
Supplier / site phase 
Installation work late     
Scheduling changes     
Low technical level of the equipment supplier   
Contractor / site phase 
Work coordination problems   
Contractor late     
Technical difficulties      
Other problems 
National cultural differences  
Differences in project culture  
Difficulties in project organization  
Personnel relations   
Changes in personnel   
Numerous changes  
 
 
6.4.5  The Interview Questions in the Case Projects 
The interview questions dealt with the same project matters as the questions in 
the basic interviews.  Questions A and B were the same. Case-specific questions 
were centered on problems encountered in the project; these were first approached 
from a general perspective, e.g. asking what factors could have caused the failure of 
the project. 
The complete list of questions cannot be attached to this study due to the 
sensitive nature of some of the matters concerning the projects. Certain project 
owners have elected to keep their projects anonymous. 
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6.5   The Applicability of the Material 
The strong point of using material from the semistructured interviews is the 
freedom it offers to interviewees to express their thoughts; their answers are not 
completely tied to the questions. At the same time, this is one of the greatest 
weaknesses of the material: the material expresses the views, opinions, and 
assumptions of the interviewees, and possibly includes even intentionally misleading 
statements [Olkkonen -93 p.82]. In other words, semistructured interviews do not 
give a fully objective view of the phenomenon. (This is clearly shown in the material 
when the interviewees make statements of the type “I think…” or “In my 
understanding…” etc.). This influence is decreased by the fact that the early 
warnings discussed in the basic interview material can be considered traditions, as 
presented by Alasuutari [-93]. This conjecture can be made at least in those cases 
where several interviewees have described an identical early warning. If the answer 
is obviously an opinion or experience of the respondent, the answer is a remnant 
according to Alasuutari [-93] and can be considered reliable, even in individual 
cases. 
Keeping them open reduces the suggestive influence of the questions and 
applying the approach presented in the question frame (table 6.3.1), i.e. moving from 
general project situations to specific problems. Because of this, the interviewee has 
had the opportunity of initially presenting the early warnings that first come to mind. 
After this, he has been led to problem situations indicated by the questions and the 
early warnings that have characterized these situations. 
The material may be one-sided as all the interviewees are Finnish and therefore 
share a common cultural sphere. This effect is decreased in the basic interviews by 
the fact that 10 out of 17 interviewees have had experience in international projects, 
as well as by the fact that all of the case projects have included international parties. 
In addition, two of the cases can be regarded as international projects.  
The basic interviews were continued until clear repetition could be observed in 
the answers of different interviewees. This was most clearly distinguishable in the 
last three interviews, and improves the representativeness of the sample. The 
representativeness is also enhanced by the varied work and project experience of the 
interviewees as well as by the fact that companies in different fields employed the 
interviewees. 
One of the weaknesses of the material is that the early warning elements are 
selected by one person (the researcher) from the total interview material. This is a 
decisive characteristic of the semistructured interview method. The same weakness 
influenced all other analysis, as well as the processing and analysis of the case 
project interview material. 
The material can be considered sufficient for the representation of the 
phenomenon, but with regard to broader generalizations the material of the basic 
interviews is fairly narrow, especially as concerns the causal analysis. There were 
only 17 interviewees, in addition to which all the interviews weren’t fully identical. 
Only four case projects are included in the study. However, the projects differ 
substantially from one another in their character as well as in their level of success, 
and this can be considered to have improved the quality of the material. In the case 
project interviews, nearly all of the questions are based on the project problems 
found in the preliminary analysis; hence the analysis of this material should be 
problem-oriented. It should not be used for mapping project problems, which is not 
an objective of this study. The focus of the questions on project problems has also 
led to the questions being different for different case projects. This, too, can be seen 
as a kind of weakness. Answers in the case project material can mainly be 
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considered remnants as presented by Alasuutari [-93]: the interviewees have faced 
the situation in question during the project. Therefore, according to Alasuutari, even 
individual answers are reliable. 
The weakness remains that the implementation of the projects was in part carried 
out several years ago. Therefore, the interviewees’ recollection of the project events 
and the early warnings they possibly detected may already have faded and become 
distorted. (Cf. the views of Ashley [-89a] and other researchers on hindsight bias, 
section 3.1.1, Denying the Phenomenon). 
In the case projects, not all parties of the project could be interviewed due to 
practical problems or great distances (overseas stays) etc. This decreases the 
possibility of forming a complete understanding of the phenomena present in the 
case projects. 
The total number of interviewees in the case projects is fairly large, 49 persons. 
This can be considered fairly sizable for a qualitative study. Combining the materials 
yields a better chance of generalizing observed “warning-problem-problem cause” 
chains. 
 
6.6  Early Warnings, the Results of the Interviews 
The Contents of This Chapter 
This chapter presents the results of both the basic and the case project interviews. 
It briefly outlines how the interview material was processed and how the interview 
elements were selected from it. The results have been discussed in greater scope and 
detail in the study Nikander [-98].  
The first part of the analysis is the type categorization of early warnings.  In the 
study Nikander [-98] have created parallel descriptive typology of early warnings. In 
this study are presented subsequently, the division of the elements into descriptive 
attributes and the cross tabulations between these elements in Appendix C.  
For the utilization of the research results, the most important parts of the analysis 
are the processing of the result attributes, the relation between early warnings and 
various project problems, and the examination of project problems and their causes. 
The material from the case interviews was processed in the same way as the 
material whereas in the study Nikander [-98] they were first discussed separately. 
Further, the chapter examines other observations made during the interviews, such 
as the observation procedures for detecting early warnings and the responses 
prompted by the detection of a problem. With the aid of the combined material, a 
dependency web is formed between early warnings, project problems, and the causes 
of problems. The chapter also includes some qualitative examination of multiple 
attributes. Finally, the reliability of the results will be assessed. 
The Processing of the Interview Material 
The interview tapes were transcribed partly by the researcher and partly by 
outside help. The outside help transcribed the answers given by the interviewees 
word for word. From this material, the researcher selected as separate answer 
elements that which he considered the core thought of the answers given by the 
interviewee. During the analysis the researcher also listened to the tapes. While 
transcribing the tapes himself, the researcher wrote down directly the core thoughts 
of the interviewees. The answer elements were inserted into a database program for 
more detailed processing. From the gathered material, the researcher first analyzed 
the similar elements representing early warnings; the character of these was then 
explored in simple percent distributions and cross tabulations. Solely the researcher 
did the analysis. 
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The Answer Elements 
The core thought of an interview answer, in as brief a form as possible, was 
selected as an answer element.  The answer elements that were especially sought 
were the interviewee’s thoughts on early warnings present in the project. A general 
definition of warnings can be found in section 4.2; examples of warnings found in 
the literature are described in section 4.3 and the preliminary type categorization in 
section 4.4. In addition to early warnings, the answers were found to contain 
elements, which can be described as observation procedures: these are ways of 
looking for early warnings in practice. A number of remarks were also made on how 
to respond to early warnings. "No-early-warnings procedure" elements were not 
rejected, because they indicate situations where the interviewee feels that he hasn’t 
detected early warnings or that early warnings cannot be detected in the situation the 
question presents, or answers where the interviewee states that he has no experience 
of the matter in question.  However, these elements are not numerous enough to be 
subjected to a more in-depth analysis.  
The grouping of the answer elements is shown in table 6.6.1.  
  
Table 6.6.1 
The Type and Number of Answer Elements 
    Basic interviews  Case interviews 
Advance warning  439            421 
No early warnings procured, 
 difficult to detect    16       2 
Observation procedures       85         - 
Procedure     18       19  
      Total   558   432  
No experience     57 
 
A total of 558 answer elements were extracted from the basic interview material, 
while the case interview material yielded 432 elements. In addition, the answers in 
the basic interviews showed that according to almost 60 answers, the interviewees 
had not experienced the situation being examined. Similarly, in the case interviews 
several interviewees replied that they had no knowledge of the matter the question 
was concerned with, or that they could not recollect the situation in detail. 
The Case Material 
The case interviews differed from the basic interviews, in that almost all of the 
interview questions concerned some problem that had surfaced in the case project in 
question. The number of open questions was relatively low and the project problem 
can therefore be seen as the starting point of the investigation. 
The case material should be processed by case, using e.g. the Content of Case 
Study method presented by Patton [-90]; that is, by comparing the cases and 
analyzing the causes of the differences with the aid of the types of the case projects, 
as well as by comparing the results by case to the results of the basic interviews. 
However, this method cannot be used for two reasons: 
a) The interviewee’s recollections of the events may have become distorted as 
considerable time has passed since the project. The fairly large number of answers 
beginning with "I don't recall" indicates this 
b) The requirement of anonymity limits the case-by-case processing of the material, 
especially the detailed scrutiny of problems and their causes.  
The case project interview material is therefore processed in the same way as the 
material from the basic interviews. 
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The interview material shows that in none of the case projects were a systematic, 
broad risk analysis carried out before the initiation of the project. In case project 1, 
the major risks of the projects were recognized and a fair amount of work was 
dedicated to anticipating them. The project management of the owner of case project 
1 was also the most experienced in the case projects examined, which is clearly 
apparent in both the interviews and the implementation of the project. Characteristic 
of the other three case projects was the limited project experience of the owner’s 
personnel, which was reflected in various ways in the project events, detected early 
warnings and problems. 
Combining the Materials 
Interview materials were processed completely separately, even for the reason 
that the two interview periods took place some time apart from each other. In the 
earlier study by the researcher, the materials have been processed separately at first, 
and subsequently the possibility of combining them has been explored [Nikander -
98]. In the present study, however, the results yielded by the material are combined 
without further individual treatment. 
Whether the materials are statistically from the same basic material was checked 
with the CHITEST of the Excel program by the Microsoft Corporation. This is a χ2 
test. The compatibility of the materials was checked for 1) the main groups of 
warnings, 2) the project problem phenomena, 3) the causes of the problems, 4) the 
early warnings/project problems, and 5) the project problems/causes of problems. 
For all of the checked percent distributions, the χ2 values varied from 0,99980 to 
1,00000. The χ2 values of numerical material are very low [Nikander-98]. 
Numerically, the distributions of the materials cannot be assumed to come from 
statistically the same material, but there is no reason to suppose a difference between 
the distributions calculated percentually. The materials can probably be combined 
either on qualitative grounds or according to the percentual distributions [Nikander-
98]. The combining will be carried out on the level of early warnings as well as on 
the level of “main groups of warnings/project problems” (table 7.2.1) and of “project 
problems/their causes” (table 7.2.2). This is done because other combinations would 
not yield relevant new information. The groups of early warnings have been 
combined qualitatively. 
 
6.7  The Type Categorization of Early Warnings 
The preliminary type categorization groups of early warnings in the table 4.1 
formed the starting point of the analysis. To this literature summary table the 
researcher accepted a total of 91 examples of early warnings on the basis of the 
definition given in section 4.2. These were divided into 21 subgroups, which were 
arranged into 8 main groups. 
Similarities 
The interview answer element material concerning early warnings was examined 
for similarities in content, with the objective of finding early warning groups. The 
empirical observations, however, did not fit 100% to the preconstructed type 
categorization and therefore the interview material itself was allowed to steer the 
analysis in accordance with the principles of qualitative research.   
Groups 
The main groups stemming from the empirical research material are “gut 
feeling,” “differences or deficiencies in the project culture,” and “external source.” 
“Gut feelings” are the most difficult signals to detect, identify and interpret. Usually 
they are inklings. The group "differences or deficiencies in the project culture" 
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consists of such issues as observations made during the first meeting, differences in 
the project terminologies, and lack of project experience. The group "external 
source" consists of outside hints and the like.  
Many main groups in both materials also include some miscellaneous early 
warnings; these are “groups” that have included one or two elements, but are 
nevertheless relevant for the qualitative analysis due to their illustrative nature. 
These miscellaneous were gathered into a separate group, which was not taken into 
account when calculating the percentual distributions; neither has it been included in 
the further crosstabulate analysis.  This exclusion was necessary, as the further 
analysis would otherwise have had to be conducted on the observation element level. 
The amount of these miscellaneous research elements is in the basic material 19 pcs 
and in the case materials 16 pcs. 
The results of both interview materials are presented together in the results. A 
total of 91 early warnings were analyzed from literature, 420 from the basic material 
and 405 from the case material. There emerged 68 subgroups, plus those elements, 
which stated that no early warnings could be procured. These 68 subgroups of early 
warnings were further arranged into 11 main type groups (table 6.7.1).  
Table 6.7.2 (appendix B) shows the early warning groups analyzed from the 
interview materials, a short description of these, and, as examples, quotes from the 
answers given by the interviewees. 
The distributions of the elements from the respective research materials seem to 
differ from each other to some extent.  To give the reader an understanding of these 
differences, the results are shown by research material in table 6.7.1. However, the 
basic and case materials can be combined as noted in the section “Combining the 
Materials.” The largest main group in all of the materials is “warnings expressed by 
personnel.” The next largest group varies by material to material (see table 6.7.1).  
 
Table 6.7.1 
The Distribution of the Elements into Main Type Groups of Early Warnings  
      Litera       Basic         Case- 
      ture    material    material 
Detected early warnings      %                 %           % 
- Gut feeling                  5.2         2.7 
- Warnings expressed by personnel, project group    40.6             28.6       22.7 
- The project manager (as a person), management,     10.9          1.7        8.6 
 managerial style 
- Project planning         8.8            6.2       13.6 
- Project control        18.7          9.3         5.2 
- Work on the project         5.5        10.5       10.9 
- Communication         4.4        10.7         5.4 
- Expressed by the parties         6.6        10.7         9.6 
 (Owner, supplier, contractor) 
- Documents, reporting (typical for projects)          4.4        14.3        10.4 
- Differences or deficiencies                 5.2         9.9 
 in the project culture 
- External source              2.4        1.2 
       Total, elements          91               420       405 
Literature sources: [Neil -89], [Kezsbom et al. -89], [Obradovitch -90], [Kerzner -
95], [Fleming -92], [Bent -82], [Cleland -94], [Kleim and Ludin -94], [Smith -83], 
[Harrison -93], [Lientz et al. -95] and [Zeitoun and Oberlender -93]  
 
  
Nikander    80 
 
Some subgroups of the preliminary type categorization (see table 4.1 and table 4.2 
in appendix A) contain observations only from the research literature, but not from the 
empirical material. These subgroups include "concealing difficulties" (which belongs 
to the main group "warning expressed by personnel") and "labour effectiveness" (the 
main group "project control"), (table 4.2, appendix A).   The empirical material 
contained no observations conforming to the element "estimating schedule" in the 
subgroup "delay of the project" (the main group of "documents, reporting", see table 
4.2), but did contain observations belonging to the elements "is slippage common" and 
"chronic delays" in the same group. In this part of the study, the latter were considered 
better placed in the document group, which is quite large. Similarly, the subgroup 
“ambiguous objectives” (the main group "project planning and objectives, table 4.2) 
could not be established as a separate subgroup, though the objectives of the project 
are referred to in other contexts. 
In grouping the elements obtained from the empirical material, some problems 
were caused by the diversity of the elements. Possibly even more numerous 
subgroups and main groups could have been selected. The distribution of the 
elements by early warning groups does not necessarily show how commonly the 
different types of early warnings are detected in project work; rather, it may indicate 
the interviewees’ perceptions of how they have detected these in the situations 
presented by the questions. In the basic material, the early warning groups 
“expressed by the personnel,” “[with the aid of] documents,” and “expressed by the 
project parties” comprise about 50 percent of the answer elements. In the case 
material, the emphasis is somewhat different. 
The distribution of the warnings by main groups seems to indicate the 
uniqueness of the case projects, which is due to the focus of the questions on 
problems. All of the special characteristics of the case projects cannot be discussed 
in this study because of the anonymity requirement; on occasion, interviews 
revealed rather sensitive information. A number of new warning subgroups can be 
detected due to the uniqueness of the case projects [Nikander -98]. Because of the 
narrowness of the material, it is hard to draw any generalized conclusions from the 
case material. Almost all of the warning subgroups that were present in the basic 
interview material can also be detected in the case material, though with a slightly 
different emphasis. 
The uniqueness of the case projects is further accentuated when the distribution 
of the elements is examined on the level of warning subgroups in the cases. An 
interesting observation is that certain warnings can clearly be considered unique to a 
specific project; that particular type of early warning was not found in other projects. 
In case 1, the largest main groups are “project planning” and “documents,” 
which together comprise about 40 percent of the total elements. It should be noted 
that in case 1 the number of detected elements is quite small, which gives a 
relatively major significance to an individual element. 
In case 2, the largest main groups are “expressed by personnel,” “work on the 
project,” and “expressed by the project parties,” which together form about 60 
percent of the total elements. 
In case 3, the largest main groups are “project planning,” and “expressed by 
personnel,” together almost 45 percent of the elements. 
In case 4, the largest main groups are “project planning” and “expressed by 
personnel,” together 40 percent of the elements. 
A new feature is observed in the elements of the case material. The situations 
described by the interviewees and the interviewees’ observations interpreted as 
warnings show that about 40 percent of the elements have formed a problem of 
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some kind already at the moment of observation to the person who noticed them. 
They can be recognized as problems but cannot be categorized more specifically. 
The observation that a problem can, at the moment of detection, also be an early 
warning of future problems, is similar to the diversity of observations (set theory 
view) found in the literature, and can also point to a “warning-problem-cause” chain 
phenomenon. 
Elements Belonging to Several Groups 
Some elements can be interpreted as belonging to more than one group. For 
example, the element “In the last price negotiation, one can get the feeling that the 
contractor is counting on additional bills” can be categorized as a gut feeling, since 
it states that “…one can get the feeling…”, but in addition, a non-verbal early 
warning could apparently embedded in the element. Similarly, in the element “In 
examining the schedule, one gets the feeling that something is wrong” is a gut 
feeling on the one hand, since it states that “…gets the feeling…” but on the other 
hand it could also linked to the early warning group of documents/level of schedules 
and the availability of these. Nevertheless, when analyzing the elements each 
element has been included in only one group, and the groups are therefore 
independent of one another. 
The Recurrence of Early Warnings 
The empirical material shows the differences in the recurrence of early warnings 
already observed in the material from the literature. The material includes 
observations that are clearly non-recurrent, such as early warnings detected in 
project plans, the bidding material or the contracts. Some early warnings may be 
single and non-recurrent, but can nevertheless be repeated or become a continuous 
state (such as the poor quality of reporting or a managerial style). In such a case, 
they are more serious and groups or chronological series can be formed of them. 
Project control planning deviations form clear chronological series. 
 
6.8  The Role of People (Leadership) 
Extremely varied definitions of the term “leadership” can be found in the 
literature [Cleland -94]. In this study, Project Leadership is understood in the sense 
as it is defined in Cleland [-94] and PMBOK [-95]; that is, as a part of project 
management. Leadership is the ability to make the other parties of the project 
understand and accept the objectives set for the project. It is the human factor that 
binds the project group together and motivates it to work toward the objectives 
[Cleland -94, p. 343].  
The following groups of early warning types can be regarded as related to people 
(see table 6.7.1): “Warnings expressed by personnel;” “Project manager, managerial 
style;” “Work on the project” (at least in part); “Expressed by parties” (at least in 
part).  The share of these groups of the total observations is 48 percent in the basic 
material and 50 percent in the case material. Of the early warning examples found in 
the literature survey 66 percent belong to these groups. 
A person is the source of a warning in ca. 62 percent of the observations (table 
C.2.8). Yet all instances where an early warning was detected have involved the 
actions of a person at least in the background: (e.g. documents are designed by 
people). Again, it must be remembered that no early warnings related to natural 
events are reported, as no questions were asked regarding them. This may to some 
extent distort the relative distribution of the observations but it is scarcely likely that 
it would significantly diminish the importance of people as sources of early 
warnings. 
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About 42 percent of the observations from the literature include problems and 
causes of problems that are related to people. These include: “Project manager 
(PM),” “Management,” “Organization,” “Personnel,” and at least in part 
“Differences in project culture.” It can be observed from the empirical material that 
observation elements referring to the above-mentioned problem groups form 36 
percent of the total in the basic material and 28 percent of the total in the case 
material (see table 7.1.1). It can be noted that most of the problem causes are 
directly traceable to people; the actions of people are in the background of all of the 
cause groups. The results are affected by the exclusion of problems caused by 
nature, which is due to the fact that no questions probed this subject. 
All of the above perspectives show how strongly the early warning phenomenon 
is related to people and their behavior; therefore, early warnings may aid in 
personnel management. Taking up this aspect, however, would move the discussion 
into the area of general management and behavioral sciences, which are not covered 
in this study. 
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7. The ability of Early Warnings to Explain Problems 
and Their Causes 
 
 
7.1.  The Project Problem Phenomena and Their Causes 
The important issue for the utilization of the results is to find out to which 
project problems, and their possible causes, the early warnings are related. The cross 
tabulation of the problems and their causes with the descriptive attributes is 
excluded from this study.  Project literature furnishes ample information about the 
interrelatedness of the  various project phases, parties, problems and the causes of 
these problems. In the material used in the present research, the dependencies 
between these factors can only be researched through early warnings; the material 
does not contain direct observations of the dependencies. 
The study [Nikander -98] examined the material from the different interviews 
separately; in the current study, the results are presented either in parallel fashion or 
in a directly combined form. The combining is done by crosstabulating the 
percentage forms.  
This chapter first discusses the problem phenomena and crosstabulates them with 
the early warning groups. Second, the problem causes analyzed from the material 
partly through inference are examined; these are crosstabulated with the problems. 
Finally, the chapter explores the kinds of “warning-problem-cause” chains that can 
be constructed on the basis of the research. These chains are augmented with the 
responses found in the material. 
The analysis of project problems is conducted both on the level of main groups 
and on the level of subgroups. The analysis of the basic material reveals a couple of 
problem main groups that were not detected during the literature survey.  As for the 
problem phenomena, some groups of problems are lacking from the case material. 
These differences may be caused by the different posing of questions in the 
materials. 
Note 
The results of the analysis of project problems are greatly affected by the posing 
of the interview questions, as a significant portion of the questions was directly 
concerned with project problems. For this reason, the results should not be used to 
determine how common various project problems are in projects; this is not one of 
the objectives of this study. 
Warning and/or Problem Situation  
Situations are detected in the case material which can be considered problems for 
the observer at the moment of detection, but which at the same time can be early 
warnings of some other potential problems. In some cases, the detected situation it 
self may be a cause of future problems, especially if nothing is done to correct the 
situation. Analysis revealed 177 elements admitting several interpretations were 
found (they composed 40 percent of the material). Of these, it is possible to 
distinguish 74 different situations which indicates an immediate problem and the 
observation of situation is simultaneously an early warning of another, future 
problem.  
The fact that the phenomena and situations may have several interpretations is 
pertinent. Such a situation may at once be a problem, an observation of situation as 
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an early warning, and even a possible cause of a future problem. This is consistent 
with the chain formation found in the literature (see section 4.7 and 4.8). 
 
7.1.1  Problem Phenomena 
The analysis of the problem phenomena occurring in a project is based on the 
literature survey of problem phenomena and their causes conducted in the theoretical 
part of the study (section 4.6). However, this survey has not been allowed to limit 
the analysis; rather, when other problem phenomena and/or causes have been found 
in the material, they have been taken into account. The elements are analyzed for 
project problems element by element, not by the groups of early warnings. 
In addition to the content of the early warning element, the context of the 
question answered by the interviewee influences the analysis of problem 
phenomena. In several of the questions/answers, the context of the question shows 
the problem with which the interviewee connects his answer. It became apparent that 
the problem phenomenon could not be analyzed without taking into account the 
context of each question. The question that the interview answer relates to describes 
the circumstances and environment of the situation; according to communication 
theories the warning (observation) should not be removed from these [Åberg -93] 
and [Wiio -89].  
Groups of Problem Phenomena 
The study [Nikander-98] analyzed 26 separate groups of project problems from 
the material (table 7.1.2, appendix D). The values listed in the column “Several 
problems” are the ones employed in further analysis. These groups are gathered into 
the 16 main problem groups presented in table 7.1.1.  
 
Table 7.1.1 
The Main Groups of Project Problems 
Project problems, main groups Litera Honko Basic Case- 
  ture   material material 
  % % % % 
Schedule problem, delay, time 11,8 % 5,1 % 19,0 % 9,5 % 
Cost-related problem 5,9 % 7,4 % 5,3 % 5,0 % 
Delivery problem, performance 10,8 % 6,2 % 8,8 % 24,8 % 
Project environment, consultant 4,9 % 7,0 % 1,7 % 2,9 % 
Ambiguous objectives 10,8 %   1,9 %   
Owner with no CEO support 6,9 %   0,8 %   
Management problems, combined 12,7 %   18,8 % 22,2 % 
Project manager as a person 6,9 %   3,5 % 3,3 % 
Organization / Staff 14,7 % 5,8 % 2,1 % 0,6 % 
Personnel problems in general 21,6 %   7,1 % 2,1 % 
Project planning in general 8,8 % 64,2 % 5,7 %   
Monitoring and project control 4,9 % 1,6 %     
Communication 4,9 %   5,0 % 0,8 % 
Engineering 2,9 %   7,4 % 27,9 % 
Financial aspects     6,1 % 0,6 % 
Differences in project cultures     4,3 % 0,2%. 
Other problems   2,7 %     
Not defined     2,8 % 0,2 % 
Total    102 257 720 517 
Literature sources:  [Kerzbom et al. -89], [Kerzner -95], [Obradovitch -90], [Lewis -
93], [Lientz et al -95], [Harrison -93], [Cleland -94], [Broaddus -91], [Smith -83], 
[Jaselskis -88], [Honko et al. -82], (see section 4.6). 
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The table shows the groups of problem phenomena and the distribution of 
elements by main groups. In addition, the table includes the problem groups 
analyzed from the literature (see section 4.6), the groups used by Honko et al. [-82]  
(see section 4.6)  and the research material. The literature survey produced 102 
elements, 257 elements were found in Honko’s material, 720 in the basic interview 
material, and 517 in the case interview material. The distributions of the 
observations in different materials vary greatly due to the different method of 
examination. In the basic material, the largest groups of observations are “schedule 
problems, delays, time”, and “management problems.” The second largest groups 
are “delivery problems, performance,” and “engineering, technical problems”. These 
four groups comprise about 54 percent of the observations. In the case material, the 
problems are concentrated in “delivery problems,” “engineering, technical 
problems,” “management problems”, and "schedule problems", ( total about 84 %). 
This is due mainly to the early warning analysis of project problems, which defined 
the questions. However, the distribution also depicts the attention that the 
interviewees have paid to various matters in their projects, since in the early warning 
analysis the diversity of project problem is much greater. The large size of Honko’s 
group “project planning” is due to the fact that he has especially researched this 
aspect.  
The Description of the Main Groups [Nikander-98] 
The most commonly used indicators of project success or failure are 1) schedule 
and time problems, (i.e. how well the planned schedule of the project is followed); 
2) cost problems, or whether the cost estimate of the project is exceeded, and 3) 
performance problems, (i.e., whether the planned functional, profit, and quality 
objectives of the project are met). 
The following descriptions of the content of the main groups rely heavily on the 
literature survey: 
1) The “project environment” group includes the problems caused by 
circumstances external to the project, the effect of the public sector on the project, 
project parties other than the client, such as the consultant, the supplier, the 
constructor and other interest groups. 
2) The group “ambiguous objectives” includes those problems that form when 
the set objectives aren’t equally clear for all the participants. These encompass 
situations where the scope of the project is ambiguous or is altered, or the emphasis 
of the implementation varies. 
3) The most crucial party for the project’s success is the owner of the project, or, 
as seen from the perspective of the other project parties, the client. Because of this, a 
separate group is assigned for all problems concerning the client. 
4) "Management problems, combined": the group contains those problems that 
occur in both management and leadership. 
5) "The project manager as a person": the group is comprised of the problems 
relating to choosing a project manager, the manager’s competence or lack thereof, 
the manager’s personal qualities etc. (Compared with table 4.4, the project manager, 
the management group, and the managementas an activityare assigned separate 
groups). 
6) "The organization/staff" group includes the problems in choosing personnel, 
problems caused by the organizational structure, as well as problems that are due to 
lack of resources or professional competence. 
7) The group of “personnel problems in general” covers the problems in 
motivating the personnel, problems caused by unproductive attitudes of the 
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Early warning Full impact of problem 
Decision 
time 
Planning and 
negotiation time 
Mobilization time 
of implementation 
The rest of time for the 
implementation of response 
Time available 
personnel, problems relating to the turnover rate of personnel, and problems that 
occur in teamwork.  
8) The group “project planning in general” contains such problems as the 
inability to form a project plan, the planning of the project by an outsider, the plan is 
designed incorrectly or perfunctorily, the schedule contains errors, the cost estimate 
is insufficient etc.  
9) “Monitoring and project control” is a problem group that is present as a 
problem in the literature as well as in Honko’s study, but is rare in actual project 
work.  
10) The group “communication” includes all problems in the transfer of 
information. 
11) The group “engineering” covers the problems in the technical engineering of 
the project. 
12) The group “financial aspects” includes the financial problems of the project 
or of the companies participating in the project. 
13) The group “differences in project cultures” comprises the problems that are 
caused by the different organizational cultures of the parties as relates to the 
implementation of projects, or the problems caused by the limited project experience 
of one of the parties. 
14) "Other problems" is a group into which have been gathered problems that are 
mentioned in Honko’s study but not present elsewhere. 
15) The group “not defined” refers to the answers where the problem indicated 
by the early warning element found during research cannot be defined on the basis 
of the available material. 
 
7.1.2  Time available 
The “time available” concept, borrowed from Ansoff’s theory, is defined as 
follows: “The amount of time available before the problem indicated by the warning 
reaches full impact on the project.” The response time available value presented by 
Ansoff (figure 3.4) was applied to the time available. Figure 5.1 (in section 5.7) 
clarifies the nature of the concept. The duration of the time available should include, 
among others, the following sub-periods: the decision time, the planning and 
negotiation time, the mobilization time of implementation and the rest of time for 
the implementation of response. These are shown in figure 7.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 The sub-periods of time available 
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In examining the material it was noted that the time available is occasionally 
twofold. A) The time available can be evaluated according to how soon the problem 
indicated by the warning can be considered to affect the project, as expressed by 
Ansoff in his theory. B) Another aspect that can be considered an instance of the 
impact of the time available is whether the indicated matter requires immediate 
response, even though the time available itself could be regarded as temporally 
extensive (there is ample time). This is apparent mainly in the context of purchase 
negotiations [Nikander -98]. Errors and misjudgments made in these situations are 
very difficult to correct after the purchase contract has been made. 
The time available could not be measured during the basic interviews; rather, the 
evaluation is done on the basis of the substance of the elements. The evaluation of 
the time available proved to be very difficult due to the limitations of the 
information provided by the basic interview material; a better evaluation would 
require more information about the background and about the circumstances in 
which the warning was detected.  
The case material enabled a more specific analysis of the length of time 
available. The project history of the case projects is known, which made it possible 
to analyze the process of decision-making after the project was concluded. Similarly, 
the time that elapsed before responses were adopted for various problems is known, 
and it shows how much time was perceived to be available.   (It should be noted that 
the decision-makers were not familiar with Ansoff’s theory and the concept of time 
available). 
Appendix E contains a summary of the problem situations that occurred in the 
case projects; more specifically, it discusses the nature of the impact of various types 
of problems on the project, the time available for responses, and the promptness with 
which responses were adopted. At least the following factors affect the assessment 
of the time available: how soon the problem begins to have full impact on the 
project, how much time is required for the planning of responses and for 
negotiations concerning those responses, and how much time is necessary for the 
responses to achieve their desired effect. The time available is also affected by the 
project situation (internal trends), the circumstances of the project environment 
(external trends) and the beliefs and assumptions of the interpreter.  
The variation of time available was significant between projects and between 
different types of problems. When responses were adopted promptly after the first 
early warnings of the problem were detected, the time available can be considered to 
have been very limited. On the other hand, when the problem was a long-term, 
chronic one or the impact was felt throughout the project, the time available factor is 
very difficult to assess; in such cases the factor may also have varied. Responses 
may have been attempted several times, but when they have been ineffective the 
situation as persisted. In addition, there have been situations where no responses 
could be adopted or where strong measures have been seen as inappropriate. 
 
7.1.3  The Causes of Problems 
During the basic interviews, it was not possible to verify the exact perceptions 
that the interviewees had of the causes of problems. The results presented regarding 
the causes of those problems that were found in the material are mainly inferences 
made by the researcher, based on the full statement of the interviewee, the interview 
question, and the experience of the researcher. In other words, they are not solely the 
perceptions of the interviewees about the causes of problems. Therefore the results 
should be approached with caution, which is why they are shown in parentheses in 
table 7.1.3. 
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This problem was partly avoided in the case material; finding the causes of the 
problems indicated by the case material was significantly easier and more exact than 
in the basic interviews. The circumstances and situations of the case projects were 
familiar to the researcher, and the interviewees participated in investigating the 
causes of the problems. In this examination as well, the problem itself and the 
problem situation have the greatest influence on determining the possible cause. 
Hence, the number of elements whose causes could not be fully clarified (i.e. that 
had several causes) was much smaller in the case material than in the basic material. 
On the basis of the CHITEST, however, it was noted that there is no statistical 
reason to assume that the percent distributions of the material stem from different 
types of data. This may also be caused by an unconscious tendency of the researcher 
to make the materials conform to the same standard. The CHITEST seems to 
indicate that the material from the basic interviews is of sufficient quality for it to be 
used in the comparisons. 
The assessments revealed little information about linking an early warning 
directly to the cause of a problem. Despite the greater potential of the case material, 
a substantial level of uncertainty exists even in those analyses. To avoid erroneous 
conclusions, the causes must be crosstabulated only with the problem phenomena, 
not with e.g. early warnings. 
The Distribution of the Causes 
The causes of project failure found in the literature survey are shown in table 4.2, 
appendix A. The causes of problems found in the research material and in the 
literature survey, as well as those used by Honko et.al [-82], are shown in table 
7.1.3.  
Analysis  yielded 373 observations in the literature survey (see section 4.7), 126 
in Honko et.al [-82], 596 in the basic material, and 480 in the case material. As with 
the problems, the percent distributions of the causes are very different due to the 
different methods of examination. The analysis did not attempt to discern any 
subgroups. The largest group in the basic material is “several reasons" (30 percent of 
the cases), while the next largest groups of causes consist of “skills and abilities of 
persons involved” and “differences in project culture.” These three groups comprise 
about 58 percent of the cases. In the case material, the largest groups of problem 
causes are “differences in project culture” (37 percent), “managerial style” and “lack 
of resources.” These account for about 61 percent of the causes of problems. 
The main groups used by Honko are “idea error,” “(project) planning error” and 
“implementation error.” The distribution of his observations among the respective 
groups is roughly one third (1/3). The idea errors of a project consist of the strategies 
and the search and development of investment ideas; the planning errors include 
defining, assessing and comparing investment options, and planning the funding; the 
implementation errors include the investment decision and the monitoring of 
investments. The tables show the similarities between the causes of failure and the 
causes of problems [Honko et.al -82]. 
Descriptions of the Causes of Problems [Nikander-98] 
The causes of problems in the research material have descriptions very similar to 
those of the problem groups discussed in section 7.1.1.  
The contents of the group "Project environment" match the contents of the 
problem group with the same name.  
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Table 7.1.3 
Causes of Project Problems 
Causes of problems Litera Honko Basic Case-
ture material material
Project environment 7,2 %
Ambiguous objective, mistakes in ideas 10,5 % 27,8 %
Attitude-related (5,4%) 8,1 %
Owner 8,0 %
Management methodology 8,6 % (9,4%) 15,2 %
Project manager as a person 7,5 % 12,7 % (4,2%) 5,4 %
Differences in project cultures (13,4%) 36,7 %
Organizational causes 6,4 % 2,4 % (8,2%) 6,5 %
Personnel skill and talent 18,8 % 4,0 % (14,1%) 4,4 %
Project planning 20,6 % 34,9 %
Adjustment responses 6,3 %
Monitoring and project control 5,4 %
Communication 4,0 %
Engineering 4,3 % 9,5 %
Lack of resources (8,7%) 9,6 %
Financial causes (5,7%) 9,4 %
Several reasons, more than 3 (29,9%) 4,6 %
Other causes 2,4 %
Cause not definable (1%) 0,2 %
Total 373 126 596 480
 
The literature sources the same as for table 7.1.1 , (see table 4.4, section 4.7). 
 
The contents of the group "Ambiguous objective, mistakes in ideas" match the 
contents of the problem group with the same name as well as cases of mistakes in 
ideas presented by Honko. 
“Attitude-related”  the causes of problems in this group are comparable to 
those included in the problem group “personnel problems in general”  the group is 
a part of the problem. The attitudes include the motivation of the personnel, an 
unproductive or reluctant attitude, etc. 
The contents of the group "Owner" match the contents of the problem group with 
the same name. 
“Managerial methodology”  this group depicts a situation where the problems 
are caused by bad management and/or leadership activities, i.e., this group is 
analogous to the “management problems” problem group. 
 The cause group “The project manager as a person” contains the same items as 
the problem group “The project manager as a person” i.e., the manager’s 
professional competence, his managerial style etc. 
The contents of the group "Differences in project culture" match the contents of 
the problem group with the same name. 
The cause group “Organizational causes” refers to a situation where the cause of 
problems is a defective or otherwise inappropriate organizational structure. 
The cause group “Personnel skill and talent” covers all deficiencies in 
professional skills and competence etc. 
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"Project planning"  match the contents of the problem group with the same name. 
With “adjustment responses” Honko refers to such changes made in the original 
plan by the project management that cause problems.The contents of the group 
"Monitoring and project control" match the contents of the problem group with the 
same name. 
The contents of the group "Communication" match the contents of the problem 
group with the same name. 
The contents of the group "Engineering" match the contents of the problem 
group with the same name. 
The cause group “Lack of resources as a cause” contains the project problems 
caused by the lack of appropriate resources. 
The contents of the group “Financial causes” match the contents of the problem 
group with the same name. 
The cause group “Several causes, more than three causes” was formed because 
the analysis revealed a substantial number of observations that could be inferred to 
have more than three causes, as well as observations where the real cause of the 
problem could not be known on the basis of the available information. The group 
isn’t completely identical with the group “Cause not definable” or Honko`s "Other 
causes". 
"Other causes" matches the group "Other problems" in Honko’s study. 
 
7.2  Dependencies of Early Warnings  Problems  Causes 
7.2.0  General 
This section focuses on those results that are the most significant for the 
utilization of the research. Examples include: What kinds of early warnings refer to 
which project problems and vice versa? What kinds of early warnings can we expect 
(look for) when different kinds of problem situations are imminent in the project?  
Another cross tabulation is the tabulation of the dependencies between problems and 
their causes. The study [Nikander -98] discussed first both research materials 
separately (tables 7.2.3-7.2.4 in the appendix D), after which the compatibility of the 
materials was verified, and finally the results of the materials were combined. In this 
study employs the combined results.  In addition, the case material is discussed in 
greater detail. 
The cross tabulation of early warnings/project problems (table 7.2.1, on a 
separate page) can be read using either the early warnings or the project problems as 
a starting point. When the starting point is the early warning, the table shows which 
problem group the detected early warning belongs to, when it has first been 
classified into a warning main group. When the starting point is the problem, the 
table shows what kinds of early warnings should possibly be looked for when trying 
to procure additional information about whether to expect a problem. In the latter 
case, the phenomenon is closely connected with risk management. The 
crosstabulated examination of project problems and their causes (table 7.2.2) is very 
similar to the cross analysis described above. This part of analysis is here mainly to 
complement the picture of the early warning-problem-cause chain formation 
phenomenon. In the study, the causes of problems are crosstabulated only with 
project problems in order to understand the chain phenomenon. 
 
7.2.1  Links between Early Warnings / Problems 
Note 
When examining the individual combinations in the table 7.2.1 and 7.2.2, it 
should be kept in mind that the number of observations (percent) represents the 
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number of early warnings the interviewees, in their opinion, have detected in the 
situations explored by the research questions, as interpreted by the researcher. They 
do not necessarily represent the actual occurrence of various situations in projects.  
When looking for areas of emphasis, it should be remembered that the research 
has been conducted according to the principles of qualitative research, and even 
single observations are therefore considered significant. 
Table 
In the table 7.2.1, the material is grouped according to the number of squares that 
contain observations. Therefore, the first of the early warning groups in table 7.2.1 is 
the group “Expressed by personnel,” the second “Expressed by the project parties,” 
the third “Documents” and so on. Four of the problem groups have the same number 
of observations; hence, they may be considered of equal weight. These groups are 
“Schedule problems,” “Delivery problems,” “Engineering problems,” and 
“Management problems.” The fifth most common group is “Cost problems.” Values 
of over 2 percent are marked in bold text to facilitate the reading of the table. 
Most Common Combimations 
It would seem that the five most common early warning / project problem 
combinations are: 1) “Expressed by personnel / Management problems” (6.6 % of 
the observations); 2) “Expressed by personnel / Engineering problems” (4.16 %); 3) 
“Work on the project / Engineering problems” (3.52 %); 4) “Project planning / 
Delivery problems” (3.21 %); 5) “Expressed by personnel / Delivery problems” (3.2 
%). These cover about 20 percent of the observations. The table contains a total of 
1198 observations. 
In the table, the figure below the percentage figure shows the number of 
interviewees that have pointed to the early warning that is a part of the combination 
in question.  For example, the combination “Expressed by personnel - Schedule 
problems” has been reported by 16 interviewees. 
20/80 Rules 
 Several areas of emphasis can be formed on the basis of the table: a) When 
adding together all of the combinations of over 1 percent, of which there are 33 (the 
total number of combinations is 208), it can be noted that their share of all possible 
combinations is 16 percent and they comprise 69 percent of the observations. This 
does not stray far from the 20/80 rule.  b) A second area of emphasis is formed by 
the upper left corner of the table (the shaded area). The early warning groups in 
"box" are: “Expressed by personnel,” “Expressed by the project parties,” 
“Documents,” “Work on the project”, "Project planning”, "Communication", " 
Differences and deficiencies in project cultures", and " Project control and 
reporting". The problem groups in this "box" are “Schedule problems,” “Delivery 
problems,” “Management problems,” “Engineering problems,” “Cost problems,” 
and “Personnel problems.” This box contains 71 percent of the observations.  
 
7.2.2  Links between Problems / Causes (Table 7.2.2) 
As noted earlier, the assessment of the causes of the problems that emerge from 
the basic interview material is largely based on the interpretations made by the 
researcher, instead of on information received from the interviewees. In the case 
interviews, more exact information about the causes of problems was available, 
because the event history of the case projects was known. However, the CHITEST 
showed that there is no statistical basis for assuming that the percent distributions of 
the materials stem from different types of informative material. Therefore, even the 
assessments of problem causes from the basic material can apparently be considered 
fairly representative. 
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Table 7.2.1 
The Materials Combined, Main Groups of Early Warnings / Project Problems 
Project Problem 
Main Group 
 
     
Project 
 
Project 
    
Project 
 
Upper 
 
 
Schedule Delivery Engineering Manag. Cost Personnel Project Goal manager environ. Organi- Econ. Comm. plan. manag. Un- 
Warning main group problem problem problem problem problem problem culture unclear as pers. consultant zation    tot. support def. 
Expressed by personnel 2,39 % 
16 
3,20 % 
19 
4,16 % 
24 
6,60 % 
28 
0,52 % 
5 
2,57 % 
17 0,65 % 0,29 % 1,64 % 1,04 % 0,58 % 1,49 % 0,43 % 0,07 % 0,07 % 0,29 % 
Expressed by the project 
parties 
1,90 % 
16 
1,78 % 
13 
2,52 % 
20 
2,86 % 
18 
0,38 % 
 
0,22 % 
 0,14 % 0,07 % 0,14 %  0,10 % 0,65 %  1,15 % 0,22 % 0,07 % 
Documents 2,67 % 
20 
2,15 % 
15 
1,07 % 
 
1,37 % 
 
0,87 % 
8 
0,30 % 
  0,07 % 0,07 % 0,29 % 0,14 %  0,51 % 1,66 %   
Work on the project 2,37 % 
19 
0,94 % 
 
3,52 % 
23 
1,51 % 
 
0,27 % 
 
0,70 % 
 0,10 % 0,14 %  0,18 % 0,10 % 0,14 % 0,60 %    
Project planning 0,97 % 
 
3,21 % 
17 
1,60 % 
 
0,79 % 
 
1,73 % 
10 
0,10 % 
 0,14 % 0,14 %  0,34 %  0,18 %    0,07 % 
Communication 0,46 % 
 
1,18 % 
 
0,60 % 
 
2,31 % 
14  0,27 % 0,22 %  0,07 %  0,14 % 0,43 % 1,30 %   0,07 % 
Differences and deficiencies 
in project cultures 0,18 % 
 
1,23 % 
 
1,34 % 
 
2,73 % 
20 0,18 %  0,93 %  0,07 % 0,20 % 0,10 %    0,07 %  
Project control and 
reporting 
2,86 % 
19 
1,41 % 
 
0,84 % 
 
0,56 % 
 0,65 % 0,36 % 0,07 %  0,07 % 0,14 %       
Gut feeling 0,49 %  0,61 % 0,86 % 0,14 % 0,14 %  0,07 % 0,18 % 0,07 % 0,14 % 0,07 % 0,14 %   0,58 % 
Project manager, 
management 0,10 % 0,80 % 1,07 % 0,94 % 0,30 % 0,10 %  0,07 % 1,25 % 0,10 %       
External source 0,10 % 0,39 % 0,18 %  0,22 %       0,43 %  0,07 %  0,07 % 
         Total observations: 1198 
Note: An individual percentage figure indicates how many times the combination has occurred in the material.  It does not necessarily represent  
the significance of the combination for solving project problems or for the success of the project. 
The figure below the percentage figure shows the number of interviewees that have pointed to the early warning that is a part of the combination in 
question. 
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Table 
The material in table 7.2.2 is grouped according to the same principles as in table 
7.2.1. This means that the order of project problems is slightly different. “Schedule 
problems” form the first group, “Delivery problems “ the second, and “Management 
problems” the third. Of the groups of problem causes, the first is “Managerial style 
as a cause,” the second “Differences in project culture as a cause,” and the third 
“Several causes, the cause cannot be exactly defined.” To facilitate reading, percent 
values greater than 2 percent have been set in bold. The material contains a total of 
1465 observations. 
20/80 Rules 
The areas of emphasis in this table are formed by the same problem groups as in 
table 7.2.1, while the areas of emphasis for the problem causes are “Management as 
a cause,” “Project culture as a cause,” “Several causes,” “Organization as a cause,” 
and “Attitudes as cause.” These problems and their causes all influence one another. 
The box in the upper left corner of this table contains ca. 58 percent of the 
observations. There are 32 combinations of over 1 percent (the total number of 
combinations is 160) and they cover 71 percent of the percentual observations in the 
materials. Again, this is very close to the 20/80 rule. In this table as well, it should 
be remembered that the research has been conducted according to the principles of 
qualitative research, and even single observations are therefore considered 
significant 
 
7.2.3 The Significance of the Combinations 
The significance that combinations of observations have on project work varies 
greatly, depending on both the project and on the owner’s assessment of his business 
priorities.  Some owners emphasize matters related to the schedule, because they 
need the investment to be ready for the sales season.  Others may place the greatest 
value on keeping the costs low.  Another factor that influences the significance of a 
combination is the perceived severity of the detected problem; i.e., the project’s 
sensitivity to the effects of problems in the particular combination.  In addition, the 
significance that is placed on the combination may also depend on the position of 
the person who calls attention to the combination, i.e., the respect that other project 
participants have for that person influences the significance accorded to the 
combination.  The final assessment of the combination’s significance is always 
made by the decision-maker (see figure 8.1). 
For the above reasons it is usually very difficult to estimate the significance of 
combinations for investment projects.  In analyzing the material, the same relative 
weight has been given to a detected early warning, the problems connected with it, 
and the causes of these problems.  The number of combinations that has been 
analyzed from the interviews can be considered to some extent representative of the 
significance of those combinations in project work, because the interviewees have 
presented their views regarding the early warnings of project problems 
independently and without prompting: they have not had contact with each other, 
and the researcher has not offered examples of possible early warnings.  In addition, 
the numbers of interviewees in table 7.2.1 can be considered to point to the same 
conclusion: it can be inferred that these interviewees have considered that particular 
early warning significant in the context of the problem in question.  Nevertheless, 
the reservations noted in the beginning of section 7.2.1 should be kept in mind: the 
percentages are indicative rather than final and single observations, in accordance 
with the principles of qualitative research, can be considered significant.  The topic 
is interesting enough to call for further research. 
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Table 7.2.2 
The Materials Combined, Project Problems / Perceived Causes of Problems  
 
The cause of the problem 
 
 
 
    
 Management Differences in Several Organi- Attitude Lack of  Economic Personnel Manager  Not 
The Main Group of Project Problems  project culture  causes zation  resources causes skills personality defined 
Schedule problem, time 1.68 % 3.25 % 4.75 % 1.06 % 0.88 % 1.43 % 0.76 % 1.09 % 0.06 %  
Delivery problem, performance 1.88 % 4.15 % 2.02 % 0.96 % 0.93 % 1.63 % 1.72 % 1.97 % 0.92 %  
Cost problem 0.65 % 1.78 % 0.81 % 0.20 % 0.26 %  1.18 % 0.52 % 0.34 %  
General management problems 3.23 % 4.61 % 3.25 % 1.85 % 2.20 % 1.53 % 1.06 % 1.10 % 0.14 %  
Engineering 2.76 % 6.59 % 1.35 % 2.35 % 1.29 % 2.67 % 0.76 % 0.57 % 0.08 %  
Total personnel problems 0.43 % 0.45 % 0.98 % 0.06 % 0.97 % 1.34 % 0.06 % 0.14 %   
Project manager personality 0.25 % 0.20 %  0.06 % 0.08 % 0.25 % 0.08 %  2.19 %  
Communication 0.86 % 0.46 % 0.77 % 1.09 % 0.29 % 0.23 %  0.12 %   
Economical factors 0.17 % 0.29 % 0.92 % 0.06 % 0.06 % 0.12 % 1.52 %    
Project environment, consultant 0.20 % 0.84 % 0.06 %   0.17 % 0.42 % 0.85 %   
Total project planning 0.23 % 0.35 % 0.40 % 0.52 %  0.06 %  1.15 %   
Differences in project culture 0.12 % 1.29 % 0.23 % 0.12 % 0.06 %   0.06 %   
Personnel group / Organization 0.12 % 0.42 % 0.35 % 0.26 %  0.12 %     
Unclear goals 0.12 % 0.29 % 0.40 %  0.12 %  0.06 %    
Upper management support, client 0.06 %  0.23 % 0.06 %   0.06 %    
Undefined 0.12 % 0.17 % 1.00 %  0.06 %   0.06 %  0.08 % 
Total observations: 1465 
Note: 
An individual percentage figure indicates how many times the combination has occurred in the material.  It does not necessarily 
represent the significance of the combination for solving project problems or for the success of the project. 
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7.3   Responses and Observation Procedures 
General 
A number of the interviewees in the basic interviews mentioned specific 
responses that they had adopted or considered advisable once they had detected a 
warning. These were not directly asked about in the interview. In the context of the 
case projects, this response area was mapped in some more detail. The material 
includes numerous mentions that can be called observation procedures; i.e., ways of 
detecting early warnings. This section focuses on these observation element groups. 
Literature, as well, seems to be an excellent source of information about possible 
responses. 
Responses 
The term “responses” covers those procedures that the interviewees have 
adopted, in order to minimize the impact of a detected problem, or whose adoption 
they have recommended. Responses thus strive to minimize the negative 
consequences that a problem could have for the final result of the project. Responses 
are not necessarily directed at, or successful in, removing the problem or its cause; 
this isn’t always possible for the project management, as the causes of problems may 
lie in the project history, and/or the factors causing the problem may be outside the 
control of the project management. The interview materials contained very few 
observations of responses, as they were not specifically asked about during the 
interviews. In the case projects, the information provided by the interview material 
on project problems, their causes, and the responses to them has been augmented by 
other observation material. 
Responses are a very important part of the utilization of warnings, since the mere 
detection and analysis of warnings does not in itself constitute actual project 
management and leadership. On the one hand, the reports of responses reflect 
caution (inexact information is not trusted), while on the other hand they show a 
desire for rapid responses that throw light on the situation, such as “increased 
monitoring” and “gathering additional information.” 
The need for constant observation of warnings was also noted. One of the most 
difficult issues in the utilization of warnings is to convince those persons who have 
neither detected warnings nor trust them that there is a  need for responses. This is 
effectively illustrated in the books of both Betts [-82] and Herman [-96] regarding 
state and military intelligence. This seems to bee the filtering phenomenon. 
Table 7.3.1 combines responses found in the material with project problems. 
From the case project interviews and the project problem analysis it is apparent that 
a great portion of the situations are such that project management is incapable of 
influencing them (cf. the studies by Bufaied [-87] and Lim [-87].) The problems are 
outside the decision-making power of the project management. Such problems 
include  the client’s financial problems, the client’s project management style, and 
the client’s manner of forming contracts. In such situations, especially the project 
management of the consultant and suppliers can usually only advise the client and 
adjust to the situation. 
The question of whether all the responses are “orthodox” isn’t addressed in this 
context. All of the ways of problem and risk handling presented in the literature 
emerge in the detailed analysis of the material. These include : -Withdrawal 
(Denial/Retreating); - Smoothing (Suppression); -Forcing (Power or Dominance); - 
Compromise (Negotiation); -Collaboration (Integration) [Kezsbom et al. -89, pp. 
227..230] and [Kerzner -95]. 
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Table 7.3.1  
Responses That Can Be Adopted on the Basis of Signals 
Problem Response recommendation
1. Project environment Problem external to the project
Stakeholder Management [Cleland]
2. Objectives  / scope Devising a project plan
    Technical performance Methods of problem analysis
    Delivery problems Pre-screening of suppliers
Pressure when problems arise
Delivery monitoring (inspection visits)
Revising the schedules (adjustment)
Hiring outside experts
Devising unambiguous contracts
    Cost overruns Methods of problem analysis
   Adjusting the budget
Tight budget control
    Schedule problems Methods of problem analysis
Adjusting the schedules
Augmenting resources
Negotiations with the concerned parties
Pressure when problems arise
3. Client Often a problem external to the project
Stakeholder Management [Cleland]
Client Perspective [Kleim and Ludin]
Careful approach
4.Project Manager Often a problem external to the project
5.Management Literature sources; chapters of leadership
   Management / Leadership problems Hiring an outside expert
Changing the organization of work
Shadow organization, informal channels
    Differences in project culture Negotiations with the concerned parties
Adjusting to the situation
6. Project group / organization Literature sources; team management
    Lack of resources Procuring additional resources
Adjusting the schedules for the situation
7. Personnel / motivation Literature sources; chapters of leadership
8. Project Planning      Literature sources; devising a project plan 
Devising own plans
Not accepting incomplete plans
9. Monitoring/ Control Literature sources; project control
10. Communication Literature sources; communication
11. Technical issues
 
[Kerzner -95], [Harrison -93], [Nikander-98], [Lewis -93], [Kezsbom et al. -89], 
[Lientz  et al. -95], [Whitten -95], [Cleland -94] [Nikander -98] 
 
Observation procedures 
Observation procedures are responses that strive to procure additional 
information about the situation. Table 7.3.2 combines the observation procedures 
found in the material with different problem situations observed in the material. 
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Quite a variety of this is presented in the interviews, ranging from regular project 
management methods to some new, promising ideas not discussed in the literature. 
The practicality of the observation procedures was not tested in this research. Often 
the observation procedures and responses have been merged and have become 
different parts of the same operation. These include project schedule management 
and information gathering. Some responses were noted that can be carried out 
beforehand and that attempt to explore the potential project problems or risks. These 
include: 
- Preliminary inquiries / prequalification, such as a closer inspection of the 
references and checking credit information 
- First impressions; the interviewees often considered this important when meeting a 
new project party 
- “Test questions” posed in the first meeting; these can give an understanding of the 
project experience and abilities of the other project party 
- Systematic audition of the drawings; this was one of the observation procedures 
not often mentioned in the literature 
- Observing the contractor and supplier at the construction site: their manner of 
arriving and initiating work, or their so-called mobilization 
- Another method considered important was setting, in the contract or otherwise, 
binding intermediate goals in the schedule in the form of milestones. 
No new observation procedures of detecting warnings emerged from the case 
projects. 
 
Table 7.3.2 
Observation procedures 
Project Problems Observation procedure 
Scheduling problems Checking schedules in advance 
 Additional information obtain   while monitoring 
Cost-related problems Additional information obtain   while monitoring 
Financial problems Preliminary research 
  Hard to get information 
  Hard to get information 
  Additional information in prequalification 
Delivery problems Visiting the supplier 
  Additional information obtain   while monitoring 
  Monitoring site mobilization 
 [Nikander -98] 
 
7.4  Multiple Attribute Examinations 
7.4.1  General 
A number of multiple attribute examinations were carried out in the study 
Nikander [-98]. Rough “warning main group - project problem - problem causes” 
dependency networks were designed on the basis of both the basic material and the 
complete material. These networks show how varied the different dependencies 
appear to be, even though the examination only includes those combinations 
between which at least two percent of the observations are apparent. The study 
Nikander [-98] also examines the basic material in more detail regarding these 
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dependencies. The study notes that the dependency networks designed may tend to 
generalize the picture of the phenomenon excessively too much. 
In the present study, the examination of multiple attributes is conducted with the 
complete material. The examination is somewhat more extensive than the one in the 
study Nikander [-98]; here the material is used to devise early warning - problem - 
cause - response dependency networks on a rough main group level. This network 
should still be considered information describing the nature of the phenomenon, but 
information given by this description still appears too sketchy for practical 
utilization.  
Note: As noted in section 7.2.3, the combinations selected for figure 7.2 
represent combinations that were most commonly referred to in the interviews; they 
do not necessarily indicate what combinations are the most significant for project 
work.   
Attempts are made to extend the picture by conducting multivariate 
examinations on the subgroup level as well. Apparently, due to the variety of the 
material, the form of practical utilization should be very specific; possibly it should 
even be on the level of an individual warning. In this case, the broad scope of the 
material will be a problem: it will be difficult to manage manually, and aid should 
apparently be sought in the possibilities of information technology, [Nikander -98]. 
The relative scarcity of the material limits the quantitative examination of 
multiple attributes, hampering e.g. the understanding of how the descriptive 
attributes, especially the project phases and parties, affect the early warning - 
problem - cause combinations. Qualitatively the material can be analyzed in a 
limited manner for several attributes simultaneously. Nevertheless, such 
examinations have not been undertaken. The material could also be examined to 
determine how the views of the interviewees vary in relation to warnings and other 
investigated items. However, such an approach would quickly move the study to the 
field of psychology, which has been bypassed here. 
 
7.4.2  The Warning - Problem - Cause “Network” 
The combined “dependency network” (figure 7.2) of the materials is designed in 
accordance with the combined tables. The danger of “misleading” information, 
noted earlier, should be taken into account. Interpreting dependencies between 
problems and their causes so that an early warning - problem combination would 
always most likely be connected to the problem cause that is most often detected in 
the material may even in this combined material prove to be illusionary. The 
possibility of an illusionary connection will probably decrease when more of the 
possibilities shown in table 7.2.2 are accepted as potential causes. 
Figure 7.2. (separate page), the early warning main group - problem - cause - 
response “network”, shows the “dependencies” between those warning main groups 
- project problems - problem causes and the responses related to the problems that 
were present in at least two percent of the observations in the material. The group 
“several reasons (more than three)” is left out of the figure, since it is the largest 
cause group for almost all of the problems. The selected level represents a division 
that is even rougher than the 20/80 rule that was observed in the material. 
The percent distribution of the observations (elements) was used as a basis for 
selecting combinations to the “network,” although the number of elements for 
project problems does not represent  exact information of the frequency of the 
project problems (see section 7.2.1). On the left in the figure are the warnings (the 
plain box), which are followed by the causes of problems (the box marked in bold), 
and the the project problems (the box with rounded corners). On the right are the
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Figure 7.2 Warnings - Project Problems - Problem Causes - Responses Network; Combined Materials 
    A question mark indicates that the research material gives no information about the responses.  
 
Note: As noted in section 7.2.3, the combinations selected for the figure represent combinations that were most commonly referred  
to in the interviews; they do not necessarily indicate what combinations are the most significant for project work. 
  
Nikander    100 
 
responses (the box marked in bold with rounded corners) that, according to the 
observations, can be adopted to remove or decrease the impact of the problems and 
their causes. 
The figure illustrates the variety of the early warning - problem - cause - 
response combinations. Even in this very limited form, the figure becomes 
somewhat difficult to read. The thickest arrows in the figure point out the 
“strongest” dependencies between the “warnings expressed by personnel” and 
“management problems” (6.38 %) as well as further dependencies “management 
problems” and their most common cause “differences in project culture” (4.61 %). 
The figure also shows that the warnings expressed by personnel often relate to 
several problems (six dependencies). In addition, the picture depicts the fact that the 
management and planning problems have numerous warnings. Similarly, differences 
in project culture are the cause of several problems. Several responses have been 
proposed to address delivery problems. 
The research material includes no specific responses for “engineering problems” 
and “personnel problems.” Because only responses found in the research material 
are included in the figure (i.e., it has not been supplemented with material from the 
research literature), it may give a one-sided view of the possible responses. For 
example, the schedule problems can certainly be reacted to in other ways than 
“additional information procured during monitoring” and “adjusting the schedule.” 
Similarly, management problems have other responses than those presented in the 
figure. The selection of the dependencies has resulted in a very simplified picture 
that does not take into account all of the early warning groups or all the problems 
and their causes. As noted earlier, the figure significantly generalizes the results. 
 
7.4.3  Multiple Attribute Examination on the Subgroup Level 
A more detailed examination of the warning subgroups gives a slightly different 
view of the situation. This is apparent out in the figures 7.3 through 7.8 for different 
project problems. In the figures, the early warnings by main group and subgroup are 
on the left; represented by a tall parallelogram in the middle is the project problem 
that the figure is concerned with; on the right are the cause of project problems. The 
arrows depict the relation between the warning subgroups and the project problem 
causes as regards the project problem under consideration. The examination is 
qualitative, and therefore does not show the number of observations for every detail. 
The percental portions of the warning main groups, presented in table 7.4.1, are 
shown in a box beside the main group. 
Figure 7.3 (separate page) illustrates the dependencies between the early warning  
groups and the problem causes as they relate to schedule problems. It should be 
remembered that the warnings should not be connected directly to the causes of 
project problems, but should always be presented in the context of the problem. The 
figure shows how the warnings expressed by personnel appear to be related to 
multifarious problem causes. The dependencies seem to be quite varied in other 
respects as well.  
Figure 7.4 (separate page) examines the management problems. It demonstrates that 
a portion of the warnings expressed by personnel appear to be related to defined 
causes. “Attitudes” and “commitment to the project” as warnings are apparently 
related to the cause group “attitudes.” When the lack of resources is a warning, the 
cause appears to also be the lack of resources.  
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Figure 7.3  Warnings of Schedule Problems and Causes Related to Those 
Problems                On the basis of observations 
 
Other problem groups examined in this fashion are delivery problems, cost 
problems, engineering problems and personnel problems (see figures 7.5. through 
7.8 in the appendix D).  All of the problems appear to exhibit great variety as 
regards the causes of problems. Tables 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 depict in greater detail the 
relations between the early warning groups and project problem groups as 
percentages in both materials. 
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Figure 7.4 Warnings of Management Problems and Causes Related to Them 
  On the basis of observations  
 
7.4.4  The Analysis of the Problem Situations in the Case Projects 
The study Nikander [-98] analyzes problem situations in the case projects for 
each project and problem; the detailed results can be found in Nikander [-98]. In the 
results, similar problem situations have been grouped together, and the case projects 
have not been named because of anonymity requirements. Appendix E contains 
summary of problem situations. It can be noted that even in such a small sample, 
almost all types of problems have occurred. 
The following types of projects occurred in the case projects: a) schedule 
problems in all of the projects, b) some form of delivery problems in all of the 
projects, c) one serious cost problem, and d) the client’s insufficient experience of 
the particular project type in three projects. Additionally, in two of the projects it 
was noted already when launching the project that there will be significant project 
culture differences and disagreements between the project parties. 
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The most serious management problem was the project management managerial 
style of one of the owners. Moderately serious engineering problems can be said to 
have occurred in three cases. One project was plagued by problems that can be 
classified as organizational problems. Another project suffered from severe 
disagreements between personnel. Resource problems were evident in one project on 
several levels of engineering and management, while in two projects serious usage 
problems occurred during start-up. The problem charts in the next section give 
additional descriptions of the problem situations. 
 
7.4.5  Problem Chains (Problem Networks) 
Early warning - problem - cause - response networks could be formed for 
specific projects on the basis of the material from the case projects. The chain where 
the early warnings were most clearly detectable is presented in figure 7.9. Figures 
7.10 and 7.11 show the networks for two other projects. In one of the projects no 
extensive chains could be detected as the project management effectively addressed 
each problem in its early stages. All of the networks demonstrate the varied ways in 
which the warnings, problems and causes are interconnected. In every figure on the 
left there are the warnings, in the middle are the project problems, and on right are 
the causes of problems. In figure 7.9 the causes of problem are above the first 
problem. 
In the figure 7.9, a clear multistage problem chain formed. The lack of resources, 
though noted early in the project, was not addressed, and it caused other problems, 
which in turn had an impact on the entire project. No forceful responses were 
adopted in that project to stop the chain of problems from forming, and the problems 
continued to multiply and form chains all through the project.  
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Figure 7.9 The Problem Chains of One of the Projects  
  Legend in figure 7.8 and 7.10 
 
The project shown in figure 7.10 (separate page) contained numerous problems,  
but these problems were usually dealt with rapidly by either the project management 
or other experienced project personnel, and therefore no long chains of problems 
formed. The figure also illustrates the fact that a more or less effective response has 
been found for each problem. As can be seen in the figure, the same phenomenon, or 
an observation of it, can function as an early warning, a cause of a problem, a 
problem or even a response (the creation of a shadow organization, the decision 
making style of the client, lack of initial information, difference in corporate 
culture).  
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Figure 7.10   The Early Warning - Problem - Cause - Response Network for 
One Project 
 
 
In the figure 7.11 (separate page), the basic cause of all of the project’s problems 
appears on the basis of the interviews to have been the personality of the client’s 
project manager.  The manager could not admit to a lack of experience and had a 
highly authoritative managerial style. The final response was changing the schedule 
of the project. For the same reason, other problems occurred in the project, but these 
have not been added to the figure.  
Conclusions from the Problem Charts 
The problem charts demonstrate how different the case projects were and how 
widely the problems and the problem causes varied. Drawing a chart of the most 
successful project would not serve any purpose as even small problems were 
promptly eliminated. The most difficult project (figure 7.11) nearly became chaotic 
[Kiiras -2000] and came quite close to total failure. The complete history of all these 
projects entails situations very similar to those presented by Kiiras on project chaos. 
The case projects were not identically managed, nor was it likely that they could 
have been. On the basis of these four projects, there appears to exist a causal 
relationship between project management and the variety of the problems evident in 
the project. This phenomenon is similar to that presented by Bufaied [-87] in his  
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Figure 7.11 The Network of Project Problems, Early Warnings, and Problem Causes in One Project 
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study in the field of risk management. He shows that project management is the 
ultimate cause of all of project risks.  
In the case projects researched in this study, management is present in the problem 
charts, though it is not necessarily the root cause of all problems. However, the event 
history of every case project shows that the project manager either influenced or 
could have influenced decisively the development of problems. His actions and 
behavior appear to be crucial. 
  
7.5  The Relation of Early Warnings to Risk Management 
7.5.0  General 
On the basis of project literature, sections 4.8;  4.10.2 and 5.6 examine concisely 
the relation between the early warnings phenomenon and risk management. Risk 
management is discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.5.5 presents a study by Bufaid [-
87] on risk chain formation (see Figure 2.5) and the Risk Mechanism Model by 
Niwa [-89] (see Figure 2.6).  Figure 4.2 shows a concept developed in the present 
study: The Chain of Problem Causes, Problems, Early Warnings and Responses.  
Other factors that affect the analysis conducted here include: the definition of early 
warnings (section 4.2), the fact that it has been shown possible to detect early 
warnings in projects (section 6.7 and table 6.7.1), the fact that early warnings appear 
to be related to problems (section 7.2 and figure 7.2) and the concept of  “time 
available” (section 7.1.2). In addition, section 7.4.5 discusses the problem chains and 
problem networks that were evident in the case projects. 
Early warnings should, by virtue of their definition, inform their interpreter of 
future or incipient problems that may occur in the project. In section 2.5, it is noted 
that the concepts  “problem” and “risk” can apparently be considered to be related to 
each other. The difference between them is mostly composed by the uncertainty of 
the materialization of risks, and by the association of risks with the future.  
The case project material does not contain direct observations of risks and risk 
management, because a systematic, broad risk analysis was not carried out in any of 
the case projects prior to initiating the project. In one project the major risks of the 
projects were recognized and a fair amount of work was dedicated to anticipating 
them (section 6.4). The information collected in the present study of the 
dependencies between early warnings and risks is based on the relationships 
between early warnings and problems derived from the interview material and on 
the observed time available concept. 
 
7.5.1  Dependencies of Early Warnings - Problems - Risk 
Table 7.2.1 in section 7.2 shows in how varied ways early warnings and 
problems are connected to each other. The table presents the information both from 
the perspective of early warnings and from that of problems. The concept of “time 
available” (see figures 5.1 and 7.1) shows that at the moment of the detection of an 
early waning, problems are potential future problems. They could therefore be seen 
as risks. However, the study showed that early warnings do not give information 
about the likelihood of the problem (risk) to come true.  
The early warnings detected in the study are rarely by themselves sources of 
information of a future problem. However, it is easier to see which problem may be 
concerned when other, previously acquired, information of the circumstances under 
which the early warning was detected is added to the analysis.  This information can 
consist of e.g. the project circumstances at the time, indications about which project 
party the early warning is connected to, and the like. 
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Early warnings do not seem to impart a very clear picture of when the problem 
might become current (available time, figure 5.1). It appears the most that can be 
said solely on the basis of an early warning is that there is ample time or very little 
time, but no more exact evaluations are possible. Other information of the type 
mentioned above might clarify the issue; this could not, however, be studied as the 
available time factor could not be measured during the research. 
Hence, the information provided by this study on the relationships between early 
warnings and problems can apparently be utilized in the risk qualification phase of 
risk management (see section 2.5). To improve one’s understanding of projects, the 
information in table 7.2.1 can be employed in order to examine whether there might 
have existed an early warning of a problem that has already become current. This 
resembles the “hindsight bias” which Ashley [-89a] uses to criticize the entire 
Ansoff's theory. 
Observation procedures, discussed in section 7.3, are responses that strive to 
procure additional information about the situation. The observation procedures are a 
separate group of responses, which can be utilized in reacting to the impending 
problem. They can be considered methods of risk assessment (risk identification) in  
risk management (see section 2.5). The practicality of the observation procedures 
was not tested in this research.  
 
7.5.2  Problem (Risk) 
Mechanism of Project 
Figure 7.9 can be 
developed into a presentation 
that conforms to Niwa’s [-89] 
risk mechanism model (figure 
7.12). The figure has been 
constructed on the basis of 
figure 4.3, and it shows the 
“causes of problems” (what 
Niwa calls risk factors) 
uppermost, the problems in 
progressive chains and the 
final result, the delay of the 
project. Early warnings have 
also been added to this figure; 
all of the case project 
problems were, according to 
the final report on the project, 
detectable as potential 
problems before they became 
current. At that time, in other 
words, they were only risks. 
The figure clearly illustrates 
how Niwa’s risk mechanism 
model illuminates the nature of the problems 
encountered in this project. 
 
 
Project delay 
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Risk Factors 
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CAUSES OF PROBLEMS 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12  
The Problem Mechanism Network of the 
Case Project fig 7.9  
(according to Niwa, see fig. 4.3)
 
7.5.3  The Chain of Problem Causes, Problems, Early Warnings and Responses 
(figure 4.2) 
Two separate problem networks can be analyzed from figure 7.10; these are 
shown in figures 7.13 and 7.14.  Parallels to Niwa’s [-89] risk mechanism model can 
be seen in both, even though the figures have not been drawn in the format of that 
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model. A schedule examination, shown in figure 4.2, has been attached to the 
figures; even though they have been drawn in a slightly different form than figure 
4.2, it is possible to see the varying interpretation of observations and events that is 
carried out at different times and that is shown in that figure. In addition, figure 7.13 
shows how the management operation carried out in the project, “the creation of a 
shadow organization,” has been a sign to other project actors of the existence of 
management problems and has also caused new management problems. In contrast, 
figure 7.14 is a very clear-cut chain. 
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Figure 7.13 The first Networks of Problem Mechanism of the Case Project 
fig. 7.10 
 
Lack of initial information  
as EW  
 
 
Engineering 
problems 
 
 
 
Additional resourse, 
Procuring of the 
initial information 
as cause 
 
 
Lack of initial information 
as  problems 
 
 
 
as cause 
 
 
Differences in 
corporate culture 
as EW 
 
 
Time 
 
 
 
Figure 7.14 The second Networks of  Problem Mechanism of the Case 
Project fig. 7.9 
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Figure 7.15 presents the project 
problem network of figure 7.11 in a 
simplified form. A resemblance to both the 
figure 4.2 and to the risk model by Bufaied 
[-89] (figure 2.5) can be seen. The root of 
the problem chain of the whole project is 
the managerial style of the project 
manager, which was apparently due to his 
personality. Problems developed partly as 
two separate chains, which share one 
dependency in the figure. Although several 
corrective measures were attempted during 
the project, only the one shown in the 
figure was successful. The partly 
unsuccessful measures included, among 
others, comprehensive negotiations with 
the equipment supplier for the drawing up 
of a final delivery contract. This need of 
negotiation in itself caused a delay in the 
fulfilling of contract. Similarly, the 
consultant’s project management tried to 
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Figure 7.15 The Network of Problem Causes, Problems, Early Warnings and Responses 
of fig 7.11 
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find out the wishes of the client’s project manager regarding the project manager, 
and to subsequently keep the scope firm. This, too, was partly unsuccessful as the 
client’s project manager apparently was unaware of the importance of the matter to 
the project. The chain of problems proceeded inevitably and led to the redefining of 
the full project schedule and the delay of the project after several stages. 
 
 7.5.4  The Interconnectedness of the Concepts  
How the early warnings phenomenon can apparently be included as a part of 
project risk management theories are clarified in figure 7.16, which illustrates the 
interconnectivity of the concepts of early warning, weak signal, time available, 
possible problem, cause of problem, risk factor, cause of risk, risk, issue, and 
response. An early warning gives information about a potential problem. The 
problem has a cause.  The concept of time available expresses the possibility that a 
problem may not materialize or become current for some time. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that a potential future problem is a risk. The risk has the cause of risk 
(risk factor).  To minimize the damage the problem causes for the project, responses 
are required to correct the situation.  
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Figure  7.16 The Interconnectedness of the Concepts 
 
7.6  The Reliability of the Results 
The nature of the material, its weaknesses etc. were discussed in section 6.5, 
“The Applicability of the Material.” It was noted that a serious threat is included in 
the material itself, in the selection of the elements. The interview elements are 
selected by a single person from the total interview material. This is a typical 
approach for the research method, but its reliability cannot be tested. The same 
weakness applies to the analysis; namely, it has been conducted by a single person, 
the researcher, which may lead to an unintentional skewing of the material. The 
results of the basic interviews were tested by giving the preliminary results of the 
analysis to three persons for assessment: MSc in Engineering Antti Jaskari from the 
JP Process Contracting Ltd.; MSc in Engineering Petri Vesanto from the JP-Terasto 
Ltd.; and MSc in Engineering Vesa Olsson from the Proha Group.  The assessment 
of all of these persons was mainly positive. An attempt has been made to take the 
relevant remarks into account in devising the final results. 
The material is made more representative partly by the fairly large number of 
interview elements. There are 439 elements in the basic interviews and 421 in the 
case interviews, forming a total of  860 elements. The χ2 test (CHITEST) was used 
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to statistically assess the similarity of the basic and case interview results.  The test 
showed that in the numerical form there is reason to assume that the materials differ; 
however, there is no reason to assume that they differ in the percentage form. The 
explanation for the similarity is either that the materials really represent samples 
from the same basic material, or the researcher has unintentionally endeavored to 
select similar elements when analyzing the material. The likelihood of the latter 
possibility is diminished by the large number of elements. 
Combining the results from the different materials significantly improves the 
reliability of the results, though this may at the same time skew the results because 
of the individual characteristics of the case projects. One factor that may have 
distorted the results of the case projects is that the researcher has intensively 
participated in the schedule management of each case project. At the same time, this 
has unquestionably facilitated the analysis of project problems and especially the 
process of determining the causes of those problems. The results can probably be 
considered a fairly reliable description of the researched phenomenon in Finnish 
industrial investment projects. 
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8.    Results 
 
8.1 Examining the Results in the Light of the Objective of the 
Research 
The objective of the research and the research questions were set in section 1.5. 
The answers to the research questions are presented by topic in the following 
sections. It seems to be possible to increase the amount of anticipation in the 
operative management of projects with the aid of the early warning phenomenon in 
the sectors of both project management and leadership. The phenomenon proves to 
be so broad and multifarious that a single study cannot complete the development of 
the utilization procedures. The research appears to fulfill its objective.    
 
8.2  The Detectability of Early Warnings, (Question 1) 
8.2.0  General 
The first research question was: “Can information of the type of Ansoff’s weak 
signals, referred to as ‘early warnings’ in this study, be found in project work?” This 
can be considered to have been answered in the positive, in part already in the 
literature survey. The examination of the literature also indicates that strategic and 
military intelligence, the research on international crises, and the research on 
corporate bankruptcies have shown that early warnings can be detected in these 
areas. Communications studies and future studies are also familiar with the 
phenomenon of weak signals.  All of this demonstrates that Ansoff is not alone in 
his ideas. The significant difference between Ansoff and other writers is that Ansoff 
emphasizes the state of knowledge and the time available. 
This study shows that phenomena conforming to Ansoff’s theory of weak 
signals, i.e. early warnings, can apparently be detected in project work. The state of 
knowledge embedded in the early warnings observed in this study appears to vary in 
accordance with Ansoff’s theory. The time available underscored by Ansoff also 
appears to exist, though the values it takes (time periods) could not be measured in 
this study.  
The research material yielded 68 different early warning groups could be 
extracted from (table 6.7.2, appendix B). These were further grouped into eleven 
(11) actual early warning main groups (table 6.7.1). In addition, the material 
contains a number of “small groups” and “no early warning procured, difficult to 
detect” groups. The early warnings appear to be related to the observations of people 
and their work, i.e. to problems caused by people’s work. Early warnings related to 
natural phenomena or similar factors were absent from the material, since they were 
not asked about in the interviews. 
Early warnings, however, are not a “crystal ball” phenomenon. The future cannot 
communicate with the present, as the future does not yet exist. All of us 
(organizations, the interest groups of a project, other organizations, participants etc.) 
make our own future [Aula,  2000]; in other words, the effects of our present 
activities and decisions are only visible in the future (tomorrow, next week etc.). 
This human activity appears to give an excellent explanation of why early warnings 
are detectable. “Someone is always aware of impending (hidden) problems, nobody 
just wants to bring them out.  Nobody seems to want to let the cat out of the bag” [an 
excerpt from an interview]. These observations can further explain the fact that 
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detectable early warnings can be connected with any one or several of the project 
parties, they can be detected in all of the project phases, and they can take extremely 
varied forms. 
 
8.2.1  The Recurrence of Early Warnings 
Some of the observations of early warnings appear to be one-time events that are 
not expected to recur. These are the instances that present the greatest difficult for 
determinining whether the observation was merely accidental or whether it really 
indicates a symptom of a relevant change (cf. Åberg’s core questions of the 
detection of weak signals, section 3.1.4). 
A separate group is formed by those, observationally individual, one-time early 
warnings that can often recur in the same or similar form or point to the same 
problem. When this is the case, groups or even time series can be formed of those 
early warnings. This should naturally be interpreted as a confirming of the urgency 
of the early warning. 
Another group is formed by those early warnings that are “permanent” in their 
nature. The first observation of such an early warning seems to often be a kind of 
“eureka” experience. These early warnings include changes in people’s behavior or 
the managerial style of the project manager. 
Still another group is composed of the observations that form some kind of a 
time series. Plan deviation is the most explicit example of these. The most 
commonly used project control methods (e.g. time control, cost control) are based on 
detecting plan deviations and choosing responses on the basis of the information 
received from the deviations. When a plan deviation is detected, something has 
already happened; all plan deviations are the result of some problem or cause of a 
problem. When the plan deviations are minor, they often elicit no response, because 
nothing serious has yet happened. They should, however, be used as early warnings, 
as the plan has not been fully successful. The amplitude or the perceived seriousness 
of the deviation can apparently be seen as a quantity describing the state of 
knowledge of this type of early warning. 
Utilization of plan deviations is further complicated by the possibly dismissive 
attitude of the project management toward minor plan deviations. This researcher 
has encountered such an attitude frequently; it has also been noticeable in the case 
projects used in this study. It seems that there is some degree of dependency 
between the success of the project and the willingness of project management to 
react to even minor problems and plan deviations. In the successful case projects, 
project management responded to even small deviations, and showed interest in 
deviations in general. In the least successful project, the project management 
practically forbade the reporting of fairly minor deviations to the client; the 
problems could only be reported once they were substantial and clearly jeopardized 
the completion of the project. The client, as well, showed indifference toward the 
utilization of plan deviations. However, no generalized conclusions can be drawn on 
the basis of only four case projects.  
It can be stated that plan deviations are a group of early warnings, but not vice 
versa. Plan deviations are familiar to project management and they can always be 
clearly measured with the modern tools of project control. This study shows that 
there are a myriad of other, often qualitative, early warnings. 
 
8.2.2 Filtering 
Ansoff’s [-84] filtering phenomenon and communication noise appear to form a 
significant part of the early warnings phenomenon. The empirical case project 
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material only yields a few indications of the existence of various filters. In some 
projects, the project management made very clear what kinds of information about 
the progress of the project was welcome, while in a couple of projects attempts 
(sometimes successful) were made to control what could be written in the monthly 
reports. In addition, decision-makers’ indifference to warnings was clearly 
perceptible. On the other hand, one of the case projects could be considered an 
example of the opposite kind, since the project management showed interest in even 
the smallest problems and their early warnings.  
Filters and noise seem to be effective in explaining why warnings are difficult to 
perceive under certain circumstances and why some people apparently have 
difficulty in detecting them. The power filter accounts of the behavior of the 
decision-maker. However, the empirical material is not broad enough to warrant 
conclusions, and the subject requires further research. 
 
8.3  Describing the Character of the Phenomenon, (Question 2) 
8.3.1 General 
The second research question was: “Is it possible to design a description of the 
early warnings phenomenon and a typology of the early warnings?” 
The present study creates an explanatory model of the early warnings 
phenomenon that clarifies its character; the model is presented in section 8.3.2 
below. The phenomenon as a whole appears to be divided into two stages: a) 
detecting early warnings and accepting them as information, and b) decision-
making, where the procured information is analyzed and the necessary responses are 
decided upon. 
The communicative character of early warnings and their detection is also noted 
in the study. Early warnings appear to often fulfill several of the criteria set by 
communication theories for messages. The study further revealed that the mere 
detection of early warnings is not sufficient in itself: to produce a change in the 
progress of the project, some response has to be made to minimize the impact of the 
threat. It is interesting to note the various procedures of detecting early warnings 
used by several interviewees, which enhanced their opportunities to detect early 
warnings. 
 
8.3.2  A Model Describing the Phenomenon 
The character of the phenomenon is clarified in figure 8.1, “The Character of the 
Early Warnings Phenomenon and the Factors Affecting It.” The figure was formed 
as a result of the interaction between the theoretical survey and the analytical phase 
of the empirical research. This interaction was strongly influenced by numerous 
conversations with various persons. 
Figure 8.1 presents project events as a kind of process of occurrences. This is a 
time-bound current that is examined by the observer, or that “sends” a message to 
the observer. The figure illustrates the two-part character and the factors affecting 
the phenomenon. The phenomenon can be divided into two phases: 1) the 
communication phase and 2) the decision-making phase; however, it is difficult to 
completely separate these from each other 
1) The communication phase can be divided into three parts: 1a) the detecting of 
the early warning; 1b) the interpretation of the early warning; and 1c) the acceptance 
of the early warning. An important factor in the communication phase, in addition to 
the actual message (observation), is the observer. He determines how the 
observation will be interpreted, because the message only reaches others in the 
interpretation of the observer.  
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Figure 8.1 The Character of the Early Warnings Phenomenon and the 
Factors Affecting It 
 
In stage 1a), detecting, the observer can utilize the type categorization developed 
in this study (table 6.7.2, appendix B). The descriptions and examples of early 
warnings presented may facilitate recognition of early warnings. Other descriptive 
typology of early warnings (appendix C) may also be helpful; these might include 
knowledge of early warnings that are typical to various project phases and the 
knowledge of their forms of manifestation.  
In  stage 1b), interpretation of early warnings, the dependencies between early 
warnings - project problems - problem causes presented in this study can be utilized. 
Interpretation may also be facilitated by knowing to which project party the type of 
early warning detected most often refers. 
In stage 1c), acceptance, the observer acts according to the theories of 
communication: first, he either rejects the early warning or accepts it as meaningful 
to the project and to himself; second, once the observer accepts the early warning, he 
endeavors to interpret the impact of the observation, which moves him toward the 
decision-making phase. This is discussed further in section 9.2.  The manner in 
which the early warning is processed can be explained both with the model of the 
“internal communication of the individual” (figure 3.9) and with facet theory. It 
should be kept in mind that the communication situation is always multi-stimulied. 
The stimuli are sets of thoughts. According to this view, the interpretation is 
influenced not only by the early warning itself, but also by the circumstances 
surrounding the detection, the project situation etc. This was manifest in the analysis 
of early warning elements. 
2) In the decision-making phase, the relevant questions are: what is the 
significance of the early warning for the project, and what responses should be 
adopted on the basis of that early warning in this project situation at hand and in the 
prevailing project environment? The contents of this phase are described in more 
detail in figure 9.1, “A Model of Utilizing Early Warnings.” The details of the 
decision-making phase, such as the relationship between the responses and the early 
warnings, could not be more comprehensively examined in this study due to the 
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small number of research elements concerning responses. A more extensive 
clarification requires further study. 
Figure 8.1. also shows that the events at the moment of observation in the current 
of project events can no longer be influenced because of the time-bound nature of 
the current. Responses always influence future events. Project control is not a 
regressive cybernetic process where situations recur and their effects can be 
corrected. Project events do not repeat themselves during the same project. 
 
8.3.3  Categorizations, The Second Part of Question 2 
The second part of the second research question receives a positive answer: on 
the basis of this research a type categorization and a descriptive typology of early 
warnings can be created.  
The type categorization consists of early warnings that have similar content; it 
can be said that these early warnings belong to the same type as far as is possible. 
The categorization is hierarchical: there are 11 main groups and 68 subgroups.  
The descriptive typology which is parallel to the type categorization,  is 
presented in appendix C. The appendix presents only the broad outlines of the 
crosstabulated examinations between the categorizations and the various attributes; 
they have been discussed in more detail in the licentiate’s dissertation Nikander [-
98].  
The categorizations presented in this study may be useful in detecting and 
interpreting early warnings. When attempts are made to utilize early warnings in 
project control and management, the existence of early warnings does not seem to 
pose a problem; a more common problem is probably recognizing and interpreting 
the early warnings. The greatest problem, mentioned by several interviewees, 
appears to be to convince the decision-makers of the threat of incipient problems and 
that advance information is available of such problems.  The problem of the 
credibility of early warnings is also present in military intelligence research and 
future studies. Investigations such as this one lend additional credibility to the whole 
phenomenon, thereby facilitating the work of the observer and interpreter of early 
warnings in providing clear input to the decision-makers. 
 
8.4. The Relation between Early Warnings and Project Problems 
Question 3 
The third research question, “How do observable early warnings apply to 
different project problems?” also receives a positive answer  that is, a relationship 
between the two can be detected. For utilization of the results, exploration of the 
dependencies between the early warning groups and project problems can be 
regarded as the most important aspect of the study. Conversely, on the basis of only 
the basic interview material it was impossible to determine how early warnings refer 
to the actual causes of project problems,  the results regarding this issue are not 
based on information received from the interviews. However, in the case interviews 
the unearthing of the causes of problems was quite successful, although the study 
fell short of understanding the direct relationship of the early warnings and problem 
causes. Because of this uncertainty, the causes of problems are only connected to the 
project problems. Due to the narrowness of the material, some dependencies may 
have escaped notice in this sector as well. 
The project problems and their causes appear to be characterized by dependency 
on people’s actions similar to early warnings. This is quite natural, as project work is 
completely composed of human actions. Only the project environment may be 
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influenced by natural phenomena, but even in these cases the environment itself is 
chosen by man, and he could relocate the project if he wished to do so. 
Problems caused by natural phenomena, illnesses, sudden accidents or other 
similar factors did not emerge from the material. This may be at least partly due to 
the fact that questions relating to such issues were not asked during the interviews. 
In the literature, these issues are often classified under the heading “unexpected 
incidents” (Immediate Danger Signs as in Weschke [-94]). Naturally, it is possible to 
be prepared for such incidents through risk management. The material also 
demonstrates that early warnings can refer both to problems within the project that 
can be influenced by project management as well as to problems outside the project, 
over which the project management has no power. 
 
8.5 Chains Formed by Problems and Causes (Question  4) 
The fought research question was “Can observations of early warnings, project 
problems, and the causes of problems be chained together and networked, and can 
their character vary depending on the point and time of observation?” receives a 
positive answer. On the basis of the empirical material, the study develops a general 
and approximate dependency network between various early warning main groups, 
project problem groups, problem causes, and responses. On the level of a specific 
case project, it is possible to devise long and branching early warning - problem - 
cause - response problem chains and dependency networks. The same phenomenon 
was apparent in the theoretical survey, especially as concerns the studies of project 
risk management. 
The general dependency network developed in this study may, however, 
excessively generalize the results; this is evident when devising dependency 
networks by project problem. For practical utilization, the database should be very 
specific; possibly the database should be designed on the level of early warning and 
project problem subgroups. In such a case, the size of the database may be a problem 
as it will be difficult to handle manually; help should be available from information 
technology database applications. 
Responses and Observation Procedures 
To supplement the narrow sample of responses and observation procedures in the 
research material, response recommendations found in the literature can be used 
(tables 7.3.1 and 7.3.2). 
On the Similarities between Problems and Causes (Set Theory View) 
Multiple interpretations of the observed items, already apparent in the theory 
part, is noted in the research material. Interpretation of the observed event or 
phenomenon may change depending on point and time of observation. The 
observation (signal) made of the event can be considered an early warning, but event 
can also be regarded as a project problem at the time of observation; furthermore, 
event can also be interpreted as the cause of a current or future problem. 
Both the material from the literature and the research material indicate that  A) 
observations made of  phenomena or phenomena, that can be observed in projects, 
are either interpretable as “pure” early warnings of a problem, or express an existing 
problem, or are interpretable as causes of problems, but that are difficult to interpret 
in more than one way at the same time. B) When comparing the tables 4.4 (Project 
Problems and Their Causes Combined from Project Management Literature) and 4.1 
(Symptoms of Project Problems on the Basis of Literature), significant similarities 
are detected. The same characteristics can also be found in the research material. 
This and the chain formation phenomenon indicate that a certain observed 
phenomenon or observation made of  phenomenon can be interpreted in various 
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ways depending on the project circumstances in the different phases of project work 
at the time of observation. C) It is fairly clear, that even other types of items that can 
be interpreted to belong to two different groups could occur. However, the responses 
are a completely separate group. This can be presented in accordance with set theory 
in the figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2 The Sets of Early Warnings, Problems, Causes and Responses 
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9.   Discussions 
 
 
9.1  Utilization possibilities 
A number of utilization models for weak signals can be found in research 
literature; Ansoff presents the Weak Signals Strategic Issue Management (WSSIMS) 
model in the area of strategic planning and management. Several other writers have 
also presented SIMS models that differ from the Ansoff model mostly in the details. 
The field of communication studies has its own weak signal utilization model 
[Åberg -89a]. The observations of the procedures of detecting early warnings made 
in this study and the views presented by several interviewees on the phenomenon 
also show that early signals can apparently be utilized as a tool in project 
management. 
In his book Åberg [-89a] discusses external and internal scanning which belong 
to the communicative functions of a company. The core questions raised by Åberg, 
also applicable to project work, are: 
“- is the observed change symptom of a greater, relevant change, or is it only 
random variation?” 
“-How can weak signals be detected as quickly as possible, so that the greatest 
available time will be available for the responses”        [Åberg -89a]. 
None of the models presented in the literature appears to be directly applicable to 
project work; they are usually too cumbersome. Alternatively, an attempt can be 
made to apply various problem analysis models [Lewis -93]. The basic principles of 
the models presented in the literature are suitable to project work, but the applied 
method should be very flexible, rapid and simple. 
The development of the Decision Support model (figure 9.1) presented in this 
study has been heavily influenced by the Ansoff model [Ansoff -84]; further, the 
development of the model has been influenced by the model of “External and 
internal scanning as a continuous event”, presented by Åberg [-89a] as well as by the 
“Structural model of social action in an action group” [Heiskala -90]. Another factor 
that has influenced the creation of the Decision Support model is the interaction 
between theory and the analytical phase of empirical research, which has also 
influenced the design of figure 8.1. In addition, discussions with the experts 
mentioned in section 7.6  have helped to form the model. 
The fundamental model for the utilization of early warnings presented in section 
9.2 should be understood as a mental approach. As there has been no opportunity to 
test the functioning of the model during the present research, the future development 
and testing of this model depends on follow-up studies. All components of the 
categorizations designed in this study can possibly be employed in the utilization; 
the cross tabulations and early warning - project problem - problem cause - response 
dependency networks devised in this study can also be helpful.  
The theories of project risk management are apparently not acquainted with the 
concept of weak signals/early warnings, although project risk management literature 
does mention the concept of “risk symptoms.” The idea of utilizing phenomena of 
the early warning type seems to be very poorly represented in the literature on 
project risk theories. As already noted in the section on literature, the literature 
survey revealed factors which connect the early warnings phenomenon to project 
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risk management. These include: the observed connection between early warnings 
and project problems, the observed similarities between risks and project problems, 
the equation of potential problems with risks, the similarities noted between early 
warnings, project problems and problem causes, the changes in the interpretation of 
these factors depending on the perspective of observation, the formation of chains of 
these factors, which is also applicable to risks, the fact that the result attribute 
“problem” used in this study matches the concept of “risk categories”, the 
similarities observed between causes of project problems and the risk factor (these 
concepts can be considered nearly synonymous). 
The above-mentioned factors can be detected in the material of the empirical 
study, which strengthens the possibility, already present in the preliminary 
examination, that utilization of the early warning phenomenon can be integrated into 
project risk management. The perspective of project risk management could not be 
very thoroughly examined due to the limited resources of this research. 
 
9.2  A Decision Support Model Based on Early Warnings 
As figure 8.1 shows, the model is divided into two main parts: A) The 
communicative part, where the early warnings are recognized and the fact that they 
give information is accepted. This part includes the stages 1…4 in figure 9.1. B) The 
decision-making part, which contains stages 4…7. It should be noted that stage 4 
can be considered to belong to both main parts. 
 
9.2.1 The Procedures of Decision-Making in the Model  
The utilization of early warnings in decision-making has two procedures: 1) 
early warnings and 2) problems or risks.   
1) In the early warning procedure, the main question to be answered is: a) what 
problem (risk) does the detected early warning refer to? 2) In a problem- or risk-
oriented perspective, the following questions should be answered: b) can early 
warnings implying the materialization of a particular risk be detected? and c) what 
kinds of responses (observation procedures) can be used to procure additional 
information of the threat of materialization of a particular problem (risk)?  
It should be noted that, theoretically, each observer of signals interprets them in 
his own way  in other words, he has his particular way of seeing the situation and 
interprets it according to his own “facets.” Nevertheless, only one decision regarding 
the responses can be made for the project as a whole. This is the responsibility of the 
actual decision-maker  project manager, the decision-maker of the owner, etc. 
That person can, naturally, take into account the views of other project participants. 
In figure 9.1, this “multiple interpretations” situation is illustrated by several 
overlapping frames around the process stages; these are marked “Different 
viewpoints” in the lower right-hand corner. 
Two stages of assessing the future are included in early warning utilization. First, 
the severity, likelihood of materialization and time available of the potential problem 
(risk) should be analyzed (assessed, anticipated) on the basis of the available 
information and the view (experience, beliefs) of the evaluator. This is equivalent to 
risk management that includes consideration of the information provided by early 
warnings. Second, the decision-maker should evaluate the impact of the planned 
responses on the project, and the reactions, and responses of the various project 
parties and/or outsiders in the situation at hand. As mentioned earlier, the model 
presented here can be a tool for anticipating the future aspects of project problems.  
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9.2.2 The Early Warnings Procedure 
In an early warning oriented approach, shown in figure 9.1, the first (1) stage is 
detecting an early warning; this is always done by a person and the early warning is 
detected in the stream of project events (figure 8.1). Ansoff gives the observer the 
important advice that detecting an early warning requires great sensitivity of the 
observer to listen to his environment “with an ear to the ground.” The attributes 
describing the early warnings phenomenon, developed in this study, can be helpful 
to the observer during monitoring; these give hints about the types of early warnings 
that should be looked for, when and where. Juran [-95], as well, notes how important 
people are as sensors, and how it is true in all cases that a person compares the real 
(observed) event to his expectations (standard) and recognizes a deviation. As noted 
in section 8.3, “Describing the Character of the Phenomenon,” communications 
theories seem to successfully explain the observation process. 
In the second (2) stage of figure 9.1, the observer accepts his observation 
(message) and begins to interpret it, i.e., either considers it an early warning or 
rejects it as insignificant. This stage clearly shows the definition of a facet: “a facet 
is composed of associations. An association is a piece of knowledge or an 
assumption, which is linked to an attitude.  Associations are activated in the 
processing of a particular stimulus.” [Åberg -93]. The greatest problem is probably 
deciding whether the information in question is really significant or merely an 
arbitrary “event.” Here the categories of early warnings devised in this study, with 
their descriptions and examples of what warnings may be like, can be utilized. 
In the third (3) stage, the observer tries to determine the state of knowledge of 
the early warning, i.e. the significance to the project of the information it provides. 
The scale of assessment does not need to be absolute or valid in all cases, as long as 
it is definable in the situation in question. To help in this assessment, the observer 
can use either the scale presented in this study (though it has been noted to be quite 
inexact and vague) or the scale presented by Ansoff. The received information 
should be recorded even if it appears irrelevant or too scant, since more information 
on the same subject may surface in the future. 
In the fourth (4) stage the observer strives to identify the problem (risk) that has 
emerged, as well as its possible causes (risk factors, causes of risk). This assessment 
is influenced not only by all the information provided by the warning 
(categorizations) but also by at least the project situation (internal trends), the 
circumstances of the project environment (external trends) and the beliefs and 
assumptions of the interpreter. The possible utilization of various project risk 
management methods (risk analysis etc.) is relevant in this stage at the latest. 
Another tool that can be used is a database of the type developed in this study 
concerning the relation between early warnings and project problems (risks) (table 
7.2.1) and information on the dependencies between project problems and their 
causes (risk factors) (table 7.2.2). This is illustrated in a simplified form in figure 
7.2, “Warnings - Project Problems - Problem Causes - Responses Network.” 
The time available (5) is explored along with recognizing the risks. The question 
to be answered is: How much time is available for the responses required by the 
problem (risk)? In other words, how urgent is the situation? This, too, is strongly 
influenced by the project situation (internal trends) and by the project environment 
(external trends) as well as by the interpreter. The classification presented by Ansoff 
in figure 3.5 can be used as a scale: delayable, postponable, urgent. 
Probably the greatest difficulty in stages (4) and (5) is to convince the decision-
maker of the existence of a problem, its impact on the project, and the necessity of 
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responses. This can be called a credibility problem; it emerged in the interviews 
conducted for this study and is equally apparent in studies on military intelligence, 
international security and international risks. Studies such as the present one about 
early warnings in project work may ameliorate this credibility problem. 
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Figure 9.1 The Decision Support Model of Early Warnings 
 The model is indebted to Ansoff [-84a], Åberg [-89a], and Heiskala [-90]. 
 
 
Finally (6) it is necessary to endeavor to decide which responses the observed 
situation calls for. This is illustrated in the matrix in the lower part of figure 9.1, 
where the aids of decision-making are, a) the available information about the 
problem (risk) and its impact on the project and b) the urgency of responses 
(available time). At least the following additional factors influence the choice of 
responses: c) internal trends, d) external trends, e) the assumptions of the decision-
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maker and his position in the project, f) the policies and corporate culture of his 
firm, and d) the effects that the response is hoped or estimated to have on the 
project. It should also be noted that a significant portion of the problems (risks) may 
be outside the influence of the decision-maker; this is evident in the analysis of the 
material. 
No acquired preliminary information should be completely disregarded: even 
insignificant information should be stored in such a way that it can be compared 
with both older information and information available in the future. This is difficult 
to accomplish manually, but is possible with the help of database applications; this 
subject is further explored in section 9.3. 
The situations in the extreme points of the decision-making matrix are the 
following: 
a) If there is ample time, but the available information is weak (an inkling), 
observation procedures that give more information can be selected as sufficient 
(table 7.3.2). This covers the upper left corner of the matrix. 
b) When there is ample time and the information about the problem (risk) is 
exact, normal project management methods can be used. See the upper right corner 
of the matrix. 
c) If there is little time and the precision level of the information lies anywhere 
between an inkling and exact information, various “emergency responses” must be 
adopted. See the lower part of the matrix. 
d) When the problem is “outside” the matrix, i.e., when there is no preliminary 
information of the risk and therefore it comes as a surprise, some kind of a “panic 
situation” will probably emerge when the risk becomes concrete. 
e) In the middle of the matrix, proactive management style leadership may be 
considered applicable. This study is unable to develop the idea any further. 
 
9.2.3  Problem Procedure 
In a problem-oriented situation, which can be considered an application of the 
early warnings phenomenon suitable for the project planning phases, a useful 
approach could be constituted by the following stages of figure 9.1: Recognizing 
problems (risks) (4), Evaluating the urgency of the situation (5), If there is no 
immediate threat, procedures of monitoring early warnings will be selected. When 
early warnings are detected, early warning oriented action is returned to. 
The significant addition that the model makes to the project risk management 
methods presented in the literature is that it allows the use of highly inexact 
information (inklings, weak signals) and makes possible the planning and 
implementation of responses in as early a stage as possible, as soon as information 
available about the situation appears sufficient. 
 
9.2.4  Difficulties 
The utilization of early warnings is made more difficult by the multifariousness 
and great scope of the phenomenon. There are a myriad of early warnings, they 
emerge in numerous forms, can be detected in various different situations and 
interpreted in several ways. In addition, several other factors influence the 
assessment of the severity of a detected risk; moreover, according to 
communications theories, receiving, accepting and interpreting observations 
(messages) fully depends on the receiver  someone who may find it hard to 
manage the copious early warnings. Furthermore, the associations of the observer 
crucially influence his acceptance and interpretation of an early warning. 
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Before the decisions required by the situation can be made, another person  the 
decision-maker  often enters the picture. The observer is now faced with the 
additional problem (mentioned above) of getting the decision-maker to believe in the 
existence of a risk, its severity, and the fact that responses are necessary. This same 
difficulty is noted in research conducted in the areas of strategic (military) 
intelligence service and future studies. A number of interviewees also remarked 
about this difficulty in the interviews conducted for this study. Additionally, the 
assertions made by Heiskanen [-88] in his book about believing in the results of 
intelligence work should be kept in mind. 
Since the early warnings of the type detected in this study cannot be measured 
with instruments currently in use, detecting an early warning always depends on a 
person, and often on no more than one person,. In addition, the final interpretation of 
early warnings, as well as the task of decision-making, is the responsibility of a 
single person, and the result depends wholly on him. Information technology may, 
however, be of use in the interpretation and recognition of risks; the Knowledge-
Based Risk Management model presented by Niwa [-89] appears especially 
promising (see section 9.3 for more information). Such an application may offer the 
decision-maker other alternatives in addition to the one that occurred to him first. 
Herein lies a danger, however, if the recommendations made by the application are 
followed slavishly. It should always be kept in mind that while an application may 
recommend and suggest, the final decision must lie with a human.  
 
9.3 The Early Warning Phenomenon as a Part of Project Risk 
Management  
The model developed in section 9.2 has very clear characteristics of project risk 
management. The stages 1…5 of figure 9.1 (making an observation, accepting the 
observation as an early warning, determining the state of knowledge and the time 
available, identifying the problem and its cause) can be regarded as at least a part of 
the first stage of work, risk assessment/risk identification of project risk 
management (section 2.5). In this stage (as pointed out earlier) the early warning 
categorizations can be utilized. 
This study offers no help for the charting of risks done in the project planning 
phase at the beginning of a project; the early warnings detected in the study refer to 
events and observations in the project itself, and the results can be used in charting 
risks during the project. Early warnings can give advance notice of arising risks. The 
stages 4 and 5 of the model can also be regarded as a part of the risk analysis/risk 
qualification stage; however, the contents of the stages of project risk management 
are broader than those of the stages made possible solely by information provided by 
the early warning phenomenon. Stage 6 of the model (Selecting responses) can be a 
part of the risk qualification and risk response development stage. 
The early warning phenomenon does not, according to this study, give 
information about the factors that are closely connected to risk management, namely 
the probability of the materialization of risks, the impact of risks on the project or 
other information required and produced by the risk analysis stage. This information 
should be procured from other sources; it can then be included as additional 
dimensions in the decision-making matrix of the model shown in figure 9.1. It 
should be noted that the information provided by an early warning about the time 
available relating to a potential problem (risk) is not the same thing as the 
probability of the materialization of a risk. They do not substitute each other and are 
not opposite factors; rather, they supplement the total knowledge, and a separate 
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matrix should be formed of them. This information is not supplied by this study  
rather, it requires further research. 
Knowledge-Based Application Possibilities 
As noted earlier, Niwa [-89] has developed a knowledge-based risk management 
model, and the information received about the early warning phenomenon in this 
study can possibly be inserted as a part of this model. The model presented by Niwa 
is mainly a tool of the risk identification stage. 
The knowledge-based risk management model can be considered to contain two 
main parts: a) an interactive program and b) the structure of the database used by 
this program. The model is risk factor oriented. A risk situation can be examined in 
the model forward in time (forward reasoning), in which case it is determined which 
risks are possible when the risk factor in question becomes manifest. The situation 
can also be examined backward in time (backward reasoning); in this case the object 
is to determine which factors caused the current risk. A relevant issue for the user is 
that he can feed additional information to the program using suitable keywords, 
and/or the program may ask questions and offer keyword alternatives for the user. 
The database of the model is based on a so-called work package idea, which can 
be considered an extended and improved application of WBS/OBS. The database is 
formed with the aid of multilevel matrices. The matrices combine the objects of 
work, which are equipment and buildings, activities (such as planning, purchases, 
installation), risks, and risk factors. The model is apparently concerned with activity 
management. The leadership side of the issue can possibly be connected to the 
model, but it does not form a very natural part of it. 
The New Structure 
Figure 9.2 illustrates one possibility of developing the model so that the early 
warnings phenomenon examined in this study could be utilized. The figure 9.2 
shows figure 7.4 in Niwa, [-89, p.99], with the information provided by this study 
added in bold print. A database of early warnings must be added to the Standard 
Package Knowledge Base database. Associate Guidance has to be extended to 
contain the control included in the early warnings phenomenon. Two approaches are 
formed in the model: a) the original risk factor procedure and b) the new early 
warning procedure. This is in accordance with the model shown in figure 9.1. In 
addition, it probably is appropriate to store the information concerning the current 
project into a separate databank (Current Project Knowledge), from which it can 
later be transferred to the complete file. This makes the management of acute 
information more exact. 
The original database can possibly be enlarged to include information about 
which early warnings can be connected to a particular work package or risk, and 
how the categorizations developed in this study is related to the work packages. This 
information, however, is not provided by this study but requires further research. 
Similarly, the way in which knowledge of early warnings could be used as keywords 
as presented by Niwa [-89] (according to him, the keywords included the idea of 
“indicators/hints”). The original model by Niwa does not appear to contain the 
stages risk analysis, risk response development and risk response control. These 
have been added to the figure, but this study gives no information on what they 
should contain and how they could be integrated in to the model of the program. 
Another important point is that a program of this type constantly adds to its 
database; it has to be capable of “learning.” In collecting the database, care should 
 
  
Nikander    126 
 
Warning
Guidance
   Associate Current
   Guidance Project
Knowledge
         Risk
         Factors                   Risks
            Initial
          Knowledge
            Risks
Early Warnings          Association
         Knowledge
     Typology            Occurs or
           does not
             occur
Forward
reasoning Knowledge
association
Backward
reasoning
Keywords
Risk Analysis
Risk Response Development
Risk Response Control
Standard
Package
Knowledge
Base
Warning
Knowledge
 
 
Figure 9.2 The Structure of the Human-Computer Interactive System for 
Project Risk Management.  
The lines in bold show the additions of the present study to Niwa’s [-89] model.  
 
be taken to ascertain that it does not grow unduly large. Betts [-82] notes that “A 
small but sufficient indicator list allows more rapid reaction than a complex list” 
[Betts -82,  p. 193]. He further states that the list of indicators of the U.S. European 
Army grew in the 1970s to nearly 500 different indicators. This was subsequently 
heavily trimmed, but about 100 indicators remained on the list [Betts -82]. 
 
9.4  Your and Your Organization’s Abilities 
Can the utilization of early warnings in risk management succeed in a micro-
level environment - projects - when it seems to be problematic elsewhere? In their 
book, Davies and Gurr [-98] examine the 17 high-intensity wars and 70 low-
intensity conflicts that raged in the world in 1997, determining how many people 
lost their lives in them and how vast a refugee problem they created. They also note 
the breadth of national and international research of early warnings of crises. Yet 
discussion about crisis management has surfaced in Europe only in recent years. 
Does this mean that leaders will wake up only when a catastrophe occurs in their 
own backyard? 
None of the developed utilization models and database systems are of any use if 
the user is not attuned to detecting even weak (inexact) early warnings. There is no 
  
Nikander    127 
 
other instrument besides people for detecting these kinds of signals; no technical 
instrument is available and probably cannot be easily developed. The study of 
communications shows that the ultimate receiver of all human messages is a person. 
This study, as well, shows the significance of people as sensors. 
If you cannot detect and recognize early warnings, if you are not attuned to 
detecting them, if you are not prepared to listen to the field “with your ear to the 
ground,” continuing this activity is futile. You must educate yourself, collect your 
own experiences, develop facets of your own to which you can then compare your 
observations. Project literature and other types of literature are full of self-
improvement guides. The commercial market offers an “unlimited” number of 
courses and consultant services. It is therefore meaningless to try to present any new 
ideas for education on this point here. 
As the old saying goes, “experience is the mother of wisdom.”  Studies based 
solely on books will not be sufficient in an area such as this, where individual 
insight is important; one must really gather personal experience and observations. 
The present researcher used the journal method from the literature for monitoring 
one of the case projects [Lientz et al. -95]. The literature recommends that one 
should keep a daily, private journal (or diary) of the project events and especially of 
one’s own feelings and small observations. It emphasizes that the journal must really 
be private and even secret. In the experience of the present researcher, the journal 
aided in clarifying the events and problems of the project; therefore, it was at least a 
good research method. 
It would be extremely important to get even the other project participants to 
realize the significance of early warnings; especially the decision-makers should 
believe in them. Here the project manager holds a key position: through his example, 
he can either strengthen or reject the anticipative management of a project. The 
present researcher experienced this very strongly in the context of the case projects: 
when the project management wasn’t interested in anticipating problems, or even 
prohibited the presentation of forecasts and warnings, this activity naturally ceased. 
That particular project ended in a near-catastrophe. On the other hand, when the 
project manager in another project paid attention even to small hints and signs of 
problems, these could not grow and form networks. The project was the most 
successful of the case projects. 
The literature and the commercial market are also full of all kinds of guides and 
services on organizational development; there are the most varied -isms, which 
come and go. A new -ism is hardly necessary. One of the reigning trends in 
organizational development has been to emphasize the openness, innovativeness and 
creativity of an organization. A certain amount of creative madness is undoubtedly 
good for the acceptance and utilization of the early warnings idea: one has to be 
prepared to accept stupid questions instead of trying to repress them. Aula [2000] 
discusses the “full-blooded” organization of the new era; this lies somewhere 
between the traditional stable box organization and a chaotic state. Could this idea 
be applied in projects? 
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10.  Summary 
 
 
 
10.1  The Successfulness of the Research Angle and Method 
Qualitative research has provided an opportunity for understanding the early 
warnings phenomenon of under examination and has therefore been a successful 
method. Using semistructured interviews as a field method has given, even with 
fairly limited material, a basis for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
The interviews do not necessarily bring out the actual events; instead, they may 
reflect the interviewees’ opinions of the events. This is one of the weaknesses of the 
method. Another weakness is the fact that the research method depends so much on 
the researcher, whose interpretations may have colored the results. As for the case 
projects, the fairly long time that has elapsed since the projects were implemented 
can have diffused the interviewees’ view of the events. 
 
10.2  Assessing the Research 
The research can be assessed on the basis of several factors. These include: 1) 
how well it has answered the research questions and fulfilled the goal set for it, 2) 
level of success of the type categorization of early warnings, 3) the information 
provided by the descriptive attributes (descriptive typology), 4) the link between 
early warnings and project problems and the devised models. 
The theoretical part of the research approaches the topic from the perspective of 
several different theories from the detection of an early warning to the required 
responses.  An analysis of the concepts related to the phenomenon is conducted in 
the theoretical part. In addition, that part explores the views of various other fields of 
study on the early warnings phenomenon; on the basis of these views it is concluded 
that Ansoff is not alone regarding the bases of his theory. The theoretical part further 
delves into Finnish communications theories and how these clarify the phase of 
detecting early warnings. A preliminary categorization is designed for early 
warnings and an investigation is conducted of the way in which the interpretation of 
the detected items can change their character from early warnings to causes of 
project problems. The observation is explained with a set theory model in the 
context of interpreting the results. 
The empirical part of the study endeavors to examine the phenomenon through 
the use of descriptive methods for analyzing the activities in a project; this part of 
the research is directed toward explaining the phenomenon. Later in the study, the 
perspective is extended in a normative direction. 
Due to the research method, the limited resources, the groundbreaking nature of 
this research, and the broad scope of the phenomenon, all of the research objectives 
set in the beginning of the research were not achieved; especially the development of 
the Decision Support model for the utilization of early warnings remains somewhat 
sketchy. The research gives a predominantly positive answer to all of the research 
questions. The second research question, concerning the state of knowledge of early 
warnings, could only be answered with a rather vague scale. The descriptive 
typology and the picture formed of the early warnings phenomenon by the 
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descriptive attributes can be considered fairly good. They clarify what can be 
observed, from whom information can be received, when information is received 
and where and in what form early warnings can be expected to be found. 
The broad scope of the phenomenon complicates the unambiguous application of 
the results. The descriptive attributes, which form the main part of the typologies 
presented in this study, primarily describe the phenomenon. As noted earlier, it has 
not been possible to exactly measure either the state of knowledge and the 
information content of an early warning or time available for responses once a 
warning has been detected. 
This research shows that the early warnings phenomenon can be described as 
having two phases: 1) the early warning has to be detected and accepted, as well as 
interpreted, and 2) decision has to be made as to what responses should be adopted. 
The research clearly indicates that the detection phase is a communicative 
phenomenon, effectively explained by the theories of communication. The study 
offers no tools for the decision-making phase; the research is too narrow to enable 
exact conclusions regarding the responses that should be adopted in various problem 
situations. The model developed in this study is more effective as a model 
explaining and organizing the phenomenon than as a decision-making model. The 
research indicates that the phenomenon can possibly be integrated into project risk 
management, though how this would be carried out in practice is not examined here. 
The literature survey showed that there exist neither earlier systematic studies of 
the early warnings phenomenon nor broad studies of the Ansoff´s theory, while 
project literature includes only references to the phenomenon. No preliminary model 
of the early warnings phenomenon was therefore available prior to the empirical part 
of this research. This study can be considered successful as far as it organizes and 
explains the phenomenon being investigated; it adds to the understanding of the 
phenomenon and is a kind of a basic study exploring the nature of the phenomenon. 
 
10.3  The Area of Applicability of the Results 
The total results of the study, the model developed of the nature of the 
phenomenon, the categorizations, the Decision Support model and the leadership 
uses, can apparently be considered a new, additional project control and 
management method created for the field of project control. The information 
technology application of project risk management, described above, is an 
application of the presented Decision Support model. The addition to project 
management designed in this study does not refute anything previously developed 
(e.g. the sectors of project management discussed in PMBOK [-95]); rather, it strives 
to improve the project management´s opportunities to anticipate and forecast future 
events in a project. 
The applicability areas of the research results can be examined both as separate 
results that answer the research questions and as a total, system result. The results 
that answer the research questions were examined earlier in this study; their areas of 
applicability will be discussed below question by question. 
 
10.3.1 The General Area of Applicability 
In general, the area of applicability of the results is at least somewhat restricted 
due to the research method, the limited amount of material, and the strong influence 
of the researcher. Weakness in the research method comes from the subjectivity of 
the interviewees as they give their views and opinions on a particular question. In 
other words, what they describe is not necessarily the actual “real-life” experiences 
they might have had. The aim of the interviews was to consider the answer remnants 
  
Nikander    130 
 
in the sense described by Alasuutari [-93], which would mean that even individual 
answers would be reliable. The number of both interviewees and case projects is, 
with a view toward generalizations, small, although it is sufficient for qualitative 
research. 
In qualitative research, the role of the researcher is very pronounced and gives 
him significant freedom in conducting the research. This, however, contains the 
weakness of the method, as the personal preferences and notions of the researcher 
can adversely affect the results. In the present study, an attempt was made to 
minimize this danger by submitting the preliminary research results to three persons 
for a kind of a panel assessment. The assessment of the research from each of these 
persons was positive. 
The results can be considered valid for the research area, i.e. industrial 
investment projects in Finland. Some part of the results can probably be generalized 
even for other types of projects, though generalizing all the results for various 
projects would be risky. The results, with the possible exception of the leadership 
views, should not be applied outside project work. 
 
10.3.2 The Applicability by Research Question 
The first result  that early warnings occur in industrial investment projects  
can be considered quite reliable. All of the interviewees had observed and 
experienced varying levels of phenomena that could be interpreted as early 
warnings. Even an interviewee in the basic interviews, who scoffed at the whole 
idea, admitted to experiencing an inkling-type early warning. The “existence” of 
early warnings can be generalized to apply to all project work. In addition, the 
positive answer concerns the state of knowledge and time available of early 
warnings. The answer is subject to certain reservations when the scales are very 
inexact (vague) and therefore almost solely the assessments of the researcher. 
Although the result is utilized in the form of the Decision Support model, it (as all 
inexact and vague information) should be regarded with caution. For these reasons 
this part of the results is difficult to generalize. 
The description of the nature of the early warnings phenomenon can generally be 
considered applicable to project work when it organizes the phenomenon and adds 
to the understanding of it. Numerous interviewees recognized the early warnings 
phenomenon; hence, it can be considered fairly commonly known. The 
communicational character of the detection phase is obvious and therefore fully 
generalizable; the same can be stated about the project risk management character of 
the early warnings phenomenon. 
The type categorization of the main groups of early warnings developed in this 
study has chiefly the same content as the summary of preliminary signals derived 
from on the basis of the literature. This lends authority to the generalization of these 
results as applied to investments projects and, with caution, to other project types as 
well. The information provided by the literature, too, usually concerns specifically  
investment projects rather than projects in general. It should be kept in mind that 
both categorizations are formed by the same person, which can lead to an 
unintentional error. Some of the early warning groups, such as “expressed by 
personnel,” “managerial style,” “communication” and “documents” may be common 
in all types of projects, and they can even be assumed to be applied in other areas of 
management as well. The attributes of the descriptive typology  state of 
knowledge, project parties, project phases and form of occurrence  are on such a 
rough level that they can, be applied to all project work if necessary. 
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The similarities between project problems and their causes was already noted in 
the literature surveys and the empirical part of the research strengthened this 
impression. The categorization of project problems and their causes are very similar 
to the ones analyzed from the literature; they can probably be used in other project 
types as well, although in that case the categorizations may not be fully compatible 
with the project type. Like the type categorization of early warnings, this 
categorization, as well, may be plagued by an unconscious error by the researcher.  
It would be somewhat venturesome to generalize the results of the cross 
tabulations of “early warnings -  project problems” and “problems - causes” in such 
a way that the percent figures show the frequency of early warnings in different 
situations. This is due to the fact that the number of results depends upon the number 
of questions. On the other hand, a qualitative generalization of the cross tabulations 
(i.e. this type of early warning refers to these types of problems) is possible in all 
types of projects, assuming that the said types of early warnings and problems can 
occur in the project in question. 
Using early warnings in some form in project management and control proved to 
be surprisingly common, as understood from the basic interviews. Several 
participants in the basic interviews implied that they use early warnings in their daily 
work. In the case projects, however, utilization of early warnings was not observed. 
None of the interviewees had a systematic method, or the equivalent, for discovering 
early warnings, and neither was such a system discovered in the research on the case 
projects. The view that early warnings can be generally applied in project 
management is supported by the following considerations (among others): A) The 
early warnings phenomenon apparently has a risk management related character. B) 
The study of communications is familiar with early warnings. C) Project 
management literature contains references to the phenomenon [Lientz et al. -95] and 
[PMBOK -95]. The details of the form and model of utilization should be adjusted 
for each case. 
 
10.3.3 Note 
The information supplied by the occurrence distributions of the problems and 
their causes analyzed from the material should not be used for purposes other than 
those for which it has been used in this research. The distributions only show how 
many early warning elements the interviewees have, connected with various project 
problems according to the interpretation of the researcher. The results expressly do 
not show the frequency of certain types of problems in projects. 
 
10.3.4 The Area of Applicability of the Entire Theory 
When the results are examined as a whole, or as a new addition to the project 
management theories, the boundaries within which the theory is applicable should 
be defined. These boundaries are largely set by the applicability areas of these parts 
of the theory discussed above.  
The rationality of decision-making is the second crucial factor of the theory. 
While forming the theory, it has been assumed that the actors (participants) in the 
project are rational in their actions. The premise is that in a project, rules that are 
mainly common to all participants are in effect in a project. 
The common rules of projects include: 
- National and international laws 
- Contracts between firms 
- The delivery conditions of international delivery agreements 
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- Cultural customs, both those specific to projects and those generally 
accepted 
- The requirements of economy 
- The objectives of the project 
- Organizational “orders,” i.e. the rules of authority 
No participant acts completely arbitrarily in accordance with his impulses, as can 
happen in governmental action in e.g. a dictatorship [Sivonen -98]. 
In practice, however, decisions made by the actors are not fully rational, since 
they do not possess all of the relevant information required for the decision. 
Therefore, they are forced to act based not only on definite knowledge but also on 
assumptions, experience and preferences. Decision-making is at least partly 
dependent on emotions. The model developed in this study endeavors to increase the 
rationality of decision-making. 
It is relevant to note that a project must proceed toward its end result within the 
defined confines of technical, financial and resource availability considerations. A 
certain logic of events exists in a project; e.g. the designed schedule is based on this. 
A significant difference between projects and international (or national) politics 
is that a project has no enemies (at least within the project) as is often considered to 
be the case in the anticipation of future events between nations. In a project, all 
parties strive to finish the project, even in the case that the project parties have 
divergent financial interests. No project party endeavors to injure another. The 
personal objectives of some actors (players), such as a wish to secure an 
employment or even pure lust for power, can affect the project both positively and 
negatively. 
  
10.4  Increasing the Body of Knowledge 
Ansoff introduced his theory of the existence of weak signals and their uses in 
the management of corporations in 1975; in the book published in 1984, he extended 
his ideas. Ansoff has shown no research results to support his theory. Several writers 
connect the early warnings conforming to the Ansoff theory with strategic 
management; at the same time, the idea itself is controversial [Mintzberg -94a]. 
Ansoff’s theory can be divided into partial theories, of which a crucial one is 
naturally the existence of signals. It is significant that the study of communication, 
as well as corporate bankruptcy studies and the fields of strategic security and 
military intelligence, recognize the existence of weak signals. The field of Finnish 
future studies, as well, has begun to research weak signals. Together these indicate 
that Ansoff’s theory receives some support.  This study shows that it apparently is 
possible to detect early warnings in project work that fulfill the criteria formed by 
Ansoff’s theory for the existence of signals. 
The testing of that part of Ansoff’s theory which asserts that the state of 
knowledge and the time available of the detected signals vary remains inexact in this 
study as regards the project environment. The study does seem to show that the early 
warnings detected in project work have varying information content; this is in 
accordance with Ansoff’s theory. No unambiguous scale can be defined for the 
measurement of this information content, and the scale remains very inexact. The 
situation is the same as regards the time available of early warnings: the time 
available seems to exist, but it cannot be measured on the basis of the research 
material. 
The Weak Signals Strategic Issue Management system can be considered the 
other main part of the Ansoff's theory. The applicability of this system as such to 
project work is not examined in greater detail in the empirical part of the present 
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study, though it becomes evident in the context of the analysis of the research results 
and the development of the Decision Support model that Ansoff’s WSSIM does not 
appear to be suited to project work without adjustment. One can say that the study 
appears to show that the basic part of the Ansoff theory is applicable to project 
work, although the theory in its broader form is not. This study extends the area of 
applicability of Ansoff’s theory to project work.  
This research shows that the existence of early warnings and their utilization in 
project work is already familiar to several project work professionals in a kind of 
unstructured, often almost unconscious, form. A similar observation can be made 
regarding project management literature. This study can be considered to have added 
a so-called previously known, but little researched, element to the theories of project 
management, which consists of project control with the aid of inexact information. 
The characteristics of this phenomenon are explained in the present study, which in 
turn adds to the knowledge basis of project management theories. 
As noted in the literature survey, the project problems that early warnings help to 
forecast are risks (cf. the definition of a risk). The empirical part of the research uses 
the term project problem instead of the term risk. The character of project problems 
used in this study includes both the case where the problem has already become 
concrete and the case where the problem is only potential, i.e. exists as a threat (a 
risk). In this sense the early warnings phenomenon can be integrated into of the 
theories on project risk management. These theories are only vaguely familiar with 
early warnings (risk symptoms), although Niwa [-89] considers risk alarm a 
requirement in project risk management, and the phases of work of project risk 
management include identifying risks. 
Nevertheless, the tools of risk identification do not seem to specifically include 
the identification of early warnings. With the help of the information technology 
application proposed in this study, the Decision Support model is integrated into 
project risk management as one of its methods; the study does not test the usefulness 
of this idea, and it therefore requires further research. Despite its limited character, 
this study fortifies the risk symptoms element of the theories on project risk 
management, which can possibly increase the predictability of the materialization of 
risks. This, however, requires further study, as does extending the idea so that it 
could become a part of a general risk management theory. 
 
10.5  The Application and Use of the Results 
As noted in the discussion regarding figure 8.1, the type categorization of early 
warnings appears useful in detecting and identifying early warnings. All of the 
results of this research can probably be used as tools for identifying and interpreting 
early warnings, both manually and as part of a possible database application. 
The results along with  the model describing the character of the phenomenon, 
make the early warnings phenomenon more organized and thereby assist in 
understanding it. The Decision Support model of the results can function as a tool 
for the anticipation of future development of project problems, thus helping the 
project management in project risk management. The model should be conceived of 
as a mental approach rather than as a strict model of action. The proposals made in 
this study as to how the results could be utilized as a part of a project risk 
management database application may form a starting point for e.g. a commercial 
computer program. 
The results of this research do not by themselves offer the opportunity to build a 
decision making model or program which would allow direct conclusions about the 
various responses that might be taken when a risk emerges. The results should not 
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be used for assessing the frequency of project problems and/or their causes in 
projects. 
The results can possibly be used as a basis for educational material and 
independent study. First of all, one should recognize the existence of early warnings, 
after which it is possible to begin to educate oneself in their utilization. 
 
10.6  The Need for Further Research 
If the early warnings phenomenon is to be effectively utilized in project control 
and leadership, further research is necessary to augment the area of applicability of 
the early warnings phenomenon. The necessary research would include studies that 
address the questions left open by the present study. 
- Examining the weak signals present in preliminary phases of investment projects 
(brainstorming, prefeasibility, feasibility) may improve decision-making in those 
projects. This appears to be quite an extensive topic for research. 
- The applications of the IFVR and the concept of epistemic value to project work. 
- More information on the occurrence of early warnings, and additional elements for 
the database on early warnings - problems - problem causes - responses. 
- The utilization possibilities in the leadership sector; this is a very broad area of 
research. 
- The further development of the proposed knowledge-based project risk 
management model so that early warnings could be employed in it. The testing of 
such a model would be a crucial part of the work. 
- Additional research is also required to enable the inference of responses in various 
problem situations (in different parts of the decision-making matrix), especially in 
chaotic project situations. 
- A more detailed study of the relation between project risk management and early 
warnings, especially as regards the probability of risks. The ways in which the 
matrix in the  Decision Support model (figure 9.1) could be extended to include the 
probability of the materialization of a risk as an added dimension, and the gathering 
of the basic database. 
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Terminology 
 
Readers may wish to familiarize themselves with project terminology with the help of a 
number of books for example the [Kerzner-95]'s or [Lewis-93]'s book.  A wide-ranging 
treatment of the subject, its terminology and its scope can also be found in [PMBOK -
95].  The following sources contain glossaries related to project work: 
 
[Nordnet-85] 
Nordnet, 1985, Nordic Project Management terminology, the five Nordic Project 
Management Societies, Oslo 
 
[AACE] 
American Association of Cost Engineering, Cost Engineers` Notebook, Project 
terminology, 
Index AA-4.000, AA-4.002, AA-6.100. 
 
[Selogie -85] liite VIII pp. 348...372 
Selogie, Louis Allyn, 1985, The Evolution And Development Of The Discipline Of 
Program/Project Management In The High Technology Environment (Research, 
Development, Military Regulations, Systems), Doctoral Thesis, University of California, 
Los Angeles. 
 
[Lewis -93] pp. 431...435 
Lewis, James P., 1993, The Project Manager’s Desk Reference, Probus Publishing 
Comp. USA 
 
Basic Interviews 
The first thematic interview round in the study. 
 
Case Interviews 
The thematic interviews conducted in conjunction with researching the case projects. 
 
Cause 
The causes of problems in this study signify those factors or phenomena that are 
perceived to have led to the problem. 
 
Early Warning 
An early warning is an observation, a signal, a message or some other item that is or can 
be seen as an expression, an indication, a proof, or a sign of the existence of some future 
or incipient positive or negative issue. It is a signal, omen, or indication of future 
developments. 
 
Element 
An element is a research observation that the researcher has extracted from the case 
interviews.  It is the core thought in the reply the interviewee has made to an interview 
question; especially something the interviewee has suggested as an early warning signal 
in response to a project situation or project problem presented in the question. 
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Form of Appearance 
The source and manifestation of an early warning are not independent of each other, and 
in this study their possible combinations are called forms of appearance.  Forms of 
appearance that are incompatible were eliminated during analysis.  Incompatible 
combinations include e.g. document/action, document/non-verbal. 
 
Forms of Occurrence  
This term denotes the form in which we perceive early warning signals.   It is closely 
related to the concept of “means and forms of communication” presented in [Wiio-89]. 
 
Fundamental reason 
See Cause. 
 
Interview (replies) element 
See Element 
 
Issue 
Ansoff [-84] defines: 
- A strategic issue is a forthcoming development, either insider or outsider of the 
organiation, which is likely to have an important impact on the ability of the enterprice  
to meet its objective. An issue may be welcome: an opportunity to be grasped in the 
environment, or an internal strength which can be exploited to advantage. Or it can be 
unwelcome: an external threat, or an internal weakness which imperils continuing 
success, even survival of the enterprise.        [Ansoff, p. 337] 
-  Issue outcome, result; a flowing, going or passing out     [Webster´s -92, p. 515] 
- “An Issue is a Potential problem, situation, or Factor that can negatively impact the 
project.”                  [Lientz et.al. -95, p. 136].  
 
Method 
Methods are procedures or techniques that can be used to assist the detection of early 
warnings. 
 
Project management 
A broad concept encompassing everything within the project activities according to the 
definition in  [PMBOK -95]; [Artto-98]. 
PMBOK presents the following divisions of project management: Project Integration 
Management, Project Scope Management, Project Time Management, Project Cost 
Management, Project Quality Management, Project Human Resource Management, 
Project Communication Management, Project Risk Management and Project 
Procurement Management.  
 
Project Control 
Control = the management effort, either preplanned to achieve the desired result or 
adopted as a corrective measure prompted by the monitoring process. [AACE, p. AA-
4.002 / 4 of 19] 
 
Project problem 
In this study, “project problems” signify phenomena that interfere with the completion of 
a project. They usually bring about immediate concerns for the project management. 
 
Project Parties 
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Stakeholders partaking in the investment project.  
- Client:  The owner of the project, a company using the project after completion, the 
leadership and personnel of such a company. 
- Consultant: An expert working in the project; a company with a direct business 
relationship with the client, usually as a planning agency, producer of project guidance 
services etc. 
- Supplier: A company that plans, produces, and usually also installs, the equipment 
needed in the project. 
- Contractor: A company carrying out tasks at the project realization site.  The 
performance usually doesn’t include production, though it does cover the delivery of 
different materials. 
 
Project phases 
The approximate period of project activity as described by the life span of the project in 
project theory. 
These include: 
  a) Preliminary engineering phase, b) Engineering phase, c) Procurement phase d) 
Delivery phase, e) Site phase, and f) Start-up phase. 
- In this study, the engineering phase covers both the preliminary engineering phase that 
takes place prior to the decision to carry out the project, and the engineering and 
designing done during the project itself.  The bulk of the engineering phase is completed 
before commissions are made.  Because the project phases overlap, engineering continues 
nearly to the completion of the project. 
- The procurement phase is in this study considered to extend from the invitation of bids 
to the actual commission. 
- The delivery phase covers the period from the ordering of the equipment to their 
delivery to the construction site.  
- The site phase includes all work at the actual on construction site, even the start-up 
phase. 
 
Project work 
This term is used in the general meaning of “an undertaking carried out in the form of a 
project.” 
 
Response 
Response denotes the tasks or activities decided upon due to the early warnings and/or 
the impending problem (risk). 
 
Sign  
“mark or gesture which conveys an idea or meaning; plus and minus sign, he nodded as 
a sign of agreement.”      [Webster´s -92, 
p. 925] 
 
Source 
The concept “source” is related to the concept of “sender” in mass communications.  For 
the purposes of this study, however, “sender” was not seen as appropriate; the material 
includes several elements that have no conscious human sender in the way messages do. 
In addition, there are numerous elements in the material that can be considered to reflect 
observation or internal reasoning. 
The term states the context in which an early warning is detected, and who or what 
introduces the warning. 
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The stages of early warnings in this study 
Inkling denotes the stage where the signals are hardest to perceive, recognize, and 
interpret.  “A gut feeling” is a good description of this stage.  The credibility of the 
signals is very low.  An anticipation can be experienced at any point in time.  The threat 
the anticipation implies can manifest itself either quickly or over a longer period. 
An Inexact Warning is easier to detect than a mere anticipation. It can even be 
recognized, but it usually presents itself very early in the project, when it is still 
impossible to know its results with any certainty. 
A Clear Warning is more pronounced in all its characteristics than an inaccurate warning 
(though the border is blurry).  They cannot be measured (given a numeric value), 
however, and therefore their credibility remains weak.  
An Exact Warning is either measurable or otherwise easy to interpret and apparent to all 
parties; this gives it a high credibility. 
 
State of Knowledge 
A five-step scale of signals presented by Ansoff, which conveys the level of the 
information provided by the signal to the recipient.  The degree of accuracy or inaccuracy 
of the information; the fuzziness of the information.  The scales are presented on the 
chapter 3.1.2. 
 
Time Available 
According to Ansoff’s definition, time available is the time that may be used for counter 
measures before the impending problem or risk reaches full impact on either the company 
or the project. 
 
Weak Signals / Strong Signals 
Ansoff gives the following definition of a strong signal [Ansoff -84a p. 22]: 
Issues identified through environmental surveillance will differ in the amount of 
information they contain. Some issues will be sufficiently visible and concrete to permit 
the firm to compute their impact and to devise specific plans foe response. We shall call 
these strong Signal issues. 
or 
contains exactly the information required for Strategic Planning. Enough is known to 
compute both the probable impact of the discontinuity and the profit impact of the 
response. 
 
His definition of a weak signal is: 
Other issues will contain Weak Signals, imprecise early indications about impending 
impactful events...... 
or 
all that is known (of them) is that some Threats and Opportunities will undoubtedly arise, 
but their shape and nature and source are not yet known. 
 
Warning 
Abbreviated form of the term “early warning”. 
  
Nikander          139 
Works Cited 
 
[Adams -81] 
Adams, John R. and Kirchof, Nicki S. eds. 1981, A Decade of Project Management, 
Project Management Institute, USA. 
 
 [AACE] 
American Association of Cost Engineering, continually updated, “Project 
Terminologies,” Cost Engineers’ Notebook, AA-4.000; AA-4.002; AA-6.100, USA. 
 
[AACE -95] 
American Association of Cost Engineering, 1995, “International’s Risk Management 
Dictionary,” Cost Engineering, Vol. 37/no 10, October 1995, USA; pp. 20...23. 
 
[Alasuutari -93] 
Alasuutari, Pertti, Laadullinen tutkimus [Qualitative Research], 1993,  Vastapaino / 
Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy [Gummerus Press], Jyväskylä, Finland. 
 
[Ansoff -75] 
Ansoff, Igor H., 1975, "Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals" 
California Management Review, Vol. XVII, No 2, winter 1975. 
 
[Ansoff -84a] 
Ansoff, Igor H., 1984, Implanting Strategic Management, Prentice/Hall International 
Inc. USA. 
 
[Ansoff -84b] 
Ansoff, Igor H., 1985, Strategisen johtamisen käsikirja [Strategic Management 
Handbook], Otava, Helsinki, Finland.  1984, Implanting Strategic Management, 
Prentice/Hall International Inc. USA. 
 
[Ansoff-94] 
Ansoff, Igor H., 1994, “Comment on Henry Mintzberg’s Rethinking Strategic Planning,” 
Long Range Planning Vol. 27, No 3, pp. 31 to 32.  
 
[Artto-94] 
Artto, Karlos, 1994, “Projektien riskien hallinta” [Project Risk Management], Riskien 
hallinta projekteissa [Risk Management in Projects], Project Institute Finland Ltd., 
Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Artto-98] 
Artto, Karlos, 1998, personal communication with professor Karlos Artto. 
 
[Artto et al. 2000] 
Artto, Karlos and Kähkönen, Kalle and Pitkänen Petri, J., 2000, Unknown Soldier 
Revisited: A Story of Risk Management, Project Management Association Finland, PMA 
Finland, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
 
 
  
Nikander          140 
[Ashley -89a] 
Ashley, David B., 1989, “Project Risk Identification Using Inference Subjective Expert 
Assessment and Historical Data,” The State of the Art in Project Risk Management, 
International Project Management Association, Proceeding 1989, pp. 7...28. 
  
[Ashley -89b] 
Ashley, David B., 1989, “Workshop A: Methods of Risk Definition and Identification,” 
The State of the Art in Project Risk Management, International Project Management 
Association, Proceeding 1989, pp. 35...37. 
 
[Aula -2000] 
Aula, Pekka, 2000, Johtamisen KAAOS vai kaaoksen johtaminen [CHAOS of 
Management or Management of Chaos], WSOY, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
 [Baker et al. -83], 
Baker, B.N. and Murphy, D.C. and Fisher, D., 1983, "Factors Affecting Project 
Success" in Cleland, D.I. and King, W.R. Project Management Handbook, Van Nostrand 
Reinhold  (Harrison -93 pp. 7-8). 
 
[Bent -82] 
Bent, James A., 1982, Applied Cost and Schedule Control, Marcel Dekker Inc. USA. 
 
[Betts -82] 
Betts, K. Ruchard, 1982, Surprise Attack, Lessons for Defense Planning, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C., USA. 
 
 [Broaddus -91] 
Broaddus, James Anthony, 1991, Design Effectiveness in Construction: The 
Relationship Between the Inputs to the Design Process and Project Success (Navy 
Construction, Scope Definition), Doctoral Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin. 
 
[Bufaied -87] 
 Bufaied, A. S., 1987,  Risks in the Construction Industry: Their Causes and Their 
Effects at the Project Level, Doctoral Thesis, University Of Manchester Institute of 
Science and Technology (United Kingdom) . 
 
 [Carroll and Hall -87] 
Carroll, Archie, B. and Hall, John, 1987, “Strategic Management Process for Corporate 
Social Policy,”  Strategic Planning and Management Handbook, edited by King, William 
and Cleland, David, Van Nostrand Reinhold Com., New York, pp. 127...146. 
 
[Case 4] 
Case project 4, The experiences of the researcher in the project; this and other case 
projects are anonymous. 
 
[Cass-90] 
Cass, Donald J., 1990, "Enhanced Graphics for Earned Value Presentation,” AFITEP 6th 
Annual Meeting 1990 Proceeding, AFITEP, France, pp. S.1.1...6. 
 
 
 
  
Nikander          141 
[Cass-94] 
Cass, Donald J., 1994, "Improve Schedule Forecasting via Earned Value,” AACE 
Transaction 1994, AACE, USA. pp. CSC.7.1....CSC.7.7. 
 
[Chapman and Ward -97] 
Chapman, Chris and Ward, Stephen, 1997, Project Risk Management: Processes, 
Techniques and Insights, John Wiley & Sons Inc. USA. 
 
[Cleland -94] 
Cleland, David I., 1994, Project Management, Strategic Design and Implementation, 
2nd edit. McGraw-Hill Inc. USA. 
 
[Down, Coleman, Absolon -94] 
Down, Alex; Coleman, Michael; Absolon, Peter, 1994, Risk Management for Software 
Projects, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London, United Kingdom. 
 
[Davies and Gurr -98] 
Davies, John L., Gurr, Ted Robert, eds., 1998, Preventive Measures, Building Risk 
Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Maryland, USA. 
 
[David -91] 
David, Fred, R., 1991, Strategic Management, third edition, Macmillan Publishing 
Company, New York, USA. 
 
 [Fleming -92] 
Fleming, Quenti W., 1992, Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria, The Management 
Guide to C/SCSC, Revised Edition, Probus Publishing Co, United Kingdom. 
 
[FitzGerald -94] 
FitzGerald, Chris, 1994/95, “Environmental Management Information Systems: New 
Tools for Measuring Performance,” Total Quality Environmental Management, winter 
1994/95, pp. 21...33. 
 
[Franke -89] 
Franke, Armin, 1989, “Project Risk Management,” The State of the Art in Project Risk 
Management, International Project Management Association, Proceeding 1989, pp. 
137...158. 
 
[FUTURA -99] 
Several articles, 1999, FUTURA 2/99,  Suomen Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti 
[The Member Journal of the Finnish Society for Future Studies], and e-FUTURA, the 
Internet magazine of the society, . 
 
 
[Harrison -93] 
Harrison, F.L., 1993, Advance Project Management, A Structure Approach, third 
edition, Gower Publishing Com., USA. 
 
 
 
  
Nikander          142 
[Heiskala -90] 
Heiskala, Risto: , 1990, “Sosiologinen kulttuuritutkimus” [The Sociological Study of 
Culture], Kvalitatiivisen aineiston analyysi ja tulkinta [The Analysis and Interpretation of 
Qualitative Material], Mäkelä, Klaus, ed., Gaudeamus, Helsinki, Finland (pp. 7... 29). 
 
[Heiskanen -88] 
Heiskanen, Raimo,  1988, Saadun tiedon mukaan... Päämajan johtama tiedustelu 1939-
1945 [According to Received Knowledge… The Surveillance Directed by the 
Headquarters 1939-1945], Otava, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Herman -96] 
Herman, Michael, 1996, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge University 
Press, United Kingdom. 
 
[Hiltunen, -99] 
Hiltunen, Elina, "Heikot signaalit ja tulevaisuuden ennakointi", Projektitoiminta 1/2000, 
Helsinki 
 
[Hirsijärvi and Hurme -93] 
Hirsijärvi, Sirkka and Hurme, Helena, 1993, Teemahaastattelu [Thematic 
Interviewing], Helsinki University Press, Helsinki, Finland.  
 
[Honko et al. -82] 
Honko, Jaakko and Prihti, Aatto and Virtanen, Kalervo, 1982, Yrityksen 
investointiprosessin kriittiset kohdat, Tutkimus strategian ja investointien onnistumisesta 
Suomen 30 suurimmassa teollisuusyrityksessä [The Critical Points of the Investment 
Process of a Company: A Study of the Success of Strategy and Investment in the 30 
Largest Industrial Companies of Finland], Kyriiri Oy, Helsinki (Joensuu), Finland. 
 
[Internet -81] 
Internet; International Project management Association, 1981, "Human Resource 
Development for Project Management,” Proceedings, Internet, Switzerland. 
 
[Internet -89] 
Internet; International Project management Association, 1989, “The State of the Art 
in Project Risk Management,” Proceeding, Internet, Switzerland. 
 
 [Jaselskis -88] 
 Jaselskis, Edward John, 1988, Achieving Construction Project Success Through 
Predictive Discrete Choice Models , Doctoral Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 
USA. 
 
[Juran -95] 
Juran, J.M., 1995, Managerial Breakthrough. The Classic Book on Improving 
Management Performance, Revised Edition, McGraw-Hill, Inc., USA. 
 
[Järvenpää-96] 
Järvenpää, Eila, 1996, Doctor of Technology, HUT, personal communication. 
 
 
 
  
Nikander          143 
 [Kezsbom et al -89] 
Kezsbom, Deborah S. and Schilling, Donald L. and Edward, Katherine A., 1989, 
Dynamic Project Management, A Practical Guide for Managers & Engineers, John 
Wiley & Sons, USA. 
 
 [Kerzner -95] 
Kerzner, Harold , 1994, Project Management, A Systems Approach to Planning, 
Scheduling and Controlling, fifth edition, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co, USA. 
 
 [King -87] 
King, William, R., 1987, “Strategic Issue Management,” Strategic Planning and 
Management Handbook, ed. King, William and Cleland, David, Van Nostrand Reinhold 
Com., New York, USA, pp. 252...264. 
 
[Kleim and Ludin -94] 
Kleim, Ralph L. and Ludin Irwin S.. 1994, The PEOPLE SIDE of Project 
Management, Gower Publishing Ltd. England. 
 
[Kuusi, -99a] 
Kuusi Osmo, 1999, Expertise in the FutureUse of Generic Technologies,  Vatt-Research 
reports  59, Government Institute for Economic Research, Helsinki, Finland 
 
[Kuusi, -99b] 
Kuusi Osmo, 1999, "Teknologisen kehityksen heikot signaalit", FUTURA, 2/99, Suomen 
Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti [The Member Journal of the Finnish Society for 
Future Studies]. 
 
[Kuusi et al. 2000] 
Kuusi, Osmo; Hiltunen, Elina; Linturi, Hannu, 2000, ”Heikot tulevaisuussignaalit” 
[Weak Future Signals], FUTURA, 2/00, Suomen Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti 
[The Member Journal of the Finnish Society for Future Studies]. 
 
[Kähkönen -96] 
Kähkönen, Kalle, 1996, “Riskit projektitoiminnassa” [Risks in Project Work], 
Riskienhallinta projekteissa [Risk Management in Projects], Project Institute Finland 
Ltd., Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Leidecker and Brono -87] 
Leidecker, Joel, K. and Bruno, Albert, V., 1987, “Critical Success Factor Analysis and 
the Strategy Development Process,” Strategic Planning and Management Handbook, 
edited by King, William and Cleland, David, Van Nostrand Reinhold Com., New York, 
USA, pp. 333... 351. 
 
[Levine-95] 
Levine, Harvey, A., 1995, “Risk Management for Dummies: Managing Schedule, Cost 
and Technical Risk and Contingency,” PM Network, October 1995. 
 
[Levine-96] 
Levine, Harvey, A., “Risk Management for Dummies, Part 2: Three Computer-Based 
Approaches to Schedule Risk Analysis,” PM Network, April 1996. 
 
  
Nikander          144 
[Lewis -93] 
Lewis, James P., 1993, The Project Manager’s Desk Reference, Probus Publishing Com. 
USA. 
 
[Lientz et al. -95] 
Lientz, Bennet L. and Rea, Kathryn P., 1995, Project management for the 21st 
Century, Academic Press, USA. 
 
[Lim -87] 
Lim, Bobby Ting Chuan, 1987, Causal Modeling Construction Project Performance, 
(Volumes I and II), Ph.D. Theses, Heriot-Watt University, United Kingdom. 
 
[Lock -92] 
Lock, Dennis, 1992, Project Management, fifth edition, Gower Publishing Company 
Limited, United Kingdom. 
 
[Makridakis and Heáu -87] 
Makridakis, Spyros and Heáu, Dominique, 1987, “The Evolution of  Strategic 
Planning and Management,” Strategic Planning and Management Handbook, ed. King, 
William and Cleland, David, Van Nostrand Reinhold Com., New York, USA, pp. 3...20.  
 
[Mannermaa -99a] 
Mannermaa, Mika, 1999, Tulevaisuuden hallinta – skenaariot strategiatyöskentelyssä 
[Managing the Future  Scenarios in Strategy Work], The EKOMONIA series, WSOY, 
Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Mannermaa -99b] 
Mannermaa, Mika, 1999, "TOOLBOX ja heikot signaalit" , FUTURA, 2/99, Suomen 
Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti [The Member Journal of the Finnish Society for 
Future Studies]. 
 
[Mannermaa, 2001] 
Mannermaa, Mika, 2001, "Heikot signaalit osaavat ennustaa" , Talouselämä, 6/2001 
 
[Metsämuronen -99] 
Metsämuronen, Jari, 1999, "Asiantuntijamielipide prosessina - tasapainojakautuma ja 
heikot signaalit", FUTURA, 2/99, Suomen Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti [The 
Member Journal of the Finnish Society for Future Studies]. 
 
 
[Michman -89] 
Michman, Ronald D., 1989, "Why Forecast for the Long Term?,” The Journal of 
Business Strategy, Sep/Oct. 1989, pp. 36...40. 
 
 [Migh -85]  
Migh, Robert J., and Fischer, William A., 1985, “The Role of Structural Factors in 
Determining Project Management Success,” IEEE Transactions on Engineering 
Management, Vol. EM32, No 2, May 1985, pp. 71...77 (in Jaselskis).  
 
 
 
  
Nikander          145 
[Mintzberg -94a] 
Mintzberg, Henry, 1994, “The Fall and Rise of Strategic Planning” Harvard Business 
Review, January-February 1994, pp. 107... 114. 
 
[Mintzberg –94b] 
Mintzberg, Henry, 1994, “Rethinking Strategic Planning Part I: Pitfalls and Fallacies” 
and “...Part II, New Roles for Planners,” Long Range Planning Vol. 27, No 3, pp. 12  to 
21  and  pp. 22 to 30. 
 
 [Morris, P. -94] 
Morris, Peter, W.G., 1994, The Management of Project, Thomas Telford Services Ltd., 
London, United Kingdom. 
 
[Morris, R. -97] 
Morris, Richard, 1997, Early Warning Indicators of Corporate Failure, A Critical 
Review of Previous Research and Further Empirical Evidence, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, United Kingdom. 
 
[Murphy et al.-74] 
Murphy, David C., and Baker, Bruce N. and Fisher, Delmar, 1974, Determinants of 
Project Success, Boston: Boston College School of Management, (in Jaselskis), USA. 
 
[Mäkelä, -98] 
Mäkelä, Keijo, 1998, "TOP10-klusterianalyysi", Suomen työministeriön Internet sivut, 
www.teho.net/ers/index.html 
 
[Mäkelä, -99] 
Mäkelä, Keijo, 1999, "ERS-ennakoinnin menetelmistä ja käytännöistä", e- FUTURA,  
Suomen Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti Intenetissä [The Member Journal of the 
Finnish Society for Future Studies in Internet], http://195.197.213.114/futurawww0.html 
 
 [Neil -89] 
Neil, J.M. (editor), 1989,  Modern Management Systems for Engineered Construction,  
American Association of Cost Engineers, Morgantown, USA. 
 
[Niemann -91] 
Niemann, William, J., 1991, "Improving the Usefulness of the Cost/Schedule Control 
Systems Criteria,” 1991 Proceedings, Project Management Institute 1991 
Seminar/Symposium, USA, pp. 318...323  
 
 [Nikander-93] 
Nikander O. Ilmari, 1993, Aikatauluverkot; CPM, PERT, resurssien hallinta, eräät 
muut vähemmän käytetyt tekniikat [Schedule Networks:  CPM, PERT, Resource 
Management and Some Other Less Common Techniques], A Seminar Paper in 
Optimization Studies, Institute of Mathematics, Helsinki University of Technology, 
unpublished. 
 
[Nikander-98]. 
Nikander O. Ilmari, 1998, Ennakkovaroitusmerkit teollisuusinvestointiprojekteissa ja 
niiden hyväksikäyttö projektinohjauksessa, [Early Warnings in Industrial Investment 
  
Nikander          146 
Projects and as a Tool of Project Control], Helsinki University of Technology, 
Licentiate’s Thesis, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Niwa -89] 
Niwa, Kiyoshi, 1989, Knowledge-Based Risk Management in Engineering, John Wiley 
& Sons, New York, USA. 
 
 [Nordnet-85] 
Nordnet, 1985, Nordic Project Management Terminology, The Five Nordic Project 
Management Societies, Oslo, Norway. 
 
[Nordnet-89] 
Nordnet, 1989, International Symposium on Quality and Project Management, Imatra, 
Finland. 
 
[Nurminen -98] 
Nurminen, Timo, 1998, Turvallisuuspolitiikan, Strategian ja Tiedustelun Opetus 
Aberystwythin Yliopistossa [The Teaching of Security Politics, Strategy and Intelligence 
at the University of Aberystwyth], Suomalaisen Strategisen Tutkimuksen  ja Seurannan 
Tukisäätiö [The Foundation for the Support of Finnish Strategic Research and 
Monitoring] , Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Nykysuomen sanakirja -80] 
Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1980, Nykysuomen sanakirja [The Dictionary of 
Contemporary Finnish], seventh edition, Werner Söderström Ltd., Helsinki, Finland. 
 
 [Obradovitch -90] 
Obradovitch, M.M. and Stephanou, S.E.; 1990, Project Management: Risks and 
Productivity,  Daniel Spencer Publishers, Oregon, USA, (out of business).  
 
[Olkkonen –93] 
Olkkonen, Tauno, 1993, Johdatus teollisuustalouden tutkimustyöhön [Introduction to 
the Research of Industrial Economics], Helsinki University of Technology, Industrial 
Economics and Industrial Psychology, Otaniemi, Finland. 
 
 [Pasedag -89] 
Pasedag, Rudolf, 1989, “Risk Management,” The State of the Art in Project Risk 
Management, International Project Management Association, Proceeding 1989, pp. 
95..97. 
 
[Patton -90] 
Patton, Michael Quinn: 1990, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, 2nd 
edition, Sage Publication, London, United Kingdom. 
 
 [Pinto and Slevin -92] 
Pinto, Jefrey K. and Slevin, Dennis P., 1992, Project Implementation Profile, XICOM, 
INC., USA. 
 
 [PMBOK -95]  
Project Management Institute, 1995, Guide to the Project Management Body of 
Knowledge, PMI, USA. 
  
Nikander          147 
 
[Rhyne -87] 
Rhyne, Lawrence C., 1987, “Information System Support: A Prerequisite for Effective 
Planning,” Strategic Planning and Management Handbook, ed. King, William and 
Cleland, David, Van Nostrand Reinhold Com., New York. pp. 387...405. 
 
[Salapatas -86] 
Salapatas, J.N. and Sawle W.S., 1986, “Measuring Success of Utility Projects Past 
Present and Future,” 1986 Proceeding, Project Management Institute, Montreal, Canada, 
Project Management Institute, pp. 67...76 (in Jaselskis). 
 
[Sharma and Mahajan -80] 
Sharma, Subhash and Mahajan, Vijay, 1980, “Early Warning Indicators of Business 
Failure,” Journal of Marketing, Vol. 44, Fall 1980, pp. 80...89. 
 
[Selogie -85] 
Selogie, Louis Allyn, 1985,  The Evolution and Development of the Discipline of 
Program/Project Management in the High Technology Environment (Research, 
Development, Military Regulations, Systems), Doctoral Thesis, University of California, 
Los Angeles, USA. 
 
[Sivonen -98] 
Sivonen, Pekka, 1998, Tulevaisuuden ennakointi kansainvälisen turvallisuuden 
tutkimuksen kohteena [The Anticipation of the Future as a Subject for International 
Security Research], National Defence College, Department of Strategic and Defence 
Studies, Strategic Research Series I, No. 11, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Smith -83] 
Smith, Mark Alan, 1983, An Assessment of the Potential Problems Occurring in the 
Engineering Phase of an Industrial Project (Project Management, Cost), Doctoral 
Thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, USA. 
 
 [Struckenbruck -82] 
Struckenbruck L., 1982, The Implementation on Project Management: A Professional's 
Handbook, Addison-Wesley / Project Management Institute, USA.  
 
[Taylor -87] 
Taylor, Bernard, 1987, “An Overview of Strategic Planning Styles,” Strategic Planning 
and Management Handbook, ed. King, William and Cleland, David, Van Nostrand 
Reinhold Com. 1987, New York, USA. pp. 21...35. 
 
 [Tuman -83] 
Tuman John, 1983, “Improving Productivity in the Project Management Environment 
Using Advanced Technology and the Behavioral Science,” Project Management Institute 
Seminar/Symposium 1983, USA.  
 
[Turtiainen -99] 
Turtiainen, Juhani, 1999, "Ennakointi - käsitteellinen analyysi", FUTURA, 2/99, pp 25 
... 31, Suomen Tulevaisuudentutkimusseuran jäsenlehti [The Member Journal of the 
Finnish Society for Future Studies]. 
 
  
Nikander          148 
 [Ward, S -89] 
Ward, Stephan, 1989, “Workshop B. Methods and Issues in the Management of Project 
Risk,” The State of the Art in Project Risk Management, International Project 
Management Association, Proceeding 1989, pp. 97...107. 
 
[Webb -87] 
Webb, John R. 1987, An Evaluation of Igor Ansoff´s Theory of Weak Signal 
Management by Means of an Investigation and Forecast of Future Development in the 
Ophthalmic Laser Environment, Doctoral Thesis, University of Strathclyde, United 
Kingdom. 
 
[Webster’s -92] 
Webster’s, 1992,  New Webster’s Dictionary and Thesaurus of the English Language, 
Lexicon Publications. Inc, Danbury, CT, USA. 
 
[Weschke -94] 
Weschke, Helka R. 1994, "Early Warning Signs of Risk Companies,” Economic 
Development Review, Summer 1994, pp. 66...67. 
 
[Whitten -95] 
Whitten, Neal, 1995, Managing Software Development Projects, Formula for Success, 
second edition. John Wiley & Sons, Inc, USA. 
 
[Wiio-74] 
Wiio, Osmo A., 1974, ”System Models of Information and Communication,” The 
Finnish Journal of Business Economics, Vol. 23, No 1. 
 
 [Wiio-89] 
Wiio, Osmo A., 1989, Viestinnän perusteet [Introduction to Communication], fifth 
edition, Weilin+Göös, Espoo, Finland. 
 
[Wiio-95] 
Wiio, Osmo A., 1995, personal communication with professor Osmo A. Wiio, University 
of Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[de Wit -85] 
Wit de, Anton, 1985, "Cost-Effective Owner Project Management - The Challenge for 
the Future,” Project Management, Clarity for the 90´s, Proceedings of the 8th 
INTERNET world Congress, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Netherlands. 
 
[Zeitoun and Oberlender -93] 
Zeitoun, Alaa A., Oberlender, Garold D., 1993, Early Warning Signs of Project 
Changes, A Report  to the Construction Industry Institute, The University of Texas at 
Austin from Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA. 
  
[Åberg-93] 
Åberg, Leif, 1993, Viestintä - Tuloksen tekijä [Communication  Producer of Results], 
third edition, Tietopaketti Oy, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
 
 
  
Nikander          149 
 
[Åberg-89b] 
Åberg, Leif,  1989, The Facet Theory of Communication, University of Helsinki, 
Department of Communications, Series 1A/9/91, Helsinki, Finland. 
 
[Åberg-96] 
Åberg, Leif, 1996, personal communication with professor Åberg, University of 
Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland. 
  
Nikander          150 
Appendix A 
Table 4.2 
Early Warnings (Symptoms) of Project Problems on the Basis of 
Project Literature 
Total of the materials 
Code is at the end of table 
Warnings expressed by personnel, project group 
Interpersonal behavior 
 - Unproductive gamesmanship, manipulation of others,......   K4 
 - The atmosphere is cold, strained unpleasant and forma   K11 
 - What is the general mood and atmosphere in the project?  K12 p. 110 
 - ...every one is writing “protection” memos. Previously, everything was verbal.... K4  
 - With customer - contractor relationship....    K4 
 - Argumentative sessions at meeting     K9 p.144 
 - insubordination       K9 p.144 
 - excessive absenteeism      K9 p.144 
 - power struggles (faction)      K9 p.144 
 - spread of negative rumors      K9 p.144 
 - sabotage of other people´s work     K9 p.144 
 - Subtle sabotage, fear, disinterest, or footdragging   K8 p.405 
 - Activity-oriented      K8 p.405 
 - Confusion, conflict, ineffiency     K8 p.405 
 - Lethargy/unresponsiveness     K8 p.405 
 - Cliques, collusion, isolation of members    K8 p.405 
Non-verbal information 
 - Keeping alert to non-verbal clues can reveal much about the political 
 environment....       K9 p.90 
 - The first signs of problems will not be in missed schedule and poor work.  
 It will be seen in the members´ eyes, facial expressions, voice, and body language.  K12 p. 125 
 - People who talk in low voices and look down at the floor repeatedly are people  
 who know something is in trouble.     K12 p.146 
 - The meeting provides an opportunity to revise, update, and add to the    
 store of knowledge that the team possesses. This knowledge includes facts perceptions  
 experience judgment and folklore.     K10  
          K8  p.372 
Concealing difficulties 
 - hidden feelings, conflicts avoidance at all costs    K4,    
          K8  p.405 
 - Some people will massage information to avoid alarming you when you  
 should really feel alarmed. They may say something like, 'Yes, we are  
 exceeding the budget. But that is only temporary as far as I can tell.'   K9 p.78 
 - People withhold information on a problem in the hope that the problem    
 will go away       K10  
          K8  p.368 
Attitudes and commitment to the project 
 - Confusion and a loss of enthusiasm and motivation.   K3 
 - It might signal a potential cost or schedule problem in the contract,     
 regardless of  trite contractor statements like "We're too busy getting the 
 important job done..."       K6 
 - The involved individuals may redirect their interest, energies, and    
 commitment and, in extreme cases, search for alternative employment 
 within or outside the company.      K3  
 - Low commitment to project objective    K4    
          K8  p.405  
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 - outright refusal to perform     K9 p.144 
 - Low level of involvement and enthusiasm    K8 p.405 
 - Image problems (credibility)     K8 p.405 
 - Lack of discussion about project     K12 p.186 
 - No discussion of task status     K12 p.186 
 - Interfacing and dependent project are attempting to become more  
 independent         K12 p.186 
   
        Honko 
Turnover rate of personnel 
 - ..sign are attempts to jump ship and move to another project.  K12 p.146 
 - high turnover       K9 p.144 
 - Difficulty in betting resources for project    K12 p.186 
 - Project team members are resigned     K12 p.186 
 - Project team members are trying to leave project   K12 p.186 
Professional competence of personnel 
 - Poor quality of workmanship     K9 p.144 
         Honko 
Personnel resources      Honko 
 
Project manager, management  
Project manager as a person 
 ...project manager takes only one perspective,.....they can focus  
 on only one thing.  The result is a project plagues with serious  
 problems.        K9,  
          K8 p.353  
 - The project manager maintains one-way contact with the team members, 
 speaking but neglecting to listen. ....     K10  
          K8 p.353  
 - The project review meeting, which should maximize the two-way flow of    
 information, turn out to be one-person shows, with the project manager  
 talking. ....       K10  
          K8 p.353. 
 - Project manager seems to have problems    K12 p.186 
Management 
 - Uninvolved management      K8 p.405 
 - Management vacillation need for information on project   K12 p.186 
 - Difficulty and elapsed time in getting management review and  
 approval of work and action      K12 p.186 
Insufficient management resources     Honko 
 
Project planning and objectives 
Preliminary planning, errors made during the brainstorming phase  Honko 
Ambiguous objectives 
 - Unclear project objectives and fluid commitment levels from key     
 participant       K4,  
          K8 p.353 
 - Undefined deliverables      K9 p.15 
 -  Shifting goals and priorities     K10 
 - Lack of clear milestone for project     K12 p.186 
Project planning 
 - Probably one of the earliest indicators of potential future cost and schedule   
 problems is a given contractor being unable to get a Performance     
 Measurement Baseline (PMB) in place, for whatever reason or excuse.  K6 
 - Replaning       K6 
 - Project objective and scope get cut back    K12 p.186 
         Honko 
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Observations in the bidding phase 
 
Project control 
Progress of the project, quality level 
 ... Monitoring of actual allocation against the plan can provide early     
 warning of  lack of manpower or lack of work.     K7 
 -  noticeable change in performance levels for the team and/or for     
 individual team members always should be followed up. Such changes can    
 be symptomatic of more serious problems, such as .......   K10 
 - Quality problems      K8 p.405 
 - Frequent surprises      K8 p.405 
         Honko 
Labour effectiveness 
 - Poor working discipline      K7 
 - Poor moral       K7 
....walk onto any project site anywhere.....    K8 p.462 
 - Low performance      K4  
          K8 p.353 
 - Low productivity      K9 p.144 
  
Delay monitoring systems 
  - Schedule variance (C/SCSC)     K6 
 - Schedule slips        K8 p.405 
 - 15 % rule       K6 
  
Changes in the cost estimate 
 - Management reserve (C/SCSC)     K6 
 - Cost variance (C/SCSC)      K6 
 - Budget slips       K8 p.405 
 - Contingency plans to the project surface    K12 p.186 
         Honko 
 
Working on the project 
The character of the work initiation  
 - False starts        K3 
         Honko 
Changes and disturbances in workflow 
 - Number of disturbances and breaks      K1 
 - High rates of change in part prompted by mistakes and errors.   K3 
Repetition of the same work 
 - high rates of reworks.      K3 
 - Duplication of effort      K9 p.15 
 Organization          Honko 
 
Communication 
 - A lack communications means that the project is in a higher state of risk. K12 p.146 
 - Poor communication skill      K9  p.15;  
          K8  p.369 
 - ...increase in flow of paper works....     K4 
 
Expressed by the project parties 
Participation of the client 
 - Perhaps one of the biggest signs of client interest in a project is the time    
 and resources it allocates to the endeavour. ... through minimal 
 contribution of time and resources, ....    K9 p.156 
Support of the upper management, CEO 
 - Favouriteism by senior management....    K9 p.142 
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 - Uninvolved, disintegrated upper management.    K10 
 - Lack of interest in project outside of the project team   K12 p.186 
Contractor’s problems in devising a schedule 
 - Logistic ongelmien huono selvittäminen     K7 
 - Ei ole tai huono alitoimittajien suunnitelma    K7 
 
Documents, reporting 
Quality of the reports 
 - ...problem sign is vagueness in the status reports and 
 information.       K12 p.146 
Delay of the project 
 - Is slippage common, while customer responsiveness is negligible   K2   
 - Chronic delays or schedule slippages.     K3 
  - Estimating schedule      text 
          Honko 
 
 [Neil -89,K1], [Kezsbom et.al. -89,K2], [Obradovitch -90,K3], [Kerzner -95 -95,K4], 
[Fleming -92,K6], [Bent -82, K7], [Cleland -94,K8], [Kleim and Ludin -94,K9], [Smith -
83,K10], [Harrison -93,K11], [Lientz et.al.-95,K12], [Zeitoun and Oberlender -93], 
[Honko et.al. -82]  
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Table 4.3 
Summary of the Causes of Project Failure Presented in the Literature  
Objectives 
- Objectives of the corporation unclear on lower levels of the 
organization 
- Project objectives defined imprecisely 
- Project objectives become blurred during the project 
- Project objectives and project scope must be clearly defined 
Personnel 
- High turnover rate of project personnel 
- Difficulties with the project group 
- Commitment of the project team to the project 
- Professional competence and abilities of personnel 
Management 
- Management failure 
- Commitment of the project manager to the project 
- Management resources 
Upper management, CEO 
- Lack of support from upper management / CEO 
Client 
- Difficulties with the client 
- Level of participation of the client  
Idea errors in the investment 
Project plan 
- Errors in the basic assumptions of the project plan 
- Project plan poorly drawn, contains errors 
- Errors in the cost estimate 
- Resource plan sloppily drawn 
Risk management 
Technical details 
Communication 
Other 
- Adjustment responses 
- Difficulties with the basic organization 
- Factors external to the company and the project 
 [Kezsbom et al. -89], [Lewis -93], [Kerzner-95], [Cleland -94], [Harrison -93], [Lientz et 
al. -95], [Morris, P. -94], [Jaselskis -88], [Lim -87], [Honko et al. -82]
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Table 4.5  Project Problems and Their Causes Combined from the Literature  
The indicators of project success / failure  references in sources   
A. Technical, Delivery,  Performance (Qualitative) 12 
B. Cost related problems, overruns   6 
C. Schedules problems, delay, time   11    
 
Problems and causes    Tot. problems causes 
1. Project environment, consultant   30     5     27  
  Project circumstances 
  Government 
  Other project parties 
      Line organization 
2. Ambiguous Objectives  / Scope    42    11    39 
  Project objectives 
  Project scope 
  Project focus 
3. Client with no CEO support   34     7    30 
  Matters dependent on the client   
  Parent company    
           Support of upper management     
4. Project Manager as a person   31     7     28 
  Choice of PM 
  PM as a person 
  Competence of PM 
5. Management / Leadership, combined  40    13     32  
  Leadership 
  Management 
  Details of the managerial style 
6.  Organization / Staff    34    15     24 
  Staffing 
  Defining resource needs 
  Organization 
7. Personnel / Motivation, in general   90    22     70 
  Motivation of personnel 
  Personnel problems 
  Turnover rate of personnel 
  Problems in teamwork 
8. Project Planning          79     9     77 
  Incompetent project planning 
  Project planning carried out by an outside group 
  Equivocal project planning 
  Definition of tasks 
  Difficulties in scheduling 
  Cost estimates 
  Details of project planning 
      The nature of the project 
9. Monitoring / Control    23     5     20 
       Administration 
10. Communication     12     5     15 
11. Engineering, Technical    18     3     16 
        total                 462 102   373 
 [Kerzbom et al.], [Kerzner -95], [ Obradovitch -90], [Lewis -93], [Lientz et al -95], [Harrison 
-93], [Cleland -94], [Broaddus -91], [Smith -83], [Jaselskis -88] 
  
Nikander          156 
Appendix B 
Table 6.3.2 
The Questions in the Basic Interviews 
 
QUESTION GROUP A 
 
The views of the interviewee on project theory and project techniques 
The objective of the questions is to confirm the professional knowledge of the interviewee 
on projects, to find out his specialty and to guide him toward the actual topic. 
This part may take up to 15 minutes. The question series can be cut down or some questions 
may be eliminated. 
 
1. Which activity areas do you think are the most important for the project’s success? 
(Name e.g. five areas) 
2. Can the significance and content of the different areas vary depending on the project 
party  client, consultant, supplier, and contractor? What is the significance of this to the 
success of the project? 
3. Defining a project 
4. Setting objectives 
5. Project guidelines 
6. Organization (Bureaucratic / Ad hoc) 
   Classical models, other models 
7.  Cost control 
8.  Purchases 
9. Monitoring of deliveries 
10. Time control 
11. Availability of resources 
12. Quality of resources, opportunities for selection  
13. Planning 
    Project planning, Technical planning 
14.  The significance of monitoring: 
 14a  Planning 
 14b  Purchases 
 14c  Deliveries 
 14d  Construction work 
 14e  Installations 
 14f  Start-up 
15. Construction site 
 15a  Management 
 15b  Time control 
 15c  Cost control 
 15d  Subcontractors 
 
QUESTION GROUP B 
 
 The experiences of the interviewee 
- This is the most important stage of the interview: to get the interviewees clarify their 
project experiences independently and freely, while leading him to “realize” the existence of 
weak signals or early warning signals. 
 - Try to mention situations to the interviewee where weak signals could occur, ask 
him to talk about the experiences he has had with signals or events/things that could be 
considered signals. 
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-  This stage may take up to one hour. 
 
1. What are the gravest factors causing failures in projects (name 5)? 
2. What factors delay or cause difficulties in projects (give examples from projects)? 
3. When are the delays or problems noticed? 
4. Can you think of early warning signals (weak signals) that warn of problems? (Pick 
the examples from the answers of the interviewee.) 
5. How have these types of weak signals been detected? 
6. Are they detected early enough to allow for controlled responses, or do the responses 
have to be implemented in an “emergency”? 
7. Discussion on a suitable old project based on memory. This is an important stage of 
looking for concrete events. 
8. The kinds of methods the interviewee can think of to detect weak signals. Might 
there be some “trick” for this? 
 
QUESTION GROUP C 
 
 Weak signals 
  Explain your theory, its basis, some background, if these haven’t already 
been discussed. (This is not strictly necessary, notes Järvenpää). 
 The objective of this stage is to specify the experiences and views of the interviewee; 
especially the reviewing of sample projects may be important. 
Has the interviewee noted these types of early signals, if they were not discussed in the 
previous stage? 
Does the theory seem credible? 
2.1. What types of signals come to mind? 
 
THE RESEARCH FRAME / THEME AREAS questions 
 Have you experienced problems in the following types of situations; how do these 
give early warning signals; what kinds of signals? 
 
PROJECT PARTIES / PROJECT PHASE 
3. CLIENT 
3.0  General experiences of problems caused by the client and the signals 
related to these  
3.1  PLANNING PHASE 
- Start-up phase 
- Basic planning 
- Detailed planning  
- Lack of upper management (CEO) support for the project 
- The level (or deficiencies) of the client’s project experience and project culture 
- How an erroneous focus or prioritization of the project is manifested 
- How the client expresses his dissatisfaction with the consultant 
- What indicates that the client’s views are changing 
3.2. DURING THE PROCUREMENT PHASE 
- The decision-making problems of the client 
3.3  DURING THE SITE PHASE 
  
4. THE CONSULTANT 
4.0  General discussion about the problems caused by the consultant and the 
signals related to these 
4.1  IN THE PLANNING PHASE 
- The first signs of resource problems 
- A badly chosen project group 
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4.2  PROCUREMENT / DELIVERY PHASE 
- Monitoring of deliveries not functioning 
4.3  SITE PHASE 
- Lax monitoring 
 
5. SUPPLIER 
5.0 General discussion about the problems caused by the supplier and the signals related 
to these 
5.1 DETAILED PLANNING 
5.2 PROCUREMENT PHASE 
5.3 CONSTRUCTION 
- Bankruptcy of the main equipment supplier 
- How do you know that the delivery may be unsuccessful when first visiting the 
supplier? 
- Supplier of complete equipment 
- Manufacturer  
- How can warning be received of a delay in the delivery of equipment? 
5.4 TRANSPORTATION 
- Can you receive an early warning from something that the transports are not 
going to succeed? 
- Warning signals occurring during transports? 
 
6. CONTRACTOR 
 General discussion about the problems caused by the contractor and the signals 
related to these 
6.1  PROCUREMENT PHASE 
- What indicates that the contractor is not proficient for the contract being made, or 
for the work? 
- How is it evident when a contractor is not familiar with project thinking and 
project techniques? 
6.2  DETAILED PLANNING 
- Do you know examples of signals given by contractors in this area? 
6.3 SITE PHASE 
  INSTALLATION WORK 
- Problems of the contractor (too few workers, financial problems) 
- What constitutes a weak signal of a delay on the part of the contractor? 
- The scheduling problems of the contractor 
- Too many activities 
- The weak quality of the network 
- Deficiencies in the initiation of monitoring 
- The poor progress of productivity is an early warning signal 
6.4  TEST USE and START-UP 
 
7. COMMON / GENERAL PROBLEM AREAS 
7.1 Cultural differences 
- Differences in the project cultures of the project parties 
7.2 Objectives 
- The objectives of the project are not clear 
- An objective or specification is ambiguous 
7.3 Project management / managerial style 
- How is the choice of an unsuitable project manager indicated? 
- The project manager does not have sufficient decision-making authority 
- How  an erroneous/unsuitable managerial style manifest itself.  Give examples. 
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- How does an erroneous managerial style affect the project? How do people react 
to it, give signals of it? 
7.4 Organization 
- Give examples that indicate an incorrect organizational form. 
7.5 Personnel 
- Discuss your experiences of how personnel problems manifest themselves; give 
examples. 
- Unproductive attitudes toward the project 
7.6 Project methods / control 
- How is a poorly done WBS evident? 
- How can you note that the schedule is faulty? 
- What indicates an incorrect manner or order of devising schedules? 
- The first warning signal of a cost overrun 
- What suggests that project management should be tightened or increased? First 
signal? 
- Is the report of the schedule manager sufficient in time control? 
- The symptoms of unnecessary Fast Tracking 
- A substantial amount of redoing tasks 
- Numerous errors and mistakes 
7.7 Communication 
- Signs of communication problems 
7.8 Changes 
- When are changes disturbingly numerous; what indicates this? 
7.9 External factors 
- How actively should these factors be monitored? 
Indirect factors 
- The general economic situation 
- Political changes 
- The public opinion on e.g. environmental questions 
- Changes in laws and administrative orders 
Direct factors 
The circumstances of a project, changes in the business environment; not taking this into 
account to redefine the project. 
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Table 6.3.3 Work / Project Experience of the Interviewees, Basic Material 
Inter- Project party Position in the project Duties   Current  Effect of  Age Work Years Number 
of  
  Areas of    Estimate Attitude 
viewee     In working life in the  
project 
 duties line duties group exper. in  
projects 
projects 
group 
  projects    of proj. 
exp. 
toward 
 primary secondary primary secondary several one  on proj. 
experienc
e 
 group group large small others varied one-
sided 
dom. intern. points the 
theory 
1 Consultant Supplier PM Middle mgmt X  Project positive 4 4 3 5 5  X  X X 5 5 
2 Consultant Client PM Middle mgmt X  Project only proj. 4 4 5 2 5  X  X X 5 4 
3 Supplier Consultant PM Eng. duties X  Project only proj. 3 3 5 5 5  X  X X 5 5 
4 Consultant Supplier Eng. duties Middle mgmt  X Line/Proj. substantial 1 1 3 ? ?   X X  2 3 
5 Client  PMgmt Firm mgmt X  Line substantial 5 5 1 1 3  X  X  3 2 
6 Consultant  PM Eng. duties  X Project no impact 2 2 2 3 5   X X  1 1 
7 Consultant  PMgmt Firm mgmt  X Line substantial 3 2 2 3 ?  X  X X 3 1 
8 Consultant Supplier PM Middle mgmt X  Line positive 2 2 2 2 ?  X   X 4 3 
9 Consultant.  Eng. duties Eng. duties  X Line no impact 2 3 3 4 4  X  X  2 3 
10 Client  PM Firm mgmt  X Line great 4 5 1 1 ? X  X X  3 5 
11 Consultant  PM Eng. duties  X Project  no impact 1 1 1 1 2   X X  1 5 
12 Client Consultant Eng. duties Middle mgmt  X Line substantial 3 3 3 2 5   X X X 3 5 
13 Supplier  PM. Middle mgmt X  Project only proj. 2 2 4 ? ?  X  X X 5 5 
14 Supplier  PM Middle mgmt X  Project only proj. 3 3 4 3 3 X X  X X 5 5 
15 Client. Consultant PM Eng. duties X  Project only proj. 1 1 2 3 ?  X  X X 4 4 
16 Client Consultant PM Middle mgmt X  Project no impact 2 2 1 1 3   X X X 3 4 
17 Client  PM Middle mgmt X  Line substantial 5 5 2 1 1   X X  3 5 
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Duties in projects    Duties in career life Age group  Work exp.  Project 
Experience 
 Nmber of 
projects 
 
       years classes years year class years Nmbr class  
PMgmt Management of major  projects  Firm mgmt CEO 1 <= 40 1 <= 15 1 <   10 1 <=   2 
 Project controller    Task leader 2 <= 45 2 <= 21 2 <= 12 2 3...4 
     Group leader 3 <= 50 3 <=25 3 <= 17 3 5...7 
PM. PM     4 >   50 4 <= 30  4 <= 20 4 8...9 
 Site mgr   Middle mgmProduction mgr 5 >   60 5 >   30  5 >   20  5 >   10 
 Inst. mgr    Dept. head         
 Chief planner    Head of marketing 
Eng. duties Project engineer   Eng. duties Planning eng. 
 Project services    Dept. eng. 
 Planning eng.     
Attitude toward the theory: see table 8.5.4 ,  Eng. duties = engineering duties, PM = project manager, PMgmt = project management 
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Table 6.3.4 The Project Experience of the Interviewees in the Case Projects 
 
Inter- Age Work Proj. Number of Operation areas of projects Proj. party  Role in 
project 
 Duties in Current Effect 
of 
Proj. 
size 
viewee  exp. yrs. projects class       In work life  project  duties line 
dut. 
estimate 
  class class large small varied unvar. dom. foreign prim. sec. primary second. var. unvar.  proj. 
size 
points 
21 3 2  2 4 X  X  Client  PMgmt Firm mgmt X  Line large 4 
22 2 2 1 1 1 X x X  Client  PM Firm mgmt X x Line small 2 
23 3 5 5 4 5  X X  Client Cons. PMgmt Mid. mgmt  X Project large 5 
24 ? ? ? ? ?  X X  Suppl.  PM   X Project  3 
25 3 2 2 1 1  X X x Suppl.  PM Eng. dut.  X Project N/A 2 
26 5 5 1 2 3  X X  Cons.  PM Firm mgmt  X Line large 5 
27 4 4 1 1 2  X X  Client  Eng. dut. Mid. mgmt  X Line small 1 
28 4   2 3 X  X X Cons. Suppl. PM  X  Project large 5 
29 2 1 1 1 2 X  X  Client  PM Mid. mgmt X  Line large 2 
30 3 2 3 3 5 x X X x Cons. Contr. PM Firm mgmt X  Project  5 
31 2 2 2 2 3  X X x Contr. Cons. PM Eng. dut.  X Project subst. 5 
32 3 3 1 1 1  X X  Client  Firm mgmt PMgmt  X Line subst. 1 
33 2 2 3 1 ? X  X  Cons.  Mid. mgmt PM X  Line subst. 2 
34 1 1 2 1 3  X X x Cons.  PM Ins. teht.  X Project  3 
35 2 2 3 1 5  X X  Contr.  PM  X  Project  4 
36 4 5 2 1 4 X  X x Client  PM Mid. mgmt X  Line large 4 
37 4 4 2 1 5  X X X Cons. Client PM Firm mgmt x X Project subst. 3 
38 5 5 2 2 3 X  X x Client  Firm mgmt PMgmt X  Line large 4 
39 4 4 3 5 5 X  X X Cons. Suppl. PM Mid. mgmt X  Project posit. 5 
40 3 3 2 2 4 X  X X Cons.  PM Mid. mgmt X  Project large 5 
41 3 3 5 5 5 X  X X Suppl. Cons. PM Eng. dut. X  Project  5 
42 3 1 1 2 4  X X x Suppl.  PM Keskijoht x X Project large 3 
43 5 5 5 2 3  X x x Suppl.  PM  x X Project  4 
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44 1 1 1 2 5  X x x Suppl.  Eng. dut.   X Project  3 
45 2 2 4 ? ? X  X X Suppl.  PM Mid. mgmt X  Project  5 
46 3 3 1 1 5  X x x Suppl.  Eng. dut.   X Project  2 
47 3 3 4 2 5 x X x x Suppl.  PM  X  Project  3 
48 3 3 4 3 3 X  X X Suppl.  PM Mid. mgmt X  Project  5 
49 2 2 2 1 3  X X x Suppl.  Eng. dut.   X Project  2 
50 1 1 2 2 2  X  X Suppl.  PM  X  Project  3 
51 1 1 1 1 3 x X x x Cons. Suppl. Eng. dut.   X Project  2 
52 2 2 2 2 4  X x x Cons. Suppl. Eng. dut.   X Project  3 
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Table 6.3.5 
The Interviewees in Alphabetical Order 
 
Last name First name Location 
 Aho  Kalevi  Imatra 
 Ahvenharju Matti Espoo 
 Alakontiola Erkki Oulu 
 Auru Rainer Kauhajoki 
 Autio Heikki Helsinki 
 Baarman  Göran Billnäs 
 Gustafsson Christian Helsinki 
* Haapala Matti Virojoki 
 Hytönen Olli Nummela 
 Hänninen  Seppo Espoo 
 Jores  Rauno Anjalankoski 
* Juuri Kalevi Helsinki 
 Kärkkäinen Kyösti Varkaus 
 Käär Jaakko Espoo 
 Laurila Anna-Maija Helsinki 
 Leppänen  Lassi Varkaus 
 Levonen Markku Vantaa 
 Lindström Leif Savonlinna 
 Luomakangas Jorma Kouvola 
 Malmivuori Seppo Espoo 
 Markkanen  Ari Varkaus 
 Millner Dan Espoo 
 Mänttäri Eero Espoo 
 Nikkilä Matti Varkaus 
 Nyysönen Tapio Varkaus 
 Olakivi Jorma Varkaus 
 Palmu Kari Varkaus 
 Paltschik Christer Espoo 
 Pulliainen  Seppo Vantaa 
* Rickman Harry Helsinki 
 Rintanen Mikko Espoo 
 Salervo Taneli Espoo 
 Sarkkinen Reijo Espoo 
 Savukoski Hannu Espoo 
 Suokas  Raimo Porvoo 
 Talsio Martti Vaasa 
 Tiilikka Matti Seinäjoki 
 Yrjölä  Kari Espoo 
 Vesanto Petri Vantaa 
 Witting Lars Helsinki 
 Anonymous persons 5  
‘) interviewed in both the basic and the case interviews 
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Table 6.7.2 Early Warning Groups Analyzed from the Material, Distribution of Elements into these, Brief Descriptions, 
Examples 
Early warning Nmbr Nmbr Per Per   Description   Quote from interview 
Signal    cent cent     (Translated from Finnish) 
      Basic Case Basic Case         
Gut feeling 22 11 5,2 % 2,7 % Gut feelings are the most difficult signals to detect,  - A suspicion may arise of being behind the schedule (H2) 
            identify and interpret. - Sometimes one has the gut feeling that it just won’t work but can’t 
really get a hold of it (H8) 
Personnel, project group 120 92 28,6 % 22,7 %         
  Non-verbal information 22 6 5,2 % 1,5 % Various non-verbal messages observed in negotiations 
are some of the most important reference signals 
- Even when the demands were unrealistic, they promised to fulfill all of 
them (H16) 
            in negotiations -The contractor asks about things that are explained  in the bid 
documents (H1) 
  Personnel behavior 86 60 20,5 % 14,8 % A large group of various behaviors     
   Personnel behavior in general 13 17 3,1 % 4,2 % The abnormal or inconsistent behavior of the   - An atmosphere of “we’re in no hurry yet”  (H16) 
             contractor or supplier almost always signifies 
problems for the project 
 - If you propose a change to the contractor and his reaction is “that’ll 
cost a lot” the conclusion is the same as before (this will crash) (H10) 
   Mood, attitude 10 20 2,4 % 4,9 % A dissatisfied atmosphere among the personnel - Mood tells you whether there are problems or not, can’t be identified 
(H11) 
                  - Lowered morale, avoiding things, lowered (group) spirit (H4) 
    Conflicts 15 15 3,6 % 3,7 % Conflict situations - All sudden unusual events with the client can be signals (H8) 
   Talk behind the back 8 1     Unnecessary criticism, rumoring -Problems are discussed behind one’s back, no direct communication,  
                    lots of indirect expressions. (H3) 
    Passing things back and forth 7 1     No progress in matters within the organization - Passing tasks around in the organization: not my business, somebody 
else’s (H16) 
   Speaking frankly 9 3     Lack of trust expressed very clearly - Sometimes people are frank and sometimes you just notice (H4) 
                  - Sometimes people will tell you or even ask you to your face (H6) 
   Commitment 10 2 2,4 %   Weak commitment to the project is apparent in several - Caustic opinions of experienced project personnel (H16) 
            ways. -Here’s my work and me, I don’t care for anything else. The client is a 
dunce, he doesn’t know a thing, and won’t learn either (H8) 
                  - People don’t care about things, indifference  (H17) 
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    Formation of cliques 4 1         - Cliques of the managerial personnel, defining their territory  (H15) 
    Authority disputes 3           - It’s pretty common that people will go past you or disregard you, 
usually they go past you to others (H12) 
   Making excuses 4      Typical for consultants, though not rare for contractors 
either 
-Delay, contrariness, holding things up, they’re great at making 
excuses  
  Lack of contact with the client   9     A phenomenon specific to a project     
  Too inflexible planning   4     When noticed     
  Lack of resources detected   13   3,2 % When noticed     
  Personnel turnover   7       A “phenomenon” especially prevalent with consultants - Putting new people on the job or proposing it (this could also mean a 
lack of resources) (H11) 
                  - Especially if the client complains they often put new people on the job
(H16) 
  Professional competence 9       The project and other skills of the personnel     
Project manager, management 7 35 1,7 % 8,6 %         
  Project manager as a person 4 9     The personal qualities of the project manager - Hesitancy in the management, this shows up in exaggerated hurry and 
rush 
  Managerial style 3 26   6,4 %   - Assigning the planning to somebody and then just waiting  
Project planning 26 55 6,2 % 13,6 %         
  Preliminary planning   16   4,0 % The level and quality of preliminary plans     
  Project plans 9       The deficiencies and inadequacies of the preliminary 
plans 
- If you know that the preliminary planning has been done badly, then 
you expect failure (H7) 
  Bid material 9      The deficiencies and inadequacies in the bid material - Are the plans that we are provided with for our use or does the 
supplier give us some sort of copies from an earlier project (H11) 
                  - Scope has been too limited (H14) 
  Contract 8 24   5,9 % An incompetently drawn or ambiguous contract - The framing and contents of the contract, you can deduce a lot from 
those (H15) 
                  - That’s apparent already in the contract and the definition of scope 
(H3) 
  Bartered contract   7     A contract deliberately rigidly designed     
  Design and contents of the 
budget 
  3     A poorly designed budget, with insufficient basis     
  Preliminary material   5     Reference material     
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Project control 39 21 9,3 % 5,2 %         
  Progress control 18 15 4,3 % 3,7 % A classic progress control method based on the 
schedule 
- Schedule delays (H16) 
  Monitoring 16 6 3,8 % 1,5 % Classic methods of project work     
   Monitoring, in general          - (What makes your warning bells ring?) Little details that are 
promised to be ready in no time, but the next time you check nothing 
has been done, and nobody cares to intervene (H16) 
    Availability of material         The contractor’s or supplier’s ability to acquire 
material  
- The contractor can’t acquire the materials (H10) 
    Quality of work         Pace and quality of work at the site  - The final touches aren’t put to the work, moving on quickly to the next
phase (H16) 
   Pace of work          - Unusual sounds or the absence of the regular sounds at the work site 
tell you whether the work is going on as usual (H1)  
  Budget corrections 5      Unfounded attempts to change the budget  - When the prices are to be checked, someone begins to look after their 
own interests 
             - Internal moment transfers (H13) 
Work on the project 44 44 10,5 % 10,9 %         
  Work initiation 20 3 4,8 % 0,7 % The efficiency of work initiation; sluggishness in this - The situation is often revealed in the kick-off meeting (H3) 
             is often very revealing - Work initiation drags (H8) 
                  - If it looks like people are just small talking with you instead of 
showing results (H8) 
   Mobilization         Mobilization at the site, slow initiation of work and/or 
poor turnout at the site 
- Looks from the sidelines, not officially, how the mobilization goes and
how the situation develops in the beginning, interferes right away 
                   if something is going wrong (H3, H8, H13) 
  Initial information /  lack of it 17 29 4,0 % 7,2 % Lack of the initial information of planning;  the 
absence of this is typical for projects 
- The first serious signal is if the initial information isn’t received 
(H12) 
                 - Initial information missing,, its absence anticipates (H15) 
  Redoing the same things 7 2         - If the same change is gone over again and again (H17) 
  Organizational form   10   2,5 %       
Communication 45 22 10,7 % 5,4 %         
  Communication 28 11 6,7 % 2,7 %         
   General problems        Messages don’t seem to reach the receiver - Misunderstanding others  (H3) 
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             - If the communications don’t work, you’d better be prepared for 
trouble  
                    The critical path moves to where the information is formed (H12) 
   Tone of messages        The tone of messages and especially changes in it  - The clarity of the documents gives a vague indication (H9) 
                indicates that something has occurred     
    Letters         Writing letters - People start writing memoranda and letters (H17) 
    Conflicting information         Conflicting information - Diverging opinions when matters are presented to the client, on the 
part of the client  (H2) 
  Hints 17 11 4,0 % 2,7 % Information about problems is often received in the - Hints and insinuations made by being dissatisfied with the schedule or 
            form of hints   with the scope of the work (H6) 
             - Rumors going round about payments, hints from other suppliers 
             - The grapevine often tells about a bankruptcy threat, hints, personal 
contacts, an (inexperienced) outsider has a hard time noticing this (H3) 
Expressed by the parties 44 39 10,5 % 9,6 %         
Typical for the client 40 39 9,5 % 9,6 %         
  Decisions not received 15 17 3,6 % 4,2 % Delays in decision-making, especially when caused -The attitude of the client: whether they are determined or vacillating   
            by the client, is one of the most serious   even in small things, that’s a sign (decisions) (H1) 
                problem-causing factors in projects - Lack of decision-making power, delays begin (H5) 
  Withdrawal of trust 6 1     A third party notices  the problem -Often about how the client and the supplier begin to make decisions  
               without the consultant (H14) 
             -The client begins to find out the consultant’s opinions via the supplier 
and no longer goes through the consultant  (H13) 
  End  users 5 10   2,5 % Testing personnel recruited late in the project -The client doesn’t have the personnel in the planning phase that takes 
over the project in the testing phase (H13) 
  Freezing 4 4     The “decisions not received” group also means that  -Lots of new ideas are brought out in every single negotiation,  
                the design principles cannot be “frozen”   the process frame can’t be “frozen” (H1) 
  Highest management, CEO 2       The highest management (or CEO) does not support 
the project. 
    
  Additional information 3 1     A very typical sign for the bidding phase - People want more accounts of more options (support of management)
(H16) 
  Purchases 3 6     Related to purchases and procurement - The style of making purchases, whether planning and manufacturing 
go together or not (H6) 
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Supplier / Contractor 4               
  Advance billing 4      Endeavors to institute advance billing may appear   - Endeavoring to get advance billing (H3, H2) 
                as early as in the contract negotiations or later as a 
request to alter the billing method 
    
Documents, reporting 60 42 14,3 % 10,4 %         
  Reporting 15 5 3,6 %   The quality and tone of the reports as well as  - Vagueness of reporting (H15) 
            delays in them are revealing factors - The longest (wordiest, explanatory) delivery monitoring report is 
often the poorest (H16) 
                  - Reports don’t arrive on time  (H16) 
  Quality and reception of 
schedules 
31 18 7,4 % 4,4 %         
   Balanced character        The quality of schedules can be evaluated on the basis     
   Logicality        of their appearance: balance, readability - You have to be able to understand the important dependencies even if 
they aren’t drawn out  (H9) 
   Receiving / Quality          - If the contractor can’t make a decent schedule, resource 
                    plan, site plan etc.. (H12) 
  Technical plans 7 18   4,4 % Changes of plans, especially when abundant, are - Deviations, noted at the end of the engineering phase, from the  
            warning signals   project requirements stated in the plans anticipate a possible delay 
(H15) 
             - Requests for alterations that can’t be avoided are an early signal 
                    of cost overruns. (H2) 
  Incorrect revisions 3      The presence of old drawings at the site is a sign of - Incorrect document revisions (H11, H12) 
                problems in communication.     
  Ambiguous responsibilities 4 1     This situation indicates a problem in organization. - Ambiguity in the responsibility areas, people don’t recognize 
them(H9) 
Differences and deficiencies in 
project culture 
22 39 5,2 % 9,6 %         
  First contact (with the client) 11 8     The observations made during the first meeting, and  -Even the first meeting reveals inexperience of the project management, 
            first impressions, are a good source of signals    and one gets the feeling that there will be trouble  (H15) 
            (according to interviewees) - The inexperience or ignorance of the client is apparent in that the 
client doesn’t 
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                    know to make requests (for information, services, reports etc.)(H7) 
   First impression   4     Observations made during meetings with the client - If a helper comes to meet you, you can draw some conclusions from 
that (first meeting)  (H16) 
             -About the firm management and its organization - I conduct an 
interview, check the quality of the technical personnel etc. (H14) 
  Project terminology 7      Differences in the project terminologies used by the 
parties, or unfamiliarity with project terminology, 
-Often already in first discussions, logical differences in views, 
terminology (H8) 
            indicate lack of experience with projects -Whether a person is used to working in projects, knows his tasks,  
                   if not, the tasks may get mixed up (H16) 
  Lack of experience 4 16   4,0 % Lack of experience is apparent soon and in several 
ways 
-Uncertainty regarding technical matters indicates ignorance 
(manager) (H2) 
             -Absence of an understanding of the whole, doesn’t realize the 
significance of different parts (manager)  (H2) 
  American culture   11   2,7 % A situation specific to a particular project     
External source 10 5 2,4 % 1,2 % External sources; may give hints, or may contain 
definite numerical data 
- Not one bankruptcy comes as a surprise, there are clear signs: 
requesting payment in advance,     
               giving discounts, changes in cash flow, hints from competitors (H13) 
                  - General signals: somebody is only sold to for cash payment, credit 
standing (H3) 
Total 420 405 100,0 % 100,0 %           
Miscellaneous groups 19 16             
                  
No early warning signals 
procured 
15 2     Detecting early warnings difficult - The incompetence of the contractor isn’t always obvious in advance 
(H2) 
  Difficult to procure warning 
signals 
            - (The client’s problems) Don’t give early warnings, come up out of the
blue. (H4) 
Total of all 454 423             
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Appendix C 
 
C. Understanding the Characteristics and Structure of 
Early Warnings 
 
 
C.0 The Contents of the Chapter 
This chapter presents the mainly descriptive typology of early warnings developed in the 
study Nikander [-98]. This categorization partly parallels and partly complements the 
type categorization of early warnings. First, the chapter defines the attributes used for this 
analysis. Second, these attributes are discussed one by one. Third, it examines the cross 
tabulations of the main groups of type categorization from the study Nikander [-98] and 
the attributes used in the present analysis. In addition, it discusses the differences and 
similarities between these categorizations. 
 
C.1  The Attributes Used in the Analysis of Descriptive typologies of 
Early Warnings 
The interview material was analyzed element by element for several attributes. The 
following factors were chosen as attributes that describe the phenomenon: 1) the 
exactitude of the information, i.e. the state of knowledge or the strength of the 
information; 2) the time available, 3) what project party the element refers to; 4) in which 
project phase the early warnings indicated by the element occur; 5) what forms of early 
warnings are detected.  
These attributes were designed partly before the analysis on the basis of the question 
frame and partly during analysis on the basis of the feedback from the material. This 
chapter first examines the results attribute by attribute, and later progresses to various 
cross-tabulated examinations. In general, the phenomenon appears to be characterized by 
great scope and variety. The difficulty of interpreting early warnings without knowing the 
circumstances of detection was apparent in all stages of analysis. In this research, these 
circumstances are is to some extent represented by the context of the question answered 
by the interviewee regarding the element under consideration, but only roughly. 
Again, it should be emphasized that the analysis was conducted by a single person, and 
the results are therefore to some extent subjective. 
 
C.2  Attributes that Describe the Phenomenon 
Regarding the descriptive attributes, the case material strengthens the impression given of 
the phenomenon by the basic material.  Consequently, this material is not presented 
separately in this study. The material also shows that the case projects are to some degree 
unique in this regard as well. 
 
C.2.1 The State of Knowledge of the Early Warnings  
(Magnitude, Level of Exactitude) 
One of the research questions is to find out whether phenomena of the Ansoffian weak 
signals type occur in project work. All the interview elements were therefore evaluated 
on a scale of exactitude according to the information they provided, in a fashion similar 
to the classification of states of knowledge by Ansoff. The exactitude (state of 
knowledge, strength) of the early warnings was evaluated, on the Ansoff model, applying 
the four-stage division of states of knowledge shown in table C.2.1. The IFVR product 
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proposed by Kuusi [-99a] could not be employed here as the empirical research was 
conducted before Kuusi publicized his idea.  
The stages of plan deviations mentioned in the table are not based on the research 
material. The theme of plans deviations as early warnings emerged very strongly in the 
interviews. These deviations are included in the main group “Project control and 
reporting,” all the subgroups of which include plan deviations, but also contain non-
measurable, qualitative warning signals. The states of knowledge of the plan deviations 
are based on the experience and assessments of the researcher. The state of knowledge 
could not be discussed during the interviews because the categories of states of 
knowledge had not yet been created. 
 
Table C.2.1 
The Exactitude of the Early Warnings (State of Knowledge) 
An inkling  A gut feeling; the early warning hardest to detect, recognize and interpret; 
very inexact information. Very minor plan deviations. The conviction that 
some kinds of problems are impending. 
An inexact warning. Can be recognized and the source is detectable, but the information 
is very inexact. Plan deviations seen as minor. The characteristics of 
problems, the nature of impact, and the timing of impact are quite clear. 
A clear warning  More manifest than the warnings in the previous category, but cannot 
be measured (assigned a number value). Clear plan deviations. Response 
identified: timing, action, budgets. 
An exact warning  The signs can be measured; they can be assigned a number value. 
Major plan deviations. The profit impact and the consequences of 
responses are computable. 
No warning procured  In addition to the above, situations were noted where no warning 
could be procured.       
 
The table C.2.2 shows the distribution of the elements into the levels of exactitude (states 
of knowledge) presented earlier. The number of elements assigned to the inexact 
categories is clearly greater than the number of observed elements: basic interviews - 557 
elements, case interviews - 556 elements (439 elements and 421 elements in table 6.6.1). 
The distribution of elements into different categories appears to closely resemble a 
normal distribution. However, this is shown to be probably an illusion, because the 
inexact and clear warnings include numerous warnings that can be interpreted in more 
than one way. 
 
Table C.2.2  
The Distribution of the Elements by the Level of Exactitude 
              %  % 
      Basic  Case 
Inklings     6.6  1.6 
Inexact warnings    33.2  42.8 
Clear warnings    46.5  52.8 
Exact warnings    10.8  1.8 
No warning procured     2.9  1.0 
    Total  557  556 
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The Vagueness of the Scale 
In analyzing the elements, it was noted that the borders between the different states of 
knowledge are very subjective and vague. A notable number of elements could be 
regarded as belonging to two separate classes of state of knowledge. This does not 
necessarily mean that there would in reality exist seven states of knowledge instead of 
five; rather, it indicates that an element can be regarded as belonging to one or the other 
category, depending on the circumstances, even when examined by the same observer 
(researcher) [Nikander -98]. 
According to [Wiio -89] and [Åberg -93], this evaluation of the state of knowledge of the 
element depends, as does all other interpretation of messages, on the experience of the 
evaluator (receiver of the information) and on his tendency to adopt a certain attitude 
toward the object to be evaluated [Wiio -89]. The facet theory presented by [Åberg-93] 
gives an excellent explanation of how we interpret the early warnings we detect, how the 
observer and the interpreter link the early warning with each project situation, with the 
circumstances of detection etc. 
 
C.2.2 The Project Parties and the Project Phase 
The aim of the inquiry is to explore the scope of occurrence and the environment of the 
early warnings. The starting point is the question frame (table 6.3.1).  The subject has 
been more closely examined in the study [Nikander-98]. 
The Project Parties 
The analysis sought to find the project parties that the element could be considered to 
refer to, i.e., the project parties of which the element gave information. The results may 
be affected by the number and distribution of the questions. The distribution shows a 
great deal of evenness between various groups. The distribution by project parties is 
shown in table C.2.3.  By looking at the table it can be observed that the estimate includes 
a fair number of answer elements that can be regarded as referring to more than one 
project party (the total number is significantly greater than the number of observed 
elements  681 elements for the basic interviews and 414 for the case interviews). This 
indicates that there are multiple interpretations of warnings. Clients and consultants have 
common warnings, as do consultants, suppliers, and contractors, early warnings that 
concern suppliers and contractors tend to be especially similar [Nikander-98]. 
 
Table C.2.3 
The Distribution of the Elements by Project Parties 
Project Party General Client Consultant Supplier Contractor Total 
 
Warnings      
Basic interviews 18.8 % 17.9 % 21.7 % 22.6 % 18.9 % 681 
Case interviews 3.4 % 34.1% 16.4 % 44.2 % Incl.prev. 414 
 
The Project Phase 
This analysis looked for the project phase or phases during which early warnings can be 
detected. The results may be influenced by the number and distribution of the questions. 
In this distribution, some concentration on the groups “whole project” and “engineering 
phase” exists; the possible explanations for this are discussed in the analysis of the cross-
tabulations. Table C.2.4 shows the distribution of the elements by project phase in the 
same manner as previously. There are 567 observations from the basic material and 421 
from the case material. 
Elements that can be linked to more than one category are present in this examination as 
well.  Their share of the total is much smaller than the respective share in the examination 
of element distribution by project parties [Nikander -98]. 
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Table C.2.4 
The Distribution of Elements by Project Phase 
 
The whole 
project 
Engineering 
phase 
Procurement 
phase 
Delivery 
phase 
Site phase No 
warnings 
Total 
Basic 
Interviews 
27.5 % 26.1 % 16.0 % 15.7 % 14.6 %  567 
Case  
Interviews 
12.4 % 51.1 % 9.5 % 14.7 % 10.2 % 2.1 % 421 
 
C.2.3 The Sources, Form of Manifestation, and Form of Occurrence of Early 
Warnings 
With the aid of the attributes “source,” “form of manifestation,” and “form of 
occurrence,” this study aims to determine what forms early warnings take and in what 
kinds of situations they can be detected. Categories of attributes were established during 
the analysis on the basis of the material. The material was analyzed separately for the 
sources and forms of manifestation of early warnings. These attributes are not 
independent of each other. On the basis of the analysis, the combinations that occur in 
practice were formed; these are in this study called forms of occurrence of early 
warnings. This study presents the results of the forms of occurrence in tabular form. The 
results have been discussed in greater detail in the study [Nikander -98]. 
Source 
The attribute “source” is related to the communications concept “sender.” In this study, 
however, the term “sender” is not used. This decision was based on the following 
reasons: a) the material includes numerous elements that are, according to the definition 
by [Åberg -93], messages without a conscious sender, and b) the material contains a 
considerable number of elements that can be considered to represent the act of making an 
observation or an internal inference. The attribute “source” indicates from whom the 
early warning is received or in what context the warning is detected. The potential 
sources of the elements analyzed from the material were used as a basis in determining 
the source of warnings [Nikander -98]. “A person,” in different forms, has been the 
source in 62 percent of the observations, while “documents” are sources in 25 percent 
(see table C.2.5). 
 
Table C.2.5 
The Sources of Warnings 
- a person;  an individual person 
- a group; a small group, a project group, a group of people 
- a firm; a business, an organization, a company 
- a document;  a document, a drawing 
- a situation,  an event, a situation at the site, a negotiation  
- not definable  
 
The Form of Manifestation 
This attribute indicates the form in which we detect early warnings. The attribute is close 
to the concept “means and forms of communication” presented by Wiio [-89]. Wiio [-89] 
first divides the means of communication into nonverbal communication and language. 
The studies of communication classify nonverbal communication in several different 
ways: such as 1) gesturing and pictorial representation; 2) representative communication, 
communication through a medium, message communication, time and distance 
communication and 3) auditory communication, signal language, motional 
communication and sensory communication [Wiio -89]. None of these classifications 
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describes well the early warning phenomenon examined during analysis in this study; 
therefore, a categorization somewhat divergent from that used in communications was 
selected for this study. 
 
Table C.2.6 
The Form of Manifestation of Warnings 
- verbal  speech  
- written   text, pictures (not only on paper) 
- non-verbal   behavior, gestures etc. 
- action   working 
- no warnings manifest 
 
The potential forms of manifestation indicated by the elements analyzed from the 
material comprise the basis of the form of manifestation (see [Webb -87] and [Nikander -
98]). The most common form of manifestation is action (34 percent), and the rarest is the 
non-verbal form. However, non-verbal form may not actually be rare; rather, it may 
indicate that the interviewees seldom detect them. 
Form of Occurrence 
The source and the form of manifestation of a warning are not mutually independent 
attributes. In this study their possible combinations are called the forms of occurrence of 
early warnings [Nikander -98]. The form of occurrence is in further analysis used as an 
attribute (in the cross-tabulations), even though the elements have been analyzed 
separately for both source and form of manifestation. Table C.2.7 shows the 
combinations that are possible in practice. 
 
Table C.2.7 
The Forms of Occurrence of Warnings 
- A person / verbal 
- A person / non-verbal 
- A person / action 
- A group / verbal 
- A group / non-verbal 
- A group / action 
- A firm / written 
- A firm / action 
- A document / written 
- A situation / action 
 
Table C.2.8 shows the distribution by form of occurrence of the elements analyzed by the 
researcher, when all analyzed alternatives are taken into account. Clearly the most 
common form of occurrence evident in the interviews is the “document/written” form. 
Other common forms are a “person/verbal” and “firm/action.” This result reflects both 
the areas to which the interviewees have paid attention and the forms of occurrence in 
which warnings are easy to detect (document/written). There are 838 such detections in 
the basic interviews and 365 in the case interviews. 
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Table C.2.8 
The Distribution of the Elements by Form of Occurrence 
Form of Person Person Person Group Group Group Firm Firm Doc. Situation Total 
Occurrence Verbal Non-
verbal 
Acti
on 
Verbal Non-
verbal 
Action Written ction Written. Action  
Basic 14.4 % 7.9 % 11.8 % 6.2 % 7.2 % 4.3 % 3.5 % 12.4 % 21.0 % 11.3 % 838 
Case 7.7 % 3.8 % 9.0 % 3.3% 6.3 % 14.0 % 0.5 % 35.6 % 18.9 % 0.8 % 365 
 
C.2.4 The Communicative Character of Early Warnings 
All of the early warning elements included in the study are such that they provide new 
information for the person who detects them. By doing this they fulfill part (1) of the 
definition of information found in [Wiio -89]: “information decreases the uncertainty 
about a given issue and diminishes the possible choices.” Similarly, they include an 
element of surprise and novelty (see Wiio -89, part (3) of the definition of information). 
The elements contain messages as defined by [Åberg -93], observations as discussed by 
[Wiio -89], as well as combinations or units that people instinctively and naturally see in 
events, according to Wiio. Various types of non-verbal messages, as well as verbal and 
written messages, are detected quite clearly (see table C.2.8). The characteristic noted by 
Wiio, “Information may be… the result of our own thought processes” [Wiio -89] can 
also be observed among the elements; this characteristic includes e.g. "gut feelings" and 
“reading between the lines.” 
In addition, the material appears to include so-called hidden information. It seems that 
people are not always capable or willing to verbalize their inklings and especially gut 
feelings; in some degree this may also apply to inexact early warnings. This possibly 
occurs in the categories “behavior of personnel,” “work on the project,” and 
“communication,” although it is difficult to analyze in detail. Naturally, the interviewees’ 
actual hidden information, which they have been unable or unwilling to express, cannot 
be explored.  
 [Åberg-93] emphasizes the multi-stimulied character of communication situations and 
encourages a holistic interpretation in accordance with his facet theory. This is well 
illustrated by the analysis of the elements: the element and the question with which it was 
related had to be processed together to better understand the information provided by the 
element. 
As noted in the discussion on the sources and forms of manifestation of elements, early 
warnings may have a kind of sender, and the concept of a “form of manifestation” is 
close to the concept of  “means and forms of communication” presented by [Wiio -89]. It 
can be concluded that the theories of communications effectively explain the nature of 
the detection of early warnings. 
 
C.3  The Cross Tabulation of the Attributes that Describe the 
Phenomenon 
General 
The study by Nikander [-98] discusses extensively the cross tabulation of attributes that 
describe the early warning phenomenon. That study examines a) the state of knowledge 
(strength) of the main groups of early warnings; b) the linking of the main groups of the 
warnings to the various project parties and phases; c) the forms of manifestation of the 
main groups of warnings; d) the links between the project parties and the project phases; 
e) the strength of the state of knowledge for different project parties and phases; f) the 
forms of occurrence for different project parties and phases and g) the state of knowledge 
(strength) of the forms of occurrence. The study uses only two-dimensional cross 
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tabulations. In tabulations with more dimensions, the number of elements in a single 
observation square remains very low. 
  
The State of Knowledge in the Main Groups, table C.3.1, appendix C 
Naturally, the “gut feelings” are the most inexact, i.e.  their state of knowledge belongs to 
the category of inklings; nevertheless, some border cases do occur. This seems that there 
can be overlap between them. Only the early warnings related to “project control and 
reporting” have an emphasis on exact information. The warnings in the groups 
“expressed by personnel” and “work on the project” focus slightly on inexact signs, 
although both groups include almost as many warnings that give clear information. An 
interesting detail is that the group “documents” also appears to provide inexact 
information. 
 
Table C.3.1 
Warning Signal Main Groups / State of Knowledge, Cross Tabulation 
"X" expressed small groups, under 3 observations. 
 
  The percent distribution of the answer elements   
  State of knowledge       
Warning signal main group Inklings Inexact Clear Exact No signal 
Gut feeling 4,6% 1,0%    
Expressed by personnel 1,7% 12,5% 11.5% 1.2% 0.9% 
Project manager, management 
 0,5% 0.9%   
Project planning 
 1,5% 2.7% 1.2% X 
Project control and reporting X 1,7% 1.7% 3.3%  
Work on the project X 4,5% 4.1%   
Communication 
 3,3% 4.6% 0,5 %  
Expressed by project parties 
 2,1% 5.7% 1.5% X 
Documents X 2,9% 9.3% 1.7%  
Differences in project culture X 1,9% 3.3% X  
External source 
  1.2% 1.2%  
Total 7,4% 32,1% 44.9% 11.7%   
 
Warnings Typical for Project Parties and Phases by Subgroups,  
tables C.3.3 and C.3.4, appendix C. 
This information aids the utilization of warnings to direct his attention to the warnings 
considered most common by the interviewees; these warnings can apparently also be 
considered the most commonly occurring ones. No significant focus on a specific party or 
phase is apparent in any of the main groups of warnings. Evenness seems to be typical for 
the tables. 
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The Main Groups of 
Warnings / Project Parties / 
Project Phase, table C.3.2, 
appendix C 
It seems that almost all of the 
main groups of warnings can 
be detected in each project 
party group and each project 
phase. This is true especially 
for the numerically largest 
early warning groups. No 
clear concentration on a 
project phase or party can be 
detected in any of the main 
groups of warnings. In 
addition, the table shows that 
the early warning group 
"expressed by project parties" 
(row) appears strongly in the 
"Client" column (5.2 %). This 
indicates that there may be a 
degree of overlap between 
these groups. 
 
Table C.3.2 
Warning Signal Main Groups / Project Parties / Project Phase, Cross Tabulation 
  Project party     Project phase       
Warning signal General Client Consul- Suppl- Contract- Whole Engin. Procur. Deliv. Site 
main group   tant ier or project phase phase phase phase 
Gut feeling 1.4% 
  
1.7% 1.4% 1.3% 3.3% 
  
0.9% 
    
Expressed by personnel 7.1% 4.0% 5.2% 4.4% 4.1% 9.8% 6.3% 4.0% 1.7% 3.0% 
Project manager, management 
  
0.7% 0.6% 
    
0.7% 0.5% 
      
Project planning 1.0% 
    
1.7% 1.1% 
  
1.2% 2.6% 1.2% 
  
Project control and reporting 
    
2.1% 3.3% 2.4% 
  
1.0% 2.6% 1.2% 3.1% 
Work on the project 2.1% 
  
1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 2.8% 
    
2.4% 
Communication 2.4% 2.6% 1.8% 1.1% 1.0% 5.1% 1.9% 1.2% 
    
Expressed by project parties 
  
5.2% 1.6% 
    
1.6% 3.8% 3.0% 1.6% 
  
Documents 1.7% 1.1% 4.8% 4.8% 4.3% 3.0% 4.7% 
  
5.2% 4.0% 
Differences in project culture 1.3% 
    
1.1% 
  
1.2% 1.2% 2.3% 
    
External source 
      
1,3% 
  
0.9% 
    
1.0% 
  
Difficult to detect 
      
1.1% 1.1% 
  
1.2% 
    
1.0% 
Total 18.6% 17.4% 21.6% 23.1% 19.3% 27.7% 24.8% 18.3% 14.5% 14.7% 
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Table C.3.3  
The Distributions of the Warning Signals Giving Information of the Project Parties, 
the Numerical Distribution of the Elements, Basic Material, pcs 
 
 Project parties        
 
Total General Client Client Consul- Cons. Contra- Suppl. Contra- Calculated 
Early Warning /   number signals  Cons. tant Suppl. ctor Contr. ctor number 
Signal Group        Contr.     
General Signals / Give Information of All 
Parties 
     
 
    
 Communication, overall 29 15 6 2 2 3  1  15 
 Conflict situations 15 10 2 1 1 1    10 
 Gut feeling 27 8 1 2 2 5 1 1  8 
 Talk behind the back 8 8        8 
 Initial information / lack of it 17 8  2 3 1 3   8 
 Mood, attitude 10 7   3     7 
 Commitment to the project 10 6 1  1 1 1   6 
 Redoing the same tasks 7 6      1  6 
 Passing things around, avoiding responsibility 7 5  1 1     5 
Information about the client 
         
 
 Communication, overall 29 15 6 2 2 3  1  23 
 Typical for the client / Decisions not received 15 
 15       15 
 Hints 16 2 4 6   1 3  12 
 Speaking frankly 9 2  7      9 
 Professional competence of personnel 9 4 3    1 1  7 
 Typical for the client / Withdrawal of trust 6 
  6      6 
 First contact, first impressions 11 4 2    4 1  6 
 Project terminology 7 4 2     1  6 
 No early signals procured 16 2 4   5  2 1 6 
 Non-verbal information 22 
 5   7 1 6 3 5 
 Project plans 9 2 3    4   5 
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 Other signals typical for the client 19 
 15 3      18 
  End users 5 
 3 1   1   4 
  Freezings 4 
 2 2      4 
  Highest management / CEO 4 
 4       4 
  Further inquiries, additional information 3 
 3       3 
  Purchases 3 
 3       3 
Information about the consultant           
 Communication, overall 29 15 6 2 2 3  1  22 
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 2 1 1 1 17 4 2 3 21 
 Gut feeling 27 8 1 2 2 5 1 1  17 
 Initial information / lack of it 17 8  2 3 1 3   14 
 Progress control 18 4 1 1 1 6 2 3  12 
 Speaking frankly 9 2  7      9 
 Initiating work (how it is done) 20 1   6 1 1 8 3 8 
 No early warnings procured 16 2 4   5  2 1 7 
 Personnel turnover 7 
 
 
 6  1   6 
 Withdrawal of trust 6 
 
 6      6 
Information about the Contractor / Supplier           
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 2 1 1 1 17 4 2 3 28 
 Non-verbal information 22 
 
5   7 1 6 3 17 
 Progress control 18 4 1 1 1 6 2 3  15 
 Initiating work (how it is done) 20 1   6 1 1 8 3 14 
 Control, in total 16 
 
  3 2 5 4 2 13 
 No early warnings procured 16 2 4   5  2 1 10 
 Bid material 9 2    1  4 2 9 
 First contact, first impressions 11 4 2    4 1  9 
 Supplier / Contractor / Advance billing 10 
 
  2 
 2 2 4 8 
 External source 14 1 2 1   4 2  7 
 Project plans 9 2 3    4   6 
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Table C.3.4 
Warning Signals Typical for a Project Phase, 
Numerical Distribution of the Elements, Basic Material 
 
Total Project phase    
Early Warning Signal Group number Engineer- Procure- Deliv- Const. Whole 
Engineering phase in material ing ment ery site project 
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 22 7 22 21 3 
 Initial information / lack of it 17 14 6 9 5 5 
 Decisions not received 15 13 13 6 6 6 
 Progress control 18 11 6 10 12 3 
 Mood, attitude 10 10 8 7 7 7 
 Speaking frankly 9 9 2 2 8 2 
 Commitment 10 9 8 9 8 8 
Procurement phase       
 Non-verbal information 22 3 18 1 2 1 
 Decisions not received 15 13 13 6 6 6 
 First contact, first impressions 11 3 10 3 2 2 
Delivery phase       
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 22 7 22 21 3 
 Reporting 15 7 6 12 6 6 
 Progress control 18 11 6 10 12 3 
 Commitment to the project 10 9 8 9 8 8 
Site phase       
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 22 7 22 21 3 
 Initiating work (how it is done) 20 7 1 2 13 1 
 Control, in total 16 3 0 6 9  
All phases       
 Communication, overall 29 4 4   19 
 Gut feeling 27     16 
 Conflict situations 15 2    13 
 Hints 16 2 1   10 
 Commitment to the project 10 1    8 
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The Main Groups of Warnings / 
Form of Occurrence, table C.3.5 , 
appendix C 
The cross tabulation concerning the 
“main groups of early warnings/form 
of occurrence” is still under 
examination. The material appears to 
include some focus that is in 
accordance with the 20/80 rule on 
certain combinations of “main group of 
warnings / form of occurrence.” Empty 
squares appear in the table only in 
small main groups. The largest 
combination group is 
“documents/written form” and the 
second largest is the “expressed by 
personnel/verbal”. 
 The state of knowledge contained by 
different forms of occurrence 
apparently varies to some extent, 
though not very greatly. Relatively the 
most exact information seems to be 
provided by the combination 
“document/written form”, and the most 
inexact by  “people/non-verbal form” 
[Nikander -98]. There seems to be a 
strong relationship between early 
warning main group  
 
"Expressed by personnel" and form of occurrence groups "person /xxx" and "group/xxx". This is very 
natural because human being must be the sender of messages.  The natural relationship is also between 
early warnings group "document" and form of occurrence group "document/written". In both situations 
there can be  degree of overlap. 
 
 
Table C.3.5 
Cross Tabulation of Early Warning Signal Main Groups / Forms of Occurrence, Basic Material 
  Form of occurrence       
 
 Person Person Person Group Group Group Firm Firm Docum. Situat. 
Warning signal main group verbal non-v, Action verbal non-v. Action Written Action Written Action 
 
Gut feeling  1,3%   1.2%     1.0% 
 
Expressed by personnel 5.0% 3,8% 4,3% 2.9% 4.5% 1.9% 0.6% 3.7% 1.0% 1.4% 
 
Project manager, management  0,6%         
 
Project planning 0.8%        2.7%  
 
Project control and reporting         3.0% 2.0% 
 
Work on the project        1.3% 1.7% 2.6% 
 
Communication 3.5%   1.7%     1.5%  
 
Expressed by project parties 1.9%  3.0%     3.3% 1.2% 1.7% 
 
Documents         7.1% 1.1% 
 
Differences in project cultures 1.1%      0.7% 1.3% 1.2%  
 
External source 0.6%       0.7%   
 
Difficult to detect           
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The Project Parties / Project Phases, table C.3.6 , appendix C 
These elements are distributed quite naturally. Warnings that refer to all parties are most 
common during the whole project. Warnings that refer to the client and the consultant are 
mostly apparent during the engineering phase, when the other parties take little part in the 
activities. The warnings referring to the supplier occur mostly during the delivery and site 
phases, whereas those referring to the contractor are manifest during the site phase 
[Nikander-98]. 
 
 
Table C.3.6 
Cross Tabulation of Project Parties / Project Phase 
 
Project phase 
   
 Whole Engineer. Procurem. Delivery Site 
Project party project phase phase phase phase 
General 11,0% 2,2% 1,2% 
  
Client 3,6% 7,6% 4,5% 
 
1,0% 
Consultant 4,3% 8,7% 1,8% 4,6% 4,4% 
Supplier 2,5% 3,6% 3,5% 7,2% 6,2% 
Contractor 2,4% 3,1% 3,4% 3,6% 7,5% 
 
 
Form of Occurrence / Project Party, table C.3.7 , appendix C 
 Information about the client is received from the activities of the company and from 
discussions between people. Information about the consultant comes from written 
documents, discussions, and the activities of the company. Information regarding the 
supplier is provided by discussions, written documents, and activities in different 
situations. The distribution of the early warnings regarding the contractor is very similar 
to that of the warnings regarding the supplier [Nikander-98]. 
 
Table C.3.7 
Cross Tabulation of Project Party / Form of Occurrence of Warning Signal 
  
Form of occurrence 
       
  
Person Person Person Group Group Group Firm Firm Docum. Situation 
Project party verbal non-v. action verbal non-v. action written action written action 
 
All parties 2.6% 1.8% 2.0% 2.3% 3.1% 1.3% 
 
1.0% 4.1% 2.4% 
 
Client 3.6% 1.7% 2.5% 1.1% 
  
1.0% 3.3% 2.8% 1.5% 
 
Consultant 2.7% 1.7% 2.4% 1.4% 1.3% 
  
2.8% 5.7% 2.1% 
 
Supplier 3.1% 1.4% 2.5% 
    
2.7% 6.1% 3.0% 
 
Contractor 2.5% 1.3% 1.8% 
    
1.8% 5.3% 2.8% 
 
Total 14.5% 7.9% 11.3% 5.8% 6.0% 3.9% 3.2% 11.6% 24.1% 11.8% 
 
Inklings and Project Experience 
This research endeavored to find out whether the “sensitivity” of different persons to 
inkling-type early warnings (such as gut feelings) is in any way related to their project 
experience or to their attitude toward the early warnings phenomenon. This was 
measured through calculating a weighted average from the interviewees’ answers, so that 
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inklings were assigned a weight of 4, inexact signals a weight of 3, clear signals 2 and 
exact signals 1. If questions prompted the interviewee to respond that no early warning 
could be procured of the subject of the question, this answer was assigned a weight of -1. 
It was noted that there seemed to be very little correlation between the averages and the 
attitudes or project experience of interviewees; no conclusions should be drawn on the 
basis of this weak correlation, especially as the material is so limited. The meager 
differences can apparently be explained by the fact that all interviewees clearly had 
project experience, compared to someone who has not been previously engaged in project 
work. All the interviewees can be considered to possess a certain level of expertise. 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 7.1.2  
The Distribution of the Elements by Project Problem Group, Basic Material 
       Result of Analysis    
Project problem, main group Question Interviewee One  Primary Several 
 Problem, subgroup group reports problem problem problem problems 
  
 
elem. % elem. % elem. % elem. % elem. % 
General, open questions 42 .9%         
Schedule problem, delay, time 45 9.6% 53 10.3 % 46 18.1 % 70 15.3 % 137 19.0 % 
Cost problem 28 5.9% 34 6.6 % 23 9.1 % 33 7.2 % 37 5.1 % 
Delivery or performance problem     34 13.4 % 50 10.9 % 63 8.8 % 
Project environment 117 24.8% 126 24.6 % 12 4.7 % 12 2.6 % 12 1.7 % 
 External factors no answers         
 Consultant’s problems 46 9.8% 46 9.0 % 12  12  12  
 Supplier’s problems 27 5.7% 35 6.8 %       
 Contractor’s problems 44 9.3% 45 8.8 %       
Ambiguous objectives 13 2.8%       14 1.9 % 
Client  57 12.1% 58 11.3 %       
 Absence of the support of (upper) 
management 
    2 0.8 % 6 1.3 % 6 0.8 % 
Management problems, in total 38 8.1% 64 12.5 % 9 3.5 % 79 17.3 % 135 18.8 % 
 Management, in general         79  
 Difficulties in decision-making         12  
 Lack of trust as a problem         28  
 Cooperation problems         6  
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Project manager as a person 14 3.0% 22 4.3 % 25 9.8 % 25 5.5 % 25 3.5 % 
 Organization / personnel group           
 Erroneous organization 15 3.2% 15 2.9 %     15  
Personnel problems, in total 19 4.0%   24 9.4 % 42 9.2 % 51 7.1 % 
 Personnel problems, in general   20 3.9 % 18  19  22  
 Resources     6  23  29  
Project planning, in total 25 5.3%   24 9.4 % 27 5.9 % 41 5.7 % 
 Project planning, in general   22 4.3 % 23  23  24  
 Problems with purchases     1  4  10  
Communication  30 6.4% 31 6.0 % 12 4.7 % 30 6.6 % 36 5.0 % 
Engineering   7 1.4 % 4 1.6 % 24 5.3 % 53 7.4 % 
Financial issues   17 3.3 % 18 7.1 % 28 6.1 % 44 6.1 % 
Differences in project culture as a problem 28 5.9% 31 6.0 % 8 3.1 % 31 6.8 % 31 4.3 % 
Not definable   13 2.5 % 13 5.1 %   20 2.8 % 
  Total 471  513  254  457  720  
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Table 7.2.3 
Cross Tabulation of Early Warning Signals / Project Problem Main Groups, Basic Material 
 Early warning signal, main group        
 Gut Expressed by  Project Project Project Work on the Commu- Expressed Documents Differences External Difficult to  
Project problem, main group feeling personnel manager planning control project nication by parties  in proj. cult.  source detect total 
Schedule problem, delay, time  3.5%  1.1% 4.2% 3.6%  2.9% 2.1%    19.0% 
Cost problem     1.3%    1.1%  0.4%  5.1% 
Delivery or performance problem  2.9%  1.4%  1.3%       8.8% 
Project environment, consultant    0.3%     0.6%    1.7% 
Ambiguous objectives  0.6%           1.9% 
Client, absence of support of mgmt        0.4%     0.8% 
Management problems, in general 0.7% 5.8%    1.4% 3.9% 2.6% 1.1% 1.3%  0.4% 18.8% 
Project manager as a person  1.8% 0,7%          3.5% 
Organization / personnel group   1.1%           2.1% 
Personnel problems, in total  4.6%           7.1% 
Project planning, in total         3.2%    5.7% 
Communication       1.9%  1.0%    5.0% 
Engineering  1.1%    1.8%  2.4%     7.4% 
Financial issues  2.5%      1.3%   0.8%  6.1% 
Differences in project culture as a 
problem 
 1.3%        1.8%   4.3% 
Not definable 1.1%           0.6% 2.8% 
Total 1.8 % 25.2 % 0.7 % 2.8 % 5.5 % 8.1 % 5.8 % 9.6 % 9.1 % 3.1 % 1.2 % 1.0 %  
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Table 7.2.4 
Cross Tabulation of Early Warning Signals / Project Problem Main Groups, Case Projects 
 Warning signal main group           
 Gut Expressed by Proj. mgr Project Project Work on the Communi- Expr. by Docu- Differ. External No Small  
Project problem main group feeling personnel mgmt planning control project cation parties ments proj.cult. source warning groups total 
Schedule problem, delay, time 0.4% 1.2%  0.8% 1.3% 1.0%  0.8% 3.1%    0.6% 9.8% 
Cost problem    2.5%          5.0% 
Delivery or performance problem  3.3% 1.5% 4.8% 2.3%  1.7% 2.9% 3.5% 1.5% 0.8% 0.2% 1.5% 24.6% 
Project environment, consultant  1.7%            2.9% 
Ambiguous objectives               
Client, absence of mgmt support               
Management problems, in total 1.0% 6.9% 1.5% 1.0%  1.5%  2.9% 1.5% 4.0%   0.8% 22.1% 
Project manager as a person  1.3% 1.7%           3.3% 
Organization / personnel group      0.4%        0.8% 
Personnel problems, in total              2.1% 
Project planning, in total               
Communication       0.6%       0.8% 
Engineering 0.8% 6.9% 1.9% 2.7% 1.3% 5.0% 1.2% 2.5% 1.9% 2.3% 0.2%  1.0% 27.7% 
Financial issues  0.4%            0.6% 
Differences in project cultures as a 
problem 
     0.2%        0.2% 
Not definable            0.2%  0.2% 
Total 2.3% 22.7% 7.9% 12.5% 5.4% 9.8% 4.6% 9.4% 11.2% 8.8% 1.2% 0.4% 3.8% 100.0% 
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Figure 7.5 Warning Signals of Delivery Problems and Causes Related to Them 
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Figure 7.6  Warning Signals of Cost Problems and Causes Related to Them  
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Figure 7.7  Warning Signals of Engineering Problems and Causes Related to Them  
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Figure 7.8 Warning Signals of Personnel Problems and Causes Related to Them 
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Table 7.4.1  
Early Warning Signal Groups / Project Problem Groups, in More Detail, Basic Material 
Early warning Nmbr Project problem groups          
signal groups of Sche- Cost Delivery Manag- Proj. Organ- Pers- Proj. Comm- Engin- Fin- Proj. 
   elem. dule   ement mgr ization onnel plann. unication eering ancial cult. 
Expressed by personnel 125             
 Non-verbal information 22 4  13    1    8  
 Personnel behavior 83             
  Personnel behavior in general 13 4  6 2       7  
  Mood, attitude 10    4   4      
  Conflict situations 15 2   4   3      
  Talk behind backs 8    1   4      
  Passing things back and forth 7 6   4   2      
  Speaking frankly 9    7         
  Commitment 10 2   6   7      
  Formation of cliques 4    1   3      
  Authority disputes 3    1         
  Making excuses 4 2   1   2      
 Personnel turnover 7 3   2   5    2  
 Professional competence 9   2 3       1  
 Miscellaneous warning signals 4 2   5   2      
Project planning              
 Project plans 9   2          
 Bid material 9   6          
 Contract 8   2          
Project control and reporting 39             
 Progress control 18 17            
 Control, in total 16 13            
 Budget corrections 5             
Work on the project 44             
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 Initiating work (how it is done) 20 12   4      2   
 Initial information / lack of it 17 8   2      10   
 Redoing the same tasks 7 6   4      1   
Communication 45             
 Communication, in general 29    18     13    
 Hints  16    10     1    
Expressed by project parties 50             
 Typical for the client 40             
  Decisions not received 15 2   9      8   
  Withdrawal of trust 6    6         
  End users 5 4         4   
  Freezings 4 2   2      4   
  Absence of mgmt support 4             
  Further inquiries, add. info 3 2   1      1   
  Purchases 3             
 Supplier / Contractor 10 1            
Documents 63             
 Reporting 15 6            
 Schedule, quality, receiving 31 8       21     
 Technical plans 7 1            
 Incorrect revisions 3             
 Ambiguous responsibilities 4        1     
 Miscellaneous warning signals 3        1     
Differences and deficiencies in 
project culture 
23             
 First contact, first impression 11            5 
 Project terminology 7            6 
 Lack of experience 4            1 
 Miscellaneous warning signals 1            1 
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Appendix E 
 
Analysis of the Problem Situations in the Case Projects 
The study analyzes the problem situations in the case projects both by project and by 
problem; similar problem situations have been grouped together in the results. Due to 
anonymity requirements the case projects have not been named. A summary of the 
problem situations is presented below. 
In addition, this appendix looks at the type of impact different problems have had on 
the project, the amount of time available for responses and the promptness with which 
responses have been undertaken. The problems may have affected the project either as 
fairly long-standing single impacts (e.g. for a few months) or as chronic problems 
throughout the project. The amount of time available had to be inferred afterwards on the 
basis of the manner in which responses were adopted in different problem situations. 
Scheduling Problems 
All of the projects contained scheduling problems, some serious and some easier to 
solve. There were a total of eight significant scheduling problems, though only one 
project was substantially delayed. Most of the scheduling problems seem to have been in 
areas that either suppliers or contractors could influence. The project management of the 
client could influence the improvement of the situation indirectly. 
Schedule problems consisted mainly of one-time problems spanning a few weeks or 
few months, though they did include some problems with a more extended period of 
impact. Responses were usually embarked on promptly, even at the first signs of a 
problem. The actual time available varied greatly. 
Time control reporting provided the warnings for the scheduling problems. In about 
half of the situations the situation came as more or less of a surprise to the project 
management. In the cases where the client’s project management had the decision-
making power and where the problems were detected sufficiently early, the response was 
to augment the project plans (make additional plans). The results were also successful. In 
the cases where the client’s project management had no direct decision-making power (as 
was the case with all problems of the supplier and contractor) the client’s project 
management was only able to negotiate and to try to put pressure on the party concerned. 
The scope and character of the responses was completely dependent on the decisions of 
the concerned party. As for the whole project, the client’s project management was 
generally only able to make alterations in the schedule. The client also negotiated with 
those suppliers and contractors whose work would apparently be affected by the 
impending delay. Especially in cases where the impending delay was a surprise, very 
little could be done to avert that delay. 
Delivery or Performance Problems 
Delivery problems differ from scheduling problems in that they also include various 
types of technical problems. The scheduling problems of equipment suppliers and 
contractors could also be classified as delivery problems. Delivery problems were the 
second most common type of problem in the case projects; they were present in each 
project in some form. There were a total of four delivery problems of a more serious 
kind. The detection and character of delivery problems were very similar to those of 
scheduling problems. 
Cost-Related Problems 
There was only one serious cost-related problem. This problem had a chronic impact 
throughout the project it appeared in, and repeated efforts to find an appropriate response 
only succeeded close to the end of the project. The time available for responses is 
difficult to determine in this case as the problem had such a long-term impact.  
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Though other projects did not encounter cost-related problems on a similar scale, all 
of them were nevertheless faced with the need to cut costs, especially as the project was 
drawing to a close. In these cases, the impending cost overrun was discovered through 
cost management reports. The threat of a serious cost overrun was apparent in a very 
early stage to project experts who critically examined that project: the basis of the design 
of the cost estimate proved weak. The reason for this can be found in the inexperience of 
the client’s project management; however, the client’s project management was not able 
or willing to correct the matter. 
Lack of Experience in Projects 
In three projects it was noted that the client did not have sufficient experience in 
projects of the type in question. This became apparent immediately in the initiation phase 
of the project, or even earlier in the preliminary planning phase in the context of 
negotiations with the consultant. This problem type had a chronic impact throughout the 
project in all cases. Responses were adopted immediately, and the time available is 
therefore considered to have been very limited. 
In two cases the client took measures to recruit reinforcements to his organization; 
these projects also attempted to provide training for the inexperienced personnel. Both 
cases contained organizational difficulties, but the project personnel endeavored to learn 
and to cooperate. The final results of both projects were excellent.  
In one case, there was unwillingness to recognize the problems, and the later attempts 
to reinforce the organization were not very effective. The organization of this project 
proved complicated from the start and various conflicts arose. The consistently greatest 
problem was that the client’s project management refused to admit their inexperience; all 
of this finally resulted in very poor results. It can be said that the client’s staff had no 
project culture nor did they strive to create one during the project.  
Differences in Project Cultures 
In a few projects it was noted immediately during initiation that there would be 
substantial differences of opinion between the parties regarding project culture. The 
differences were apparent in the first negotiations and to some extent even in the 
preliminary planning phase. The impact of this problem type was felt chronically throughout 
the project in all projects.  In one of the projects, management endeavored to minimize the 
impact of the differences with periodical training of the personnel and common 
negotiations. In the other projects the differences were between firms and nothing could 
be done about them. During the project the personnel tried to adjust to the situation and to 
understand the viewpoints of the other party. 
Management Problems 
Naturally, management problems were present in some form in all of the projects, 
though they were very mild in two of them. All projects that encountered this type of 
problem were affected by it throughout their duration, which makes it difficult to speak 
of time available for responses. The gravest problem was the managerial style of the 
client’s project management in one of the projects; this was due to the personality of the 
manager in question. The people who were acquainted with the manager in advance 
apparently already knew the problem; others soon discovered it through e.g. the contents 
of the procurement contract and the way in which this contract was made. In another 
project, the client had decision-making problems that were experienced as rather difficult; 
this resulted from the decision-making culture of the particular company. Attempts were 
made to ameliorate the problem by forging personal contacts with the decision-makers, 
but the problem caused significant distress and anxiety to the management. 
Engineering Problems 
Three quite different cases can be considered to have encountered engineering 
problems of a more serious kind. These problems had a very short-term, one-time impact. 
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Time available is considered to have been short and responses were undertaken without 
delay. In one of the cases, a hint was received from another contractor, but the situation 
itself came as a surprise. In another case, the problem was completely unforeseen by the 
management. In a third case, engineering problems could be expected since the 
implementation of the project was consciously launched with very inadequate plans. As 
the problems were within the sphere of the supplier, the only measure that could be taken 
was to negotiate, which was immediately done by the project management. In the cases 
where the problems arose in areas that the project management could influence, 
additional engineering was immediately instituted or engineering resources were 
increased.   
Organizational Problems 
The first project was plagued throughout its duration by chronic difficulties that could 
be classified as organizational problems; they were mainly related to the authority of the 
project manager, who never received sufficient decision-making power, resulting in 
unusual managerial relations. Attempts were made to remove the problem through project 
guidelines, but this was unsuccessful. In the end the problem did not hamper the project, 
apparently because the project personnel was very experienced and found the correct 
working procedures independently. The project created a project culture particular to 
itself.  
The second project encountered a very short-term, one-time organizational problem, 
which was corrected without delay. The time available was very brief. 
Personnel Problems 
Severe conflicts among the personnel occurred in only one of the projects. These 
problems were chronic in nature and affected the project for its whole duration. They can 
be considered to have arisen quite surprisingly and little could be done about them, which 
means that the time available cannot be precisely assessed.  There was no willingness or 
opportunity to institute e.g. changes in personnel. 
Resource Problems 
One of the specific personnel problems is a resource problem, which had long-term 
adverse effects. Resource problems occurred in one project on several levels of 
engineering and management. Signs of these problems were quickly discovered in the 
early phases of the project. In some cases, responses were embarked upon promptly, 
while in others no visible responses were undertaken (though there may have been 
internal discussions of which the present researcher has no information). That the project 
management did not always respond forcefully is perhaps partly explained by the fact 
that the problem was in the area of subprojects. The problems caused a problem chain, 
which in turn caused a number of delivery problems (delays), though the most significant 
results were only apparent in a follow-up project. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since prehistoric times, man’s activities have included project-
type undertakings.  The emergence of Concurrent Engineering has 
made growing demands on project management. The classic 
project management methods are often slow: problems may 
already exist when those methods are applied. The research 
examines the background of Ansoff’s theory, the way in which 
project theories treat project problems, the causes of problems, and 
possible early warnings.  
The research shows that signals, messages that comply with 
communications theory can be found in the project environment. 
These signals are always to some degree inaccurate. The 
relationship between early warnings, project problems, and 
problem causes is investigated; the dependence network designed 
of these three factors plus the responses they require furnishes 
some of the most important data for further utilization. The study 
designs a fundamental model for the utilization of the early 
warnings phenomenon. 
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